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The research on the topology and dynamics of complex networks is one of the most focused
area in complex system science. The goals are to structure our understanding of the real-world so-
cial, economical, technological, and biological systems in the aspect of networks consisting a large
number of interacting units and to develop corresponding detection, prediction, and control strate-
gies. In this highly interdisciplinary field, my research mainly concentrates on universal estimation
schemes, physical controllability, as well as mechanisms behind extreme events and cascading fail-
ure for complex networked systems.
Revealing the underlying structure and dynamics of complex networked systems from observed
data without of any specific prior information is of fundamental importance to science, engineer-
ing, and society. We articulate a Markov network based model, the sparse dynamical Boltzmann
machine (SDBM), as a universal network structural estimator and dynamics approximator based on
techniques including compressive sensing and K-means algorithm. It recovers the network structure
of the original system and predicts its short-term or even long-term dynamical behavior for a large
variety of representative dynamical processes on model and real-world complex networks.
One of the most challenging problems in complex dynamical systems is to control complex net-
works. Upon finding that the energy required to approach a target state with reasonable precision
is often unbearably large, and the energy of controlling a set of networks with similar structural
properties follows a fat-tail distribution, we identify fundamental structural “short boards” that play
a dominant role in the enormous energy and offer a theoretical interpretation for the fat-tail distri-
bution and simple strategies to significantly reduce the energy.
Extreme events and cascading failure, a type of collective behavior in complex networked sys-
tems, often have catastrophic consequences. Utilizing transportation and evolutionary game dy-
i
namics as prototypical settings, we investigate the emergence of extreme events in simplex complex
networks, mobile ad-hoc networks and multi-layer interdependent networks. A striking resonance-
like phenomenon and the emergence of global-scale cascading breakdown are discovered. We de-
rive analytic theories to understand the mechanism of control at a quantitative level and articulate
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1. A Schematic Illustration of SDBM Structure Reconstruction. (a) Connection recon-
struction of the red node in a complex network with 20 nodes. The connections
of the network is completely unknown, thus the red node could be potentially con-
nected with any other node, as shown by the orange dashed links. After the com-
pressive sensing process [see (c)] and the K-means clustering [see Fig.8] for this
node with the dynamical process data of the system, its true connections are de-
tected, marked by the red links. The link weights and the node bias are represented
by vector VN×1 in (c). (b) All the network connections are recovered by running
the process shown in (a) for each node. The Markov blanket of the red node in
(a) consists all its nearest neighbors, shown as the nodes with dashed red circles.
(c) A schematic illustration of the compressive sensing framework for connection
detection, formulated by Eq. (2.9). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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Figure Page
2. Solution Examples of Compressive Sensing and the Corresponding K-Means Clus-
tering Results. The compressive sensing solutions (green squares) are compared,
element-wise, with the true element values of the original connection vectors (dark
purple triangles), where the x-axis is the index of nodes with different degree values
for different network topologies and dynamics types. The target nodes and the cor-
rectly detected existent connections via the K-means are marked as light blue and
light purple bars, respectively. The false negative and the false positive estimations
are marked as red and gray bars, respectively. For all cases, the amount of linear
measurements is M = 0.4N . The restriction on Hamming distances is set to be
Γ = 0.35 for all examples, and a small change in Γ would not affect the qualitative
results. (a) A node with the smallest degree k = 2 in a BA scale-free network of
size N = 100 and average degree 〈k〉 = 4 with SDBM dynamics. (b) The node
of the largest degree k = 18 in the same network. (c) A node of degree k = 8 in
an ER random network of size N = 100 and average degree 〈k〉 = 4 with SDBM
dynamics. (d) The node with the largest degree k = 19 in a BA scale-free net-
work of size N = 100 and average degree 〈k〉 = 4 with prisoner’s dilemma game
(PDG) dynamics. (e) A node of degree k = 11 in a real-world social network of
size N = 67 subject to CP dynamics. (f) A node of degree k = 10 in a real-world
electrical circuit network of sizeN = 122 with Language model dynamics. In (d-f),
the element values of the original connection vector are set to unity since no true
weight values are given. For cases (a,b,c,f), there are no false negative detections,
i.e., all existent links have been successfully detected. For cases (a,c,e), there are no
false positive detections, i.e., no non-existent links are mistaken as existent ones. A
detailed description of the dynamical processes is given in Tab. 1. . . . . . . . . . 19
xvi
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3. Structural Estimation Success Rates and Parameter Estimation Errors Versus the
Normalized Data Amount. For SDBM dynamics on (a) ER-random and (b) BA
scale-free networks, the success rates of detection of existent links and identifica-
tion of nonexistent links, 1 − R1e (green circles) and 1 − R0e (white circles), re-
spectively, versus the normalized data amount M/N with error bars. The absolute
values of the errors in estimating the link weights and the nodal biases for the ex-
istent links (purple squares) and non-existent links (white squares) are also shown.
Most data points have quite small error bars, indicating the performance stability of
our method. High performance structural and parameter estimations are achieved
insofar asM/N exceeds about 10%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4. A Schematic Illustration of SDBM Parameter Estimation. (a) The parameter es-
timation framework for the corresponding SDBM of the same system shown in
Fig. 1 (a,b). It is formulated by Eq. (2.11). The connections of the network are
already known via the structure reconstruction step, and thus the entries are only
obtained from a node’s Markov blanket [shown in Fig. 1(b)]. This calculation is
implemented for each node in the system. (b) The values of the link weights and
the node biases (shown as different colors) for the corresponding SDBM are cal-
culated via the parameter estimation scheme in (a) and the degree guided solution
substitution operation (see Materials and Methods). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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5. Comparison Between the Conditional Probability of the Original System and That
Generated Via the Reconstructed SDBM. (a) Conditional probability P [xi(t+1) =
1|XRi (t)] versus time t for the original system with SDBM dynamics for a BA-scale
free network and (b) the reconstructed approximator using the configuration time
series of the original system, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N (the y-axis) and 1 ≤ t ≤ T (the
x-axis). (c) Time series of the conditional probability P [xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)]
for the original system with SIS dynamics for a BA-scale free network and (d) the
reconstructed approximator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6. Distributions of the Conditional Probability Estimation Errors for Various Com-
plex Network Dynamics. The distributions of δ = |P [xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)] −
P est[xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)]| for the dynamical processes in categories I to V from
Table 1 for ER random (green bars) and BA scale-free (blue bars) networks, where
P est[xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)] denotes the conditional probability estimated from the
corresponding SDBM approximator through the original state configuration times
series, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and 1 ≤ t ≤ T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
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7. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the
Approximator Using the Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series. (a,d),
(b,e), and (c,f): the conditional probability P [xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)] time series
generated from the original state configuration time series (upper panel) and from
the SDBM approximator using the state configuration time series generated by itself
(lower panel) for SQ-SG, SIS, and Voter dynamics on ER random networks, respec-
tively. (g,h,i) The mean and standard deviations of p = P [xi(t+1) = 1|XRi (t)] for
each node i for all time steps for SQ-SG (g), SIS (h), and Voter dynamics (i), respec-
tively, on ER random networks, calculated from the original system (red circles) and
the approximator (blue squares), where 1 ≤ i ≤ N (the x-axis). . . . . . . . . . . . 38
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8. A Schematic Illustration of the K-Means Algorithm for a 2-Dimensional Data Clus-
tering Task. (a) The data points (solid blue circles) in a 2-D feature space to be
clustered. It can be visually distinguished that there are three clusters, thus K = 3.
The K-means algorithm will assign each data point into one of the three clusters.
(b) Randomly guess 3 cluster center locations (aqua, green, and red hollow circles),
and each data point finds out which center it’s closet to. (c) The 2-D space is di-
vided into three regions by three decision boundaries (black dashed lines), each
containing the corresponding data points whose closest center is within this region.
The data points currently in the regions with the corresponding aqua, green, and
red centers are assigned to the aqua, green, and red clusters, respectively. At this
stage, data points may be assigned to a cluster that it visually does not belong to.
(d) Each center moves to the centroid of the data points currently assigned to it. (e)
The updated cluster assignments of the data points are obtained according to the
new center locations (movements are shown by the black arrows). The steps in (c)
and (d) are repeated until convergence. (f) The final cluster assignments. Different
from this illustration, the compressive sensing solutions of the link weights wij are
1-dimensional data points, which form two clusters in 1-D space, corresponding to
the existent and non-existent links, respectively. (We use the 2-D case to illustrate
the K-means algorithm instead of 1-D, due to the representation difficulty in the 1-D
case.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
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9. An Example of Our Proposed Degree Guided Solution Substitution Operation and
Final Equation Group Construction. The target node 1 has only two neighbors,
nodes 2 and 3. Without loss of generality, we set k3 < k1 = 2 < k2 so that the
link weight between nodes 1 and 3, w13, is already obtained. The quantity P
MB
s =
ln(1/〈x1(t + 1)〉s − 1) (s = 1, . . . , 4, as 2k1 = 4 possible (x2, x3) configurations
exist in total) denotes the estimated probability for x1 = 1 under configuration s
at the next time step. The occurring probabilities of the corresponding (x2, x3)
configurations are listed as percentages in the left column of each panel. (a) All the
four (x2, x3) configurations are shown by the first two columns of the 4× 3 matrix
in the equation. (b) The contribution of the known w13 and the configurations of
x3 as marked in (a) are moved to the left-hand side of the equation. (c) In order to
solve for (w12, b1)
T, the two most precise PMBs values (s = 2 and 4) corresponding
to the most frequent (x2, x3) configurations from (b) are chosen to build a linear
2-equation group. However, the 2 × 2 matrix on the right-hand side does not have
full rank and, hence, this equation group is ill defined (d) Configurations s = 1
and 2 are selected to construct a 2-equation group with a full rank 2 × 2 matrix on
the right-hand side with relatively precise probability estimations, and this equation
group is used to solve (w12, b1)
T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
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10. Schematic Illustrations of a Multi-Layer, Interdependent Network and the Com-
pressing Sensing Approach of Solving the Interdependent Connection Structure.
(a) A 3-layer interdependent network with 8 nodes in each layer. Nodes i11 and i12
are the bridge nodes in layer 1; nodes i21, i22, and i23 are the bridge nodes in layer 2;
and nodes i31, i32, and i33 are the bridge nodes in layer 3. The interdependent node
pairs are i11 and i32, i12 and i22, i21 and i31, and i23 and i33. (b) A schematic illus-
tration of Eq. 3.2. The numbers of rows and columns only have schematic meaning.
The number of time instances selected (the number of rows of Uˆi andW
′
i) is usually
much smaller than the length of vector in a typical compressive sensing setting. The
colored parts of matrix W′i and vector A
′
i corresponds to the inner-layer connec-
tions of layerm, while the black-and-white parts corresponds to the interdependent
connections between layer m and the bridge nodes in all other layers. Using (a) as
an example, if m = 2 and i = i21, then the black-and-white components in (b) are
corresponding to the possible interdependencies between node i = i21 and nodes
q = i11, i12, i31, i32, and i33. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
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11. Bridge Node Identification and Interdependencies Reconstruction. (a1,a2,a3) The
standard deviations of the compressive sensing solution Ai for each node i within
layer 1 (a1), 2 (a2), layer 3 (a3), respectively. The interdependent multiplex struc-
ture adopted in this example contains 3 layers, each of which is built in ER-random
topology with Nm = 50 nodes (m = 1, 2, and 3) and average degree 〈k〉 = 4.
The x-axis denotes the node index, and the y-axis denotes the standard deviation σ
for each corresponding node. The threshold σc = 10
−3 is used in our calculation,
and the light purple bars marks identified the bridge nodes (BN). (b1,b2,b3) The
colormap of the augmented connection vector A′i for each node i in layer 1 (a1), 2
(a2), and 3 (a3). The x-axis show the index i, and the entry in the j’s (or the q’s)
row and the i’s column stands for the connection between node i and j (or q), where
j (1 ≤ j ≤ Nm) denotes an inner-layer node, and q (q > Nm) denotes an bridge
node in another layer (below the dashed line). The dark blue back ground stands for
the non-existent connections, while the all other colored entries implies an existent
connection. Only the bridge nodes have nonzero entries ηiqciq (q > Nm) in the
augmented part, while in the non-augmented part, a nonzero entry of an ordinary
node has the value aij = 1 (dark red), while that of a bridge node has the value
(1− ηiq)ciq < 1 (green, yellow, orange, or light red). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
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12. The Interdependent Connection Structure Recovery and the Payoff Exchange Rate
Estimation Performance Under Evolutionary Game Dynamics. (a,b,c) The rela-
tive interdependent connection reconstruction error rate ǫC for the nonzero terms
(“NZ”, i.e., the existent links, shown in purple) and the zero terms (“Z”, i.e., the
non-existent links, shown in green) versus the normalized number of measurements
RM = l/Nm under noise level µN = 0 (triangles pointing up), 10
−4 (circles), 10−3
(squares), and 10−2 (triangles pointing left). (d,e,f) The absolute estimation error
eW = |ηestimation − ηtrue| of the interdependent payoff exchange rate ηiq averaged
over all the interdependent node pairs versus RM under the four different noise lev-
els as in (a,b,c). The results are obtained on three 2-layer multiplex networks: (a,d)
both layers have ER-random topology; (b,e) both layers have BA scale-free topol-
ogy; (c,f) one layer has ER-random topology, while another one has BA scale-free
topology. All layers in all cases are in sizeNm = 100 with average degree 〈k〉 = 4.
10% randomly selected nodes in each layer are bridge nodes, each of which owns
an interdependent partner in another layer, and there are accordingly 10 interdepen-
dent links in each multiplex system. Each data point is averaged over 10 network
realizations, each with 10 compressive sensing implementations. . . . . . . . . . . 56
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13. Structural and Practical Controllability Measures in Directed Networks. Structural
controllability measure nD versus directional edge probability Pb for (a) ER random
networks and (b) BA scale-free networks of size N = 1000 and three values of the
average degree (〈k〉 = 4, 6, and 8). The dash-dotted lines represent the results
obtained by the cavity method [2, 2], and the squares, triangles, and circles are the
simulation results from the maximum matching algorithm [2]. (c, d) Measure of
practical controllability P (C¯W ) for ER random and BA scale-free networks of size
N = 100, respectively, where P (C¯W ) is the probability that the condition number
of the Gramian matrix is less than some physically reasonable threshold value versus
Pb. Comparing a with c, or b with d, we observe the striking phenomenon that, in
the parameter regime where the number of driver nodes is minimized so that the
corresponding networks are deemed to be most structurally controllable, they are
practically uncontrollable. The phenomenon persists regardless of the network size
and type. All nodes are self-loop free. The qualitative behavior is robust against the
value of C¯W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
14. Distributions of Control Energy for Practically Controllable Networks. (a, c) Energy
distributions under different values of the threshold condition number C¯W for Pb =
0.1 and tf = 1. 〈k〉 = 6 for random networks (a) and 〈k〉 = 8 for scale-free
networks (c). (b, c) Energy distributions for different values of the average degree
〈k〉 and the directional connection probability Pb under C¯W = 1012 and tf = 1 for
ER random and BA scale-free networks, respectively. In all cases, we observe an
algebraic (power-law) scaling behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
xxv
Figure Page
15. Relationship Among 1D Chain Energy, the Smallest Eigenvalue of H-Matrix, and
Network Control Energy. (a) For an 1D chain network of length l, energy El and
λ−1Hl versus l, providing support for the analytic result equation (4.4). (b) Correlation
between 〈E〉, the average of control energy for networks with the same LCC length,
and EL, the energy of a LCC with length DC = L (L = 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 for ER and
L = 3, 4, 5, and 6 for BA networks), calculated from ensembles of 10000 networks. 71
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16. Schematic Illustration of Various Concepts to Characterize and Understand the
Practical Controllability of a Network. (a) Control-signal paths (CSPs) of a ran-
dom network obtained from maximum matching in structural controllability theory,
where a control signal enters a CSP via the corresponding driver node (yellow),
the starting node of the path, and goes through each matched node (blue) along the
path. In this example, the network has nD = 10 CSPs of different lengths. Non-path
links, links that are irrelevant to matching, are displayed in green. (b) All possible
LCCs in the network. Typically there are multiple LCCs of the same length. In this
example, the length of the LCCs is 4, which is defined as the control diameter of
the network. Two LCCs sharing no common nodes are marked by red nodes and
solid red arrows. Links belonging to other LCCs are marked by red dashed arrows.
CSPs are denoted using letters a to j from the left to the right. Each node is spec-
ified using its path number and its position along the path sequentially from top to
bottom. For example, node e1 is the driver node of path e, and node h2 is the node
right after the driver node on path h. The two LCCs with solid arrows are listed in
bold. Eight LCCs in the network converge to only three end-nodes, e6, f5, and f6
(marked by red dashed circles), leading to LCC degeneracy m = 3. The control
energy is determined by any randomly chosen m LCCs among all existent ones. . . 81
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17. Cascade Parallel R-C Circuit and Its Corresponding Network Presentation. (a) A
cascade parallel R-C circuit with L = 7 resistors (R1, R2, . . ., and RL, each of
resistance 1Ω) and 7 capacitors (C1, C2, . . ., and CL, each of capacitance 1F).
External voltage input u(t) is applied onto the left side of the circuit, and the voltage
of capacitor Ci is ui(t)(1 ≤ i ≤ L). (b) Network representation of the circuit in a
as a bidirectional 1D chain network of seven nodes, where the external voltage input
u(t) is injected into node 1 (yellow driver node, the controller). The dynamical state
of node i is described by the voltage on its capacitor, ui(t). Links (blue) between
nodes are bidirectional and have uniform weight 1 in either direction. Each node
has a self-link (red) of weight −2, except the ending node (node 7) whose self-link
has weight −1. (c) The circuit network in b with an extra external current input
ie(t) into the capacitor C3, where i3 and i4 denote the currents through resistors R3
and R4, respectively. In the absence of the extra current input, i3(t) − i4(t) is the
current through the branch of C3. (d) The extra external current input ie(t) serves
as a redundant control input injected into node 3 of the network in b. Now there are
two driver nodes (yellow) in the network, nodes 1 and 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
18. Control Energy and Optimization for 1D Chain and Cascade Parallel R-C Circuit.
(a) Energy required for controlling a unidirectional chain (red) and the correspond-
ing circuit (blue) as well as the dissipated energy of the circuit calculated from
equation (4.5) versus the chain length L. (b) Control and dissipated energies in the
presence of a redundant control signal to node i (i > 1), which breaks the chain into
two subchains of lengths i and L− i, respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
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19. Effects of Redundant Control Inputs. (a) For control diameter DC = 2, distribution
of the energy ratio Ex/E under optimization strategies (I) (Mid, red circles) and (II)
(End, blue squares), where Ex and E are the required energies with and without re-
dundant control, respectively. Results from two randomized optimization strategies
are marked by R-Mid (black triangles) and R-End (gray diamonds), correspond-
ing to strategies (I) and (II), respectively. The values of Ex/E are collected from
practically controllable networks from an ensemble of 10000 ER random networks
(〈k〉 = 6, Pb = 0.1). For each network, if strategy (I) [or (II)] requires r redundant
controls, r additional random control inputs are applied to the system 10 times to
average out the random fluctuations. Panels (b-d) show the Ex/E distributions for
networks with control diameter DC = 3, 4, and 5, respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . 84
xxix
Figure Page
20. Augmented Control Inputs and Energy Optimization. (a) Densities of the original
driver nodes nD (dark purple) and of the augmented controls n
⋆
D (light purple). (b)
Normalized energy reduction ∆E⋆mid/E
⋆ = (E⋆ − E⋆mid)/E⋆ (light blue) when
an additional control signal is added to the middle of each LCC [strategy (I)] and
normalized energy reduction ∆E⋆R-mid/E
⋆ = (E⋆ − E⋆R-mid)/E⋆ (dark blue) when
the same number of control signals are randomly added into each network. (c)
Normalized energy reduction ∆E⋆end/E
⋆ = (E⋆ − E⋆end)/E⋆ (light green) when
an additional control signal is added to the end node of each LCC [strategy (II)]
and normalized energy reduction ∆E⋆R-end/E
⋆ = (E⋆ − E⋆R-end)/E⋆ (dark green)
when the same number of control signals are randomly added into each network.
All colored bars (light/dark purple, light/dark blue, and light/dark green) start from
0, and the darkly colored bars overlap with the corresponding portions of the lightly
colored bars. For the bars with only dark colors, the lightly colored bars are in the
same height but covered by the dark ones in front of them. In majority cases, our
optimization strategies work better than random control signal augmentation, and
in 7 out of 17 networks, the energy reduction under our strategies is one or several
order of magnitude greater than under random augmentation. . . . . . . . . . . . 85
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21. The Number of Extreme Events Versus Velocity and Mobility. For a network of
N = 1200 nodes in a square domain of size L = 10 (arbitrary unit), a, The number
of extreme events nex versus the agent velocity v for W = 50N , 80N , and 100N ;
b, nex of extreme events versus velocity v when nodes execute random walk (R)
or deterministic motion (D) within square, circular, and stadium-shaped domains.
The areas of the circle and the stadium are chosen to be equal to the area of the
square L × L. c, Robustness of control with respect to heterogeneity in the nodal
communication range: nex versus v for β = −1, 0, and 1, where β is a parameter
characterizing the distribution of nodal communication range. d and e, robustness of
control with respect to packet-transportation protocol: nex versus velocity v when
packet generation and annihilation are taken into account for two situations where d
the total number of packets is fixed atW and e the number of newly generated pack-
ets at each time step is fixed to be W/N . f, Generalization of mobility: nex versus
mobility, defined as the probability that a node moves with velocity v, for a number
of v values. All simulation results are obtained using 100 realizations in T = 1000
time steps. The error bars in nex from different realizations have relatively small
and similar magnitude in (a-e), and it monotonously increases with velocity v, as
shown in panel a [the error bars in (b-e) are omitted for clear visualization]. Here,
the definition of an extreme event on a node is that its number of packets is at least
four standard-deviations above the average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
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22. Geometrical Setting and the Theory Result. a, Illustration of various geometrical
quantities used in the analysis: communication radius a, distance b from the middle
of the square to the target node, distance bn from the middle of the square to a
neighbor of the target node, the width ∆bn of the bar region, and the cutoff region
of the communication circle. b, Results of Eq. 5.2 for db = 0.01 and ∆bn = 0.002
(the main features do not depend on the specific values of db and ∆bn). . . . . . . 90
23. Boundary Effect. a1, b1, c1, Behavior of 〈w(t)〉b versus b from direct simulation
(blue squares) and predicted by Eq. (5.8) (solid black lines) for v = 0, 0.5 and 3.0,
respectively. Note that v ≈ 0.5 is the optimal value of the velocity that minimizes
nex in Fig. 21, and v = 3.0 represents a relatively high velocity value for the system
of size L = 10 and communication radius a = 1. For a1, we have η(v = 0) = 0.
Since Eq. (5.8) indicates a smooth dependence of 〈w(t)〉b on b and since a detailed
interdependence between η(v) and v is unknown, we find η(v) = 15 best fits the
case in b1. For c1, we have η(v = 3.0) → η(v → ∞) = 50. The red dashed
line indicates the position of the peak in the curve of 〈w(t)〉b versus b. a2, b2, c2,
Positions of all extreme events occurred in square domain for v = 0, 0.5, and 3.0,
respectively. a3, b3, c3, Positions of all extreme events occurred in circular domain
for v = 0, 0.5, and 3.0, respectively. a4, b4, c4, Positions of all extreme events
occurred in stadium domain for v = 0, 0.5, and 3.0, respectively. All results are
obtained from 20 independent statistical realizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
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24. Effect of Long Range Links. a, effect of periodic boundary condition: nex versus v
when 0% (green circles, no PBC), 30% (aqua triangles), 50% (pink triangles), and
100% (purple triangles, complete PBC) randomly selected cross-boundary links are
applied. b, Effect of communication wormhole on control: nex versus v when a
wormhole link is applied to any pair of nodes closer than dHW = 13.0, 12.5, 12.3,
and 12.0 for pHW = 0.4%, 2%, 3%, and 5%, respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
25. Number of Extreme Events in Intermittently Mobile Networks. a and b, For a
mobile network with hard-wall boundary conditions, nex versus v and for a number
of fixed values of the frozen time ∆T and versus ∆T for three values of v. c and
d, Corresponding results for periodic boundary conditions. e and f, For a classic
ER-network under intermittent random rewiring (a kind of generalized mobility),
nex versus the rewiring probability PR (for a number of fixed values of ∆T ) and
versus ∆T (for PR = 0.5, 0.8, and 1.0), respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
26. Degree Bias and Scaling. For a mobile network in a square domain with hard-
wall boundary conditions, a, number nex of extreme events occurring on small (red
circles) and large (blue squares) degree nodes versus v, and b, nex versus the total
number of packets W for various velocity values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
27. Linear Relation Between 〈W (T − 1)〉 and k(T ). a-c), Linear relation between
〈w(t−1)〉 and k(t) for mobile networks with hard-wall and periodic boundary con-
ditions, and for ER-random networks, respectively. d, Dependence of η(v) on v for
mobile networks with hard-wall and periodic boundary conditions, and η(PR) ver-
sus PR for ER-random networks (inlets). All results are averaged over 20 statistical
realizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
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28. PDF of Flow P (W ) in Simulation and in Different Theory Assumptions. a, For
the classic ER random networks with rewiring probability PR = 1, PDF of flow
P (w) obtained from direct simulation (red squares) and self-consistent equation
(solid blue line). b, PDF of flow P (w) from direct simulation (red squares), from
theory without taking into account spatial degree correlation (black circles), and
from theory with degree-degree correlation (solid blue line). . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
29. Schematic Illustration of a Multilayer, Interdependent Network Subject to Internal
(Interlayer) Resource Competitions. Layers 1 (G1) and 2 (G2) are two different sub-
sets of Layer 0 (G, or the global network), which is solely used for model generate
and does not participate in the transportation dynamics. In this schematic exam-
ple, N = 10 (number of node in Layer 0), M = 2 (the number of interdependent
layers), and Pm = 0.5 (m = 1 and 2). Accordingly, Nm = N · Pm = 5, and
correspondingly, the node degrees in Layers 1 and 2 are 0.5 time of their degrees in
Layer 0 (fluctuation exists due to randomness). The combination of Layers 1 and
2 forms a multilayer interdependent network. Nodes 5 and 6 exist in both Layers
1 and 2, and thus, the two layers would compete for resources within each of these
two overlapped nodes. Nodes 4 and 9 exist in neither of the two layers. Each of all
the other nodes exist in only one of the two layers. (See the Methods section for
model details.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
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30. Extreme Event Occurrence and Packet Arrival Rates. (a) Extreme event occurrence
rate REE and (b) packet arrival rate RA versus the number of layers, M , for sys-
tems with Pm = 0.25 (circles), 0.5 (squares), 0.75 (diamonds), and 1 (triangles),
respectively. (c) REE and (d) RA versus Pm for M = 3 (diamonds), 5 (circles),
and 10 (squares), respectively. The results are obtained through 20 simulation re-
alizations for each of the 10 network realizations. Each network has the average
degree 〈k〉 = 4 and size N = 1000. Each realization runs for 500 time steps. The
quantities REE and RA are averaged over the last 300 steps (typically, the system
evolves into equilibrium within 200 time steps). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
31. System’s Time Evolution Towards a Catastrophic State. For a multilayer network
of N = 1000 nodes, M = 3 layers, and Pm = 1, (a) the transition between a free
(blue) and a catastrophic states (red) in time for all nodes. (b) The ratio of node
i’s load fi to its capacity Ci versus time for all nodes. (c) Time traces of the total
number of packets in the layer (denoted as W , thick solid line), of the number of
“stuck” packets due to the surrounding extreme events (Wstop, triangles), and of the
number of movable packets (Wjump, squares). Among theWjump movable packets,
the number of those that effectively execute random walks (Wrand, red dashed line)
and the number of the remaining packets moving along their respective shortest
paths (Wshort, blue dot line) are also plotted versus time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
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32. Numerically Obtained and Theoretical Predicted Probabilities of Extreme Events.
For M = 1 (circles), 3 (squares), 5 (diamonds), and 10 (triangles), (a) numerically
obtained probability qEE(k) for an extreme event to occur on a node of degree k and
(b) theoretical prediction based on the concept of betweenness. (c) For Pm = 1,
the probability of extreme events versus M , where the degree distribution function




k−3 for kmin = 2 and
kmax = 75 (typical values from network realizations). In fact, small changes in the
values of kmin and kmax do not affect the main features of the results. . . . . . . . 121
33. Probability of Extreme Events Calculated From Our Theory of Effective Between-
ness. (a-d) The probability qEE(k) for an extreme event to occur on a node of
degree k obtained from simulation (circles), the theory of betweenness (diamonds),
and the theory of effective betweenness (squares) for M = 1, 2, 3, and 5, respec-
tively. In (e), the extreme-event probability versusM is shown, obtained from sim-
ulation (circles), the theory of betweenness (diamonds), and the theory of effective
betweenness (squares), for M = 10 and Pm = 1. The degree distribution function
P (k) used to calculate qEE is obtained using 10 network realizations. The between-
ness and effective betweenness for each node of degree value k are calculated from
the corresponding network topology and averaged over all such nodes among the
10 network realizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
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34. Occurrence Rate of Extreme Events and Packet Arrival Rate Under Control. In
the control parameter space, ntop denotes the number of top-degree hubs whose
capacities are augmented, and ri is the ratio of the enhanced capacity to the orig-
inal capacity. The extreme event occurrence rate REE and the packet arrival rate
RA in the parameter space are shown, respectively in (a) and (b). The simulation
parameters are the same as in Fig. 30. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
35. Number of Packets Ld Steps Away From Their Destinations. For a single layer
network of size N = 1000, the number of packets in an equilibrium state that
are Ld steps away from their respective destinations from theory (triangles) and
simulation (circles). The total number of packets that the system can accommodate
in the equilibrium state is about W = 558, which includes the newly generated
packets within the current time step (diamonds) and all the remaining old packets
(squares). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
36. Normalized Effective Betweenness and Free Flux Distribution Function. For a sin-
gle layer network of size N = 1000, (a) the normalized effective betweenness of
a node of degree k, pE, versus k, from simulation (squares) and theory (line). The
simulation results are obtained from 20 network realizations. (b) The free flux dis-
tribution function P (w) for a node of degree 75 versus w obtained from simulation
(squares) and theory (line), where the distribution function is meaningful only when
the system is set to be free of extreme events, i.e., each node is set to have infinite
capacity so that packets can travel freely via the shortest path towards their destina-
tions. This way the theoretical probability for the node to be visited can be calculated.133
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37. (Color online.) Death rate Sd (red circles) and frequencies of cooperation ρC (blue
squares) and defection ρD (green triangles) versus the tolerance parameter α for
six combinations of three values of the control parameter β (−1, 0, and 1) and two
values of T0 (20 and 100) for b = 1.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
38. (Color online.) For four combinations of the parameter values of α and T0, Sd (red
circles), ρC (blue squares), and ρD (green triangles) versus the control parameter β
for b = 1.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
39. (Color online.) Time tolerance T (k) (left) and its derivative dT (k)/dβ (right) ver-
sus control parameter β for T0 = 20. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
40. Time Series of Attack Frequency w(T ) for All IP Addresses. (a) Spatiotemporal
representation of attack frequencies w(t) of all IP addresses on a logarithmic scale,
where the x-axis and y-axis are, respectively, time t and IP address index from 1 to
491 (top to bottom). The IP region 1-246 is denoted as the aqua background, where
each of the four IP regions (19-31, 35-47, 50-130, and 131-191) exhibits a particular
attack pattern that is overlayed on the background. The IP region 247-363 possesses
an attack pattern that is overlayed on the dark-blue background lying under the
entire IP-space. (b) Three-dimensional presentation of the attack frequency w(t) on
a logarithmic scale. The “walls” of unity height are not visible on the logarithmic
scale, but higher “walls” are visible in the IP region 364-491 [corresponding to the
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1 . INTRODUCTION
1.1. Structure and Dynamics Estimation for Complex Networks
Revealing the underlying structure and dynamics of complex networked systems from observed
data is of fundamental importance to science, engineering, and society. Successful recovery is usu-
ally achieved with the aid of certain specific prior information about the particular mathematical
rules governing the system dynamics. Is it possible to develop a universal framework capable of re-
verse engineering different types of dynamical processes on complex networks, regardless of their
details? In Chapter 2, I articulate a Markov network based model, the sparse dynamical Boltzmann
machine (SDBM), as a universal network structural estimator and dynamics approximator. The
SDBM can establish its topology according to that of the original system and is capable of simu-
lating the original dynamical process by reproducing the time series data. Given a networked dy-
namical system, it is possible to obtain its SDBM equivalent with identical topology and dynamical
behaviors as the original system. I develop a fully automated method based on techniques includ-
ing compressive sensing and K-means algorithm to find the SDBM. My method is completely data
driven in that it requires neither the original system equations nor any subjective parameter choice.
I demonstrate, for a large variety of representative dynamical processes on model and real-world
complex networks, that the equivalent SDBM can recover the network structure of the original sys-
tem and predicts its short-term or even long-term dynamical behavior with high precision.
Real-world phenomena often indicate that the behaviors of complex systems of similar or differ-
ent natures can be coupled in certain ways, and the interdependencies between those system usually
play crucial roles in determining their dynamical behavior both microscopically and macroscop-
ically. Identifying the interdependent interactions between different complex networked systems
thus becomes a critical issue in science and engineering. In Chapter 3, I propose a two-stage com-
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pressive sensing based method that recovers the connection topology and the related parameter
values of the interdependent components of multi-layer complex networked infrastructures with
high precision, given only the dynamical process time series. The performance effectiveness of the
method is demonstrated by various types of modeled and real-world complex networks with both
discrete and continuous dynamical processes taking places on them, and high robustness against
noise is simultaneously achieved in all cases. Systems with large sizes that hinders the previous
compressive sensing based approaches may also become applicable due to the layer-wise recon-
struction scheme within our method.
1.2. The Paradox of Controlling Complex Networks
One of the most challenging problems in complex dynamical systems is to control complex
networks. In previous frameworks based on the structural or the exact controllability theories, the
ability to steer a complex network toward any desired state is measured by the minimum number of
required driver nodes. However, if I implement actual control by imposing input signals on the min-
imum set of driver nodes as determined, e.g., by the structural controllability theory, an unexpected
phenomenon arises: the energy required to approach a target state with reasonable precision is often
unbearably large, precluding us from achieving actual control, i.e., the designated state can not be
reached in effect, especially for networks with a small number of drivers. In particular, the energy
of controlling a set of networks with similar structural properties follows a fat-tail distribution, indi-
cating the existence of networks with practically divergent energy. In Chapter 4, I aim to reconcile
the paradox of controlling complex networks: optimal structural controllability versus unrealistic
energy required for control. I identify fundamental structural “short boards” in complex networks
that play a dominant role in the enormous energy, and offer a theoretical interpretation for the fat-
tail energy distribution and simple strategies to significantly reduce the energy by imposing slightly
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augmented set of input signals on properly chosen nodes. Our findings indicate that, although full
control can be guaranteed by the prevailing structural controllability theory, it is necessary to bal-
ance the number of driver nodes and the control energy to achieve actual control, and our results
provide a framework to address this outstanding issue.
1.3. Extreme Events and Cascading Failure on Complex Networks
Extreme events, a type of collective behavior in complex networked dynamical systems, often
can have catastrophic consequences. To develop effective strategies to control extreme events is of
fundamental importance and practical interest. In Chapter 5, utilizing transportation dynamics on
complex networks as a prototypical setting, I find that making the network “mobile” can effectively
suppress extreme events. A striking, resonance-like phenomenon is uncovered, where an optimal
degree of mobility exists for which the probability of extreme events is minimized. I derive an
analytic theory to understand the mechanism of control at a detailed and quantitative level, and
validate the theory numerically. Implications of our finding to current areas such as cybersecurity
are discussed.
Multilayer, interdependent complex networks are ubiquitous in modern infrastructures. The re-
silience of such networks is of considerable interest. Extreme events, a type of collective dynamical
behaviors, can compromise the network resilience dramatically. In Chapter 6, utilizing transporta-
tion as a prototypical type of dynamical process to model, e.g., the interplay among public trans-
portation, power, information, or telecommunication service facilities, I investigate the emergence
of extreme events in interdependent networks. I introduce an inter-layer traffic resource compet-
ing mechanism to take into account the limited capacity associated with distinct network layers. A
striking finding is that, when the number of network layers and/or the overlap among the layers are
increased, extreme events can emerge in a cascading manner on a global scale, even if the capacity
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is sufficiently large so that extreme events on any of the same number of independent layers can be
ruled out. Asymptotically, there are two stable absorption states: a state free of extreme events and
a state of extreme events, and the transition between then is abrupt in both time and parameter do-
mains. Our results indicate that internal interactions in the multiplex system can yield qualitatively
distinct phenomena that do not occur for independent network layers. An implication is that, public
resource competitions among different service providers can lead to a higher resource requirement
than naively expected. I derive an analytical theory to understand the emergence of global-scale
extreme events based on the concept of effective betweenness. I also articulate a cost-effective con-
trol scheme through increasing the capacity of very few hubs to suppress the cascading process of
extreme events so as to protect the entire multi-layer infrastructure against global-scale breakdown.
Cooperation has been recognized as a fundamental driving force in many natural, social, and
economical systems. Given a complex networked system in which agents (nodes) interact with
one another according to the rules of evolutionary games and are subject to failure or death, can
cooperation prevail and be optimized? In Chapter 7, I articulate a control scheme to maximize
cooperation by introducing a time tolerance, a time duration that sustains an agent even if its payoff
falls below a threshold. Strikingly, I find that a significant cooperation cluster can emerge when
the time tolerance is approximately uniformly distributed over the network. A heuristic theory is
derived to understand the optimization mechanism, which emphasizes the role played by medium-
degree nodes. Implications to policy making to prevent/mitigate large-scale cascading breakdown
are pointed out.
1.4. Spatiotemporal Patterns and Predictability of Cyberattacks
A relatively unexplored issue in cybersecurity science and engineering is whether there exist
intrinsic patterns of cyberattacks. Conventional wisdom favors absence of such patterns due to the
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overwhelming complexity of the modern cyberspace. Surprisingly, in Chapter 8, through a de-
tailed analysis of an extensive data set that records the time-dependent frequencies of attacks over
a relatively wide range of consecutive IP addresses, I successfully uncover intrinsic spatiotemporal
patterns underlying cyberattacks, where the term “spatio” refers to the IP address space. In partic-
ular, I focus on analyzing macroscopic properties of the attack traffic flows and identify two main
patterns with distinct spatiotemporal characteristics: deterministic and stochastic. Strikingly, there
are very few sets of major attackers committing almost all the attacks, since their attack “finger-
prints” and target selection scheme can be unequivocally identified according to the very limited
number of unique spatiotemporal characteristics, each of which only exists on a consecutive IP re-
gion and differs significantly from the others. I utilize a number of quantitative measures, including
the flux-fluctuation law, the Markov state transition probability matrix, and predictability measures,
to characterize the attack patterns in a comprehensive manner. A general finding is that the attack
patterns possess high degrees of predictability, potentially paving the way to anticipating and, con-
sequently, mitigating or even preventing large-scale cyberattacks using macroscopic approaches.
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2 . UNIVERSAL STRUCTURAL ESTIMATOR AND DYNAMICS APPROXIMATOR FOR
COMPLEX NETWORKS
2.1. Introduction
A central issue in complexity science and engineering is systems identification and dynamical
behavior prediction based on experimental or observational data. For a complex networked system,
often the network structure and the nodal dynamical processes are unknown but only time series
measured from various nodes in the network can be obtained. The challenging task is to infer the
detailed network topology and the nodal dynamical systems from the available data. This line of
pursuit started in biomedical science for problems such as identification of gene regulatory networks
from expression data in systems biology [3–6] and uncovering various functional networks in the
human brain from activation data in neuroscience [7–10]. The inverse problem has also been an area
of research in statistical physics where, for example, the inverse Ising problem in static [11–15] and
kinetic [16–22] situations has attracted continuous interest. Recent years have witnessed the emer-
gence and growth of a subfield of research in complex networks: data based network identification
(or reverse engineering of complex networks) [23–38]. In these works, the success of mapping out
the entire network structure and estimating the nodal dynamical equations partly relies on taking
advantage of the particular properties of the system dynamics in terms of the specific types and
rules. For example, depending on the detailed dynamical processes such as continuous-time oscil-
lations [29, 30, 32], evolutionary games [33], or epidemic spreading [37], appropriate mathematical
frameworks uniquely tailored at the specific underlying dynamical process can be formulated to
solve the inverse problem.
In this paper, we address the following challenging question: is it possible to develop a uni-
versal and completely data-driven framework for extracting network topology and identifying the
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dynamical processes, without the need to know a priori the specific types of network dynamics? An
answer to this question would be of significant value not only to complexity science and engineering
but also to modern data science where the goal is to unearth the hidden structural information and
to predict the future evolution of the system. Here we propose the concept of universal structural
estimator and dynamics approximator for complex networked systems and demonstrate that such a
framework or “machine” can indeed be developed for a large number of distinct types of network
dynamical processes. Our approach will be a combination of numerical computation and physical
reasoning. Since we are yet able to develop a rigorous mathematical framework for the universal
machine, the present work should be regarded as an initial attempt towards the development of a
universal framework for network reconstruction and dynamics prediction.
The key principle underlying our work is the following. In spite of the dramatic difference
in the types of dynamics in terms of, e.g., the interaction setting and state updating rules, there
are two common features shared by many dynamical processes on complex networks: (1) they are
stochastic, first-order Markovian processes, i.e., only the current states of the systems determine
their immediate future; and (2) the nodal interactions are local. The two features are characteristic
of a Markov network (or a Markov random field) [39, 40]. In particular, a Markov network is an
undirected and weighted probabilistic graphical model that is effective at determining the complex
probabilistic interdependencies in situations where directionality in the interaction between con-
nected nodes cannot be naturally assigned, in contrast to the directed Bayesian networks [39, 40].
A Markov network has two types of parameters: a node bias parameter that controls its preference
of state choice, and a weight parameter characterizing the interaction strength of each undirected
link. The joint probability distribution of the state variables X = (x1, x2, . . . , xN )







C φ(XC), where φ(XC) is the potential function for a well-connected
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network clique C , and the summation in the denominator is over all possible system state X. If this
joint probability distribution is available, literally all conditional probability interdependencies can
be obtained. The way to define a clique and to determine its potential function plays a key role
in the Markov network’s representation power of modeling the interdependencies within a partic-
ular system. To be concrete, in this work we pursue the possibility of modeling the conditional
probability interdependence of a variety of dynamical processes on complex networked systems
via a binary Ising Markov network with its potential function in the form of the Boltzmann factor,
exp(−E), where E is the energy determined by the local states and their interactions along with
the network parameters (the link weights and node biases) in a log-linear form [41]. This is ef-
fectively a sparse Boltzmann machine [41] adopted to complex network topologies without hidden
units. (Note that hidden units usually play a critical role in ordinary Boltzmann machines [41]).
We introduce a temporal evolution mechanism as a persistent sampling process for such a machine
based on the conditional probabilities obtained via the joint probability, and generate a Markov
chain of persistently sampled state configurations to form state transition time series for each node.
For convenience, we call our model a sparse dynamical Boltzmann machine (SDBM).
For a dynamical process on complex networks, such as epidemic spreading or evolutionary game
dynamics, the state of each node at the next time step is determined by the probability conditioned on
the current states of its neighbors (and its own state in some cases). There is freedom to manipulate
the conditional probabilities that dictate the system behavior in the immediate future by changing
the values of its parameters, i.e., the weights and biases. A basic question is then, for an SDBM, is
it possible to properly choose these parameters so that the conditional probabilities so produced are
identical or nearly identical to those of a typical dynamical process with each given observed system
state configuration? If the answer is affirmative, the SDBM can serve as a dynamics approximator
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Fig. 1. A Schematic Illustration of SDBM Structure Reconstruction. (a) Connection reconstruction
of the red node in a complex network with 20 nodes. The connections of the network is completely
unknown, thus the red node could be potentially connected with any other node, as shown by the
orange dashed links. After the compressive sensing process [see (c)] and the K-means clustering
[see Fig.8] for this node with the dynamical process data of the system, its true connections are
detected, marked by the red links. The link weights and the node bias are represented by vector
VN×1 in (c). (b) All the network connections are recovered by running the process shown in (a) for
each node. The Markov blanket of the red node in (a) consists all its nearest neighbors, shown as the
nodes with dashed red circles. (c) A schematic illustration of the compressive sensing framework
for connection detection, formulated by Eq. (2.9).9
of the original system, and the approximated conditional probabilities possess predictive power for
the system state at the next time step. When such an SDBM is found for many types of dynamical
process on complex networks, it effectively serves as a universal dynamics approximator. Moreover,
if the detailed statistical properties of the state configurations can be reproduced in the long time
limit, that is, if the time series generated by this SDBM are statistically identical or nearly identical
to those from the original system, then the SDBM is a generative model of the observed data (in the
language of machine learning), which is potentially capable of long term prediction.
When a dynamics approximator exists for each type of dynamics on a complex network, the
topology of the SDBM is nothing but that of the original network, providing a simultaneous so-
lution to the problem of network structure reconstruction. Previous works on the inverse static or
kinetic Ising problems led to methods of reconstruction for Ising dynamics by maximizing the data
likelihood (or pseudo-likelihood) function via the gradient descent approaches [11–22]. Instead of
adopting these approaches, as a part of our methodology to extract the network structure, we artic-
ulate a compressive sensing [42–47] based approach, whose working power has been demonstrated
for a variety types of non-Ising type of dynamics on complex networks [32–38]. By incorporat-
ing a K-means clustering algorithm into the sparse solution obtained from compressive sensing, we
demonstrate that nearly perfect reconstruction of the complex network topology can be achieved.
Using 14 different types of dynamical processes on complex networks, we find that, if the time
series data generated by these dynamical processes are assumed to be generated from its equivalent
SDBMs, the universal reconstruction framework is capable of recovering the underlining network
structure of each original dynamics with almost zero error. This represents solid and concrete ev-
idence that SDBM is capable of serving as a universal structural estimator for complex networks.
In addition to being able to precisely reconstruct the network topologies, the SDBM also allows the
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link weights and node biases to be calculated with high accuracy.
Our method is fully automated and does not require any subjective parameter choice.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. SDBM as a Network Structural Estimator
For an SDBM of size N , the probability that the system is in a particular binary state configura-
tion XN×1 = (x1, x2, . . . , xi, . . . , xN )





with EX being the total energy of the network inX:
EX = X









where xi and xj are binary variables (0 or 1) characterizing the state of nodes i and j, respectively,
W is a weighted matrix with its off diagonal elements wij = wji (i, j = 1, . . . , N, i 6= j) speci-
fying the weight associated with the link between nodes i and j. The ith diagonal element of W is
chosen as the bias parameter bi for node i (i = 1, . . . , N ), which determines node i’s preference to
state 0 or 1. The total energy EX includes the interaction energies (the sum of all wijxixj terms)






where the summation is over all possible X configurations. The state of xi at the next time step
is determined by the states of all the other nodes at the present time step, XRi , via the following
conditional probability
P [xi(t+ 1) = 1|XRi (t)] =
P [xi(t+ 1) = 1,X
R
i (t)]
P [xi(t+ 1) = 1,X
R





where the two joint probabilities are given by





























A Markov network defined in this fashion is also called a kinetic Ising model [16–22]. With the
joint probabilities, the conditional probability in Eq. (2.4) becomes
P [xi(t+ 1) = 1|XRi (t)] =
1
1 + exp [
∑N















P [xi(t+ 1) = 1|XRi (t)]
)−1 − 1, we have
lnQi(t) =
(



























x1(t1), . . . , xi−1(t1), xi+1(t1), . . . , xN (t1), 1























which can be written concisely as
YM×1 = ⊖M×N ·VN×1, (2.8)
where the vector YM×1 ∈ RM contains the values of lnQi(t) for M different time steps, the
M × N matrix ⊖M×N is determined by the states of all the nodes except i, and the first (N − 1)
components of the vector VN×1 ∈ RN are the link weights between node i and all other nodes in
the network [illustrated in Fig. 1 (a)] with its last entry being node i’s intrinsic bias.
Since the conditional probability P [xi(t+1) = 1|XRi (t)] depends solely on the state configura-
tion of i’s nearest neighbors, or i’sMarkov blanket [39,40] at time t, as shown in Fig. 1(b) identical
configurations at other time steps imply identical conditional probabilities. Thus, given time series
data of the dynamical process, the conditional probability can be estimated according to the law of
large numbers by averaging over the states of i at all the time steps slightly before the neighboring
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state configurations become identical. Note, however, that this probability needs to be conditioned
on the state configuration of the entire system except node i, i.e., on XRi (t), and the average of xi
is calculated over all the time steps tm + 1 satisfying X
R
i (t) = X
R
i (tm). This means that there is a
dramatic increase in the configuration size, i.e., from ki (the degree of node i) to N − 1 (the size of
the vector XRi ), which makes the number of exactly identical configurations too small to give any





i (tm) by introducing a tolerance parameter, Γ, to confine the corresponding Hamming
distances normalized by N (we assume XRi (t) ≈ XRi (tm) if the relative difference between them












〈x1(t1)〉, . . . , 〈xi−1(t1)〉, 〈xi+1(t1)〉, . . . , 〈xN (t1)〉, 1























where qi(t) ≡ 〈xi(t1+1)〉−1− 1, and 〈·〉 stands for the averaging over all instants of time at which
the condition XRi (t) = X
R
i (tm) is satisfied. A schematic illustration of whole process is presented
in Fig. 1, with Eq. 2.9 shown in panel (c).
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For a complex network, the degree of a node is typically small compared with the network size.
For node i, the link weights are nonzero only for the connections with the immediate neighbors.
The vector VN×1 is thus typically sparse with the majority of its elements being zero. The sparsity
property renders applicable compressive sensing [42–47], through which an N dimensional sparse
vector can be reconstructed via a set of M linear measurements, for M ≪ N . By minimizing the
L1 norm of VN×1, i.e., ‖VN×1‖1 =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i |wij| + |bi|, subject to YM×1 = ⊖M×N · VN×1,
we can reconstruct VN×1 to obtain the connection weights between node i and all other nodes in
the network. One would hope that, applying the procedure to each node would lead to the complete
weighted adjacency matrix, W.
To gain insights, we test the structural estimation method for an SDBM itself [Figs. 2(a-c)] and
three different types of dynamical processes [Figs. 2(d-f)] by feeding the time series data generated
by an SDBM into the framework and comparing the reconstructed SDBMwith the original machine.
The time instants t1, t2, . . . , tM needed to construct Eq. (2.9) are chosen randomly from T time
instants in total. For each node, the compressive sensing algorithm is implemented a multiple of
times to obtain the averaged relevant quantities. As shown in Fig. 2, we see that the averaged
solutions from the compressive sensing algorithm appear in sharp peaks at places that correspond
to the existent links, despite the large differences among the values. This means that, while most
existent links can be predicted against the null links, the accuracy of the solution so obtained is
not sufficient for the actual element values of VN×1 to be determined. For the null links, the
corresponding solutions generally appear as a noisy background. For the ideal case where any wij
is zero, the background noise can be quite large especially for the large degree nodes, as shown in
Figs. 2(b) and 2(d). Further calculations indicate that averaging a larger number of simulation runs
can suppress the background noise to certain extent, but it cannot be eliminated and may become
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quite influential for various types of dynamics (Sec. 2.2.2).
In previous works on reconstruction of complex networks based on stochastic dynamical corre-
lations [29, 30] or compressive sensing [33, 37], the existent (real) links can be distinguished from
the nonexistent links by setting a single threshold value in certain quantitative measure. The success
relies on the fact that the dynamics at various nodes are of the same type, and the reconstruction
algorithm is tailored toward the specific type of dynamical process. Our task is significantly more
challenging as the goal is to develop a universal system (or machine) to replicate a diverse array of
dynamical processes based on data. As can be seen in Figs. 2(a-c), for compressive sensing based
reconstruction, the computational criteria to distinguish existent from nonexistent links differ sub-
stantially for different dynamics in terms of quantities such as the solution magnitude, peak value
distribution, and background noise intensity. As a result, a more elaborate and sophisticated proce-
dure is required for determining the threshold for each particular case, suggesting that a straightfor-
ward application of compressive sensing cannot lead to a universal reconstruction algorithm. One
may also regard the solutions of the existent links as a kind of extreme events [48–50] on top of
the random background, but it is difficult to devise a universal criterion to judge if a peak in the
distribution of the quantitative measure represents the correct extreme event corresponding to an
existent link.
Through extensive testing, we find that a previously developed unsupervised clustering measure,
the K-means [39, 40], possesses the desired traits that can be exploited in combination with com-
pressive sensing to develop a universal reconstruction machine (see Materials and Methods for
details). As we will show, K-means can serve as a base for a highly effective structural estimator for
various types of dynamics on networks of distinct topologies. Depending on the specific combina-
tion of the network topology and dynamics, the reconstruction accuracies vary to certain extent but
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are still acceptable. Since the compressive sensing operation is node specific, the solutions obtained
separately from different nodes may give conflicting information as to whether there is actually a
link between the two nodes, requiring a proper resolution scheme. We develop such a scheme based
on node degree consistency (see Materials and Methods). Our universal reconstruction machine
thus contains three main components: compressive sensing, K-means, and conflict resolution. We
shall demonstrate that the machine can separate the true positive solutions from the noisy back-
ground with high success rate, for all combinations of the nodal dynamics and the network topology
tested.
2.2.2. Universality of SDBM as a Network Structural Estimator
Figure 3 demonstrates the performance of network structural estimation for SDBM dynamics
on random and scale-free networks in terms of the amount of data, characterized by the number
of measurements M , normalized by N , for SDBMs built up for systems with different original
topologies. We defineR1e andR
0
e as the estimation error rates for the existent and non-existent links,
namely, the false positive and the false negative rates, respectively. We see that, for a wide range
of the values ofM/N , the success rates of the existent and non-existent links, 1− R1e and 1 −R0e ,
respectively, are nearly 100% for homogeneous network topology. For heterogeneous (scale-free)
networks, the success rate 1 − R1e tends to be slightly lower than 100%, due to the violation of the
sparsity condition for hub nodes, leading to the difficulty to distinguish the peaks in the distribution
of the compressive sensing solutions from the noisy background. For M/N = 1, the success rates
are reduced slightly, due to the non-zero dissimilarity tolerance Γ that makes the values of XRi at
different time steps indistinguishable and introduces linear dependence into Eq. (2.9). As a result,
the accuracy of compressive sensing solutions is compromised to certain extent. Generally, high
reconstruction precision is guaranteed for almost any value choice of M as long as it is not too
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close to 0 and N , and this feature makes our methodology free of subjective parameters.
Our working hypothesis is that, for a networked system with a certain type of nodal dynam-
ics, there exists an equivalent SDBM. Reconstructing the structure of the SDBM would simultane-
ously give the topology of the original networked dynamical system. Accordingly, the time series
data generated from the original system can be used to reveal its underlining interaction structures
through the corresponding SDBM. In particular, we directly feed the original time series into the
framework of compressive sensing and K-means for SDBM to generate the network structure, and
test whether the structure generated by the SDBM based reconstruction mimics that of the orig-
inal network. The similarity can be quantified by the error rates of the existent and non-existent
links. Table 1 list the 14 dynamical processes on model networks and the underlying conditional
probabilities, and Tab. 2 shows the performance in terms of the percentage error rates R0e and R
1
e .
The 14 types of dynamical processes are taken from the fields of evolutionary game theory, opin-
ion dynamics, and spreading processes, covering a number of focused research topics in complex
networks. Strikingly, for all the dynamics with diverse properties, we find that that, for each and
every dynamics-network combination, zero or nearly zero error rates are obtained for both the ex-
istent and non-existent links, revealing a strong similarity between the original networks and the
ones generated from SDBM, regardless of the type of dynamics. The nonzero error rates in Tab. 2
come mainly from the high degree nodes. Consequently, as indicated in Tab. 2, the reconstruction
accuracy for networks of homogeneous topology is generally higher than that for heterogeneous
networks.
For certain types of evolutionary game dynamics, especially for the snowdrift game (SG) [24]
and the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) [20–23] with the Fermi updating rule [21], information
about the state configuration of the second nearest neighbors is required to calculate the payoffs
18














































Fig. 2. Solution Examples of Compressive Sensing and the Corresponding K-Means Clustering
Results. The compressive sensing solutions (green squares) are compared, element-wise, with the
true element values of the original connection vectors (dark purple triangles), where the x-axis is the
index of nodes with different degree values for different network topologies and dynamics types.
The target nodes and the correctly detected existent connections via the K-means are marked as
light blue and light purple bars, respectively. The false negative and the false positive estimations
are marked as red and gray bars, respectively. For all cases, the amount of linear measurements is
M = 0.4N . The restriction on Hamming distances is set to be Γ = 0.35 for all examples, and a
small change in Γ would not affect the qualitative results. (a) A node with the smallest degree k = 2
in a BA scale-free network of size N = 100 and average degree 〈k〉 = 4 with SDBM dynamics.
(b) The node of the largest degree k = 18 in the same network. (c) A node of degree k = 8 in
an ER random network of size N = 100 and average degree 〈k〉 = 4 with SDBM dynamics. (d)
The node with the largest degree k = 19 in a BA scale-free network of size N = 100 and average
degree 〈k〉 = 4 with prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) dynamics. (e) A node of degree k = 11 in a
real-world social network of size N = 67 subject to CP dynamics. (f) A node of degree k = 10 in
a real-world electrical circuit network of size N = 122 with Language model dynamics. In (d-f),
the element values of the original connection vector are set to unity since no true weight values are
given. For cases (a,b,c,f), there are no false negative detections, i.e., all existent links have been
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Fig. 3. Structural Estimation Success Rates and Parameter Estimation Errors Versus the Normalized
Data Amount. For SDBM dynamics on (a) ER-random and (b) BA scale-free networks, the success
rates of detection of existent links and identification of nonexistent links, 1−R1e (green circles) and
1− R0e (white circles), respectively, versus the normalized data amount M/N with error bars. The
absolute values of the errors in estimating the link weights and the nodal biases for the existent links
(purple squares) and non-existent links (white squares) are also shown. Most data points have quite
small error bars, indicating the performance stability of our method. High performance structural
and parameter estimations are achieved insofar asM/N exceeds about 10%.
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TABLE 1
Description of the 14 Dynamical Processes on Model Networks and the Conditional Probabilities.
The quantity P 0→1i or P
1→0
i is the probability that the state of node i (of degree ki) becomes 1 at
the next time step when its current state is 0, or vice versa, conditioned on its current neighbor state
configuration. The number of i’s neighbors in state 1 is ni. (See Supplementary Note 1 for a
detailed description of the dynamics and parameters for estimating the conditional probabilities
P 0→1i and P
1→0
i .)





























III Minority game [4–8] ki−niki
ni
ki
Voter [2, 3] niki
ki−ni
ki
Majority vote [2, 3]


Q if ni < ki/2
1/2 if ni = ki/2
1−Q if ni > ki/2


1−Q if ni < ki/2
1/2 if ni = ki/2
Q if ni > ki/2
IV Link-update voter [10, 11] ni〈k〉
ki−ni
〈k〉
Language model [12, 13] S(niki )
α (1− S)(ki−niki )α
Kirman [14, 15, 15] c1 + dni c2 + d(ki − ni)
V CP [18, 19] niki
λi µi
SIS [16, 69–71] 1− (1− λi)ni µi
VI SG [24] * *
PDG [20–23] * *
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TABLE 2
Reconstruction Error Rates. For the same dynamical processes in Tab. 1, the error rates (in
percentages) in uncovering the existent and non-existent links, R1e and R
0
e , respectively.
ER-random and BA scale-free of size N = 100 and average degree 〈k〉 = 4 are used as the
underlining network supporting the various dynamical processes. The normalized number of linear
measurements used in compressive sensing isM/N = 0.4 for all cases.
Category Dynamics Type R0e / R
1





I SDBM 0.0 / 0.1 0.1 / 3.4
II Ising Glauber [1] 0.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.0
SQ-SG [25] 0.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 3.2
SQ-PDG [25] 0.0 / 0.0 0.3 / 3.3
III Minority game [4–8] 0.0 / 0.6 0.0 / 0.2
Voter [2, 3] 0.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.0
Majority vote [2, 3] 0.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.1
IV Link-update voter [10, 11] 0.0 / 0.0 1.8 / 3.6
Language model [12, 13] 0.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.4
Kirman [14, 15, 15] 0.0 / 2.3 0.0 / 3.8
V CP [18, 19] 0.0 / 1.4 0.0 / 0.4
SIS [16, 69–71] 0.3 / 5.2 0.1 / 15.6
VI SG [24] 0.0 / 1.7 0.0 / 9.4
PDG [20–23] 0.1 / 9.6 0.1 / 9.8
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of the first nearest neighbors. In such a system, the next move of a target node is determined by
comparing its payoff from those of its neighbors. This implies that, using solely the state configura-
tion information of the Markov blanket, without the aid of the payoff information that requires the
state information of the second nearest neighbors, is insufficient to determine the state of the target
node into the immediate future, rendering inapplicable our SDBM based reconstruction. Contrary
to this intuition, we find that for both SG and PDG, high reconstruction accuracy can be achieved,
as shown in Tab. 2. Recall that our reconstruction method is formulated based on the independence
assumption of Markov networks, i.e., in order to reconstruct the local structure of a target node, it
should be completely independent of the rest of the system when the configuration of its Markov
blanket is given. The results in Tab. 2 indicate that our SDBM based algorithm performs better
than expected in terms of the reconstruction accuracy. In fact, the independence assumption can be
made to hold by adopting a self-questioning (SQ) based updating rule (see Supplementary Note 1
for details). In this case, excellent reconstruction accuracy is obtained, as can be seen from Tab. 2.
The structural estimation results reported so far are based on model network topologies. Real-
world complex networks have also been used to test our framework, as shown in Figs. 2(e,f). Ta-
bles 3 and 4 list a number of real world networks and the reconstruction accuracy. For various com-
binations of network topology and dynamical process, high reconstruction accuracy is achieved,
where for a number of cases the error rates are essentially zero. There are a few special cases where
the errors are relatively large, corresponding to situations where the globally frozen or oscillating
states dominate the dynamical process so that too few linearly independent measurements can be
obtained. Overall, the equivalent SDBM correspondence and the effectiveness of our reconstruction
scheme for real-world networks can be expected.
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TABLE 3
Structure Reconstruction Error Rates of 5 Real-World Networks Associated with 11 Typical
Complex Network Dynamics. The percentage error rates of the non-existent and the existent links
detection (R0e / R
1
e , %) are listed for all combinations of the network structure and dynamics. Each
entry denotes the error rates R0e / R
1
e corresponding to a particular type of dynamics (shown in the
column) for a real-world network topology (shown in the row). The result for each combination is
obtained withM = 0.4N linear measurements used in each implementation. For some
combinations, there exists a global absorption state in which the system state configuration freezes,
or a vibration state where the system only switches between a small number of configurations. In
such a case, not sufficient number of linearly independent measurements can be obtained to
implement compressive sensing. The entries associated with these cases are marked by “* / *”. A
detailed description of the real world networks can be found in Supplementary Note 2.
Dynamics Type Social-1 Social-2 Protein-1 Protein-2 Protein-3
Ising Glauber 0.2 / 3.8 0.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.0 1.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.0
Minority game 0.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 7.0 3.7 / 0.0 * / * * / *
Voter 0.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 4.2 3.9 / 0.8 * / * * / *
Majority vote 0.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 32.4 0.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.0
Link-update voter 3.0 / 2.5 0.1 / 7.0 0.2 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.0 2.7 / 0.0
Language model 0.2 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.0 0.1 / 0.0 2.1 / 0.0 * / *
Kirman 0.0 / 0.0 0.5 / 34.5 0.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.0
CP 0.2 / 0.0 0.0 / 7.0 0.0 / 0.0 * / * * / *
SIS 4.7 / 2.5 0.0 / 14.1 0.4 / 0.0 * / * * / *
SG 0.9 / 5.0 0.5 / 2.8 1.8 / 0.0 1.6 / 0.0 * / *
PDG 0.5 / 0.0 0.9 / 4.2 2.4 / 0.0 3.3 / 0.0 13.9 / 16.0
24
TABLE 4
Structure Reconstruction Error Rates of 4 Additional Real-World Networks Associated with 11
Types of Complex Network Dynamics. Table legends are the same as for Tab. 3.
Dynamics Type Food Web-1 Food Web-2 Food Web-3 Circuit
Ising Glauber * / * 0.0 / 0.0 * / * 0.0 / 0.0
Minority game 0.1 / 0.0 1.0 / 0.0 0.4 / 0.3 0.8 / 0.0
Voter 0.1 / 0.0 0.7 / 0.0 0.6 / 1.7 2.0 / 0.0
Majority vote 0.4 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.0 1.5 / 0.0 0.0 / 0.0
Link-update voter 1.1 / 0.0 15.7 / 0.0 * / * * / *
Language model 0.2 / 0.0 0.3 / 0.0 0.0 / 4.4 0.0 / 0.1
Kirman * / * 0.0 / 2.2 * / * 0.0 / 0.0
CP 0.4 / 0.5 0.0 / 0.7 5.3 / 1.5 0.0 / 0.0
SIS 1.3 / 9.4 4.7 / 8.0 17.3 / 17.3 * / *
SG 2.1 / 16.1 8.4 / 25.6 6.2 / 23.0 8.3 / 4.8
PDG 2.8 / 7.6 8.4 / 19.0 8.8 / 15.3 23.0 / 14.3
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2.2.3. Parameter Estimation Scheme
From the reconstructed network structure, any node i’s ki immediate neighbors, m1, m2, . . .,
mki , and their state configuration, X
MB
i = (xm1 , xm2 , . . . , xmki )
T, can be identified. Since the
probability that i’s state is 1 at the next time step depends only on i’s immediate neighbors, XRi (t)
in Eq. (2.5) can be simplified toXMBi (t), and Eq. (2.5) can be written as




m=1 wimxm(t) + bi]
. (2.10)

















〈xm1(t1)〉, 〈xm2(t1)〉, . . . , 〈xmki (t1)〉, 1























Our parameter estimation formulation is illustrated schematically in Fig. 4(a).
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Fig. 4. A Schematic Illustration of SDBM Parameter Estimation. (a) The parameter estimation
framework for the corresponding SDBM of the same system shown in Fig. 1 (a,b). It is formulated
by Eq. (2.11). The connections of the network are already known via the structure reconstruction
step, and thus the entries are only obtained from a node’s Markov blanket [shown in Fig. 1(b)].
This calculation is implemented for each node in the system. (b) The values of the link weights
and the node biases (shown as different colors) for the corresponding SDBM are calculated via
the parameter estimation scheme in (a) and the degree guided solution substitution operation (see
Materials and Methods).
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For a particular neighboring state configuration of node i, XMBi (t), its occurring frequency
determines the precision in the estimation of P [xi(t + 1)|XMBi (t)] ≃ 〈xi(t + 1)〉, which in turn
determines the solution precision of Eq. (2.11). The occurrence of different neighboring state con-
figurations for the same node may differ dramatically. Furthermore, the accuracy in estimating the
probability P [xi(t+1)|XMBi (t)] depends on the node degree due to the increasing difficulty in find-
ing exactly the same configurations for larger degree nodes. Overcoming the estimation difficulty
is a highly non-trivial problem. Exploiting the available data further, we develop a degree guided
solution substitution operation to cope with this difficulty, where sufficient estimation precision is
guaranteed for most cases (see Materials and Methods). A SDBM with estimated parameters is
schematically shown in Fig. 4(b).
2.2.4. Universal Dynamics Approximator
In Table 1, the complex network dynamics are categorized in terms of the specific probabilities
P 0→1i and P
1→0
i . In particular, category I is for the SDBM dynamics and category II contains dy-
namical processes with P 0→1i and P
1→0
i having a mathematical form similar to that of the SDBM.
For category III, the forms of P 0→1i and P
1→0
i for the three types of dynamics are quite different.
Despite the differences among the dynamical processes in the three categories, they share a key
property: i.e., P 0→1i + P
1→0
i = 1, which plays a critical role in implementing the parameter esti-
mation. For the processes in categories IV and V, we have P 0→1i + P
1→0
i 6= 1, where P 1→0i is a
time-invariant constant for the nodal dynamics in category V.
We first test our parameter estimation scheme using the state time series generated by the
SDBM, which can be validated through a direct comparison of the estimated parameter values with
their true values, as shown in Figs. 2(a-c). However, since the parameters only affect the system





















































Fig. 5. Comparison Between the Conditional Probability of the Original System and That Generated
Via the Reconstructed SDBM. (a) Conditional probability P [xi(t+1) = 1|XRi (t)] versus time t for
the original system with SDBM dynamics for a BA-scale free network and (b) the reconstructed ap-
proximator using the configuration time series of the original system, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N (the y-axis)
and 1 ≤ t ≤ T (the x-axis). (c) Time series of the conditional probability P [xi(t+ 1) = 1|XRi (t)]
for the original system with SIS dynamics for a BA-scale free network and (d) the reconstructed
approximator.
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sess the predictive power, we introduce an alternative validation scheme. For each particular system
configuration, the acceptable parameter estimation results would serve as a base to generate another
SDBM with identical conditional probabilities for each node at each time step, as compared with
those of the original system. Figures 5(a) and 5(b) present a comparison between the conditional
probabilities P [xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)] of the original SDBM and the estimated SDBM calculated
from Eq. (2.5). We see that the two time series of P (xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)) are visually indistin-
guishable. Figure 6(a) shows the error distributions of the estimated conditional probability time
series, where an overwhelmingly sharp peak occurs at 0, indicating an excellent agreement between
the estimated and the true parameter values.
For typical dynamical processes on complex networks, our goal is to find the equivalent SDBMs
whose true parameter values are not available. In this case, the performance of the parameter es-
timation scheme can be assessed through the reconstructed conditional probabilities. Based on the
recovered network structure, the time series of the network dynamics are fed into the parameter
estimation scheme, and the link weights and the nodal biases are obtained to form a system obeying
the SDBM dynamics. Corresponding to the categories in Table 1, the distributions of the estimation
errors between the original conditional probability P [xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)] and the one generated
by the newly constructed SDBM are shown in Fig. 6, where panels (a-f) show the error distributions
corresponding to the six types of dynamics in categories II and III in Table 1, respectively. In each
case, a sharp peak at zero dominates the distribution, indicating the equivalence of the reconstructed
SDBM to the original dynamics. Given a particular type of complex network dynamics, the SDBM
resulted from our structural and parameter estimation scheme is indeed equivalent to the original
dynamical system. The limited amount of data obtained from the original system renders important
state prediction of the system, a task that can be accomplished by taking advantage of the equiva-
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lence of the SDBM to the original system in the sense that the SDBM produces approximately equal
state transition probabilities in the immediate future, given the current system configuration. The
SDBM thus possesses a significant predictive power for the original system. Thus, regardless of the
type of the dynamical process, insofar it satisfies the relation P 0→1i + P
1→0
i = 1, the reconstructed
SDBM can serve as a universal dynamics approximator.
For an SDBM, the relation P 1→1i = 1 − P 1→0i = P 0→1i holds in general. However, for the
dynamical processes in categories IV and V, we have P 1→1i 6= 1 − P 1→0i = P 0→1i so that a single
SDBM is not sufficient to fully characterize the dynamical evolution. Our solution is to construct
two SDBMs, A and B, each associated with one of the two cases: xi(t) = 0 and xi(t) = 1,
respectively. The link weights wAij (or w
B




i ) for node i in SDBM
A (or B) are computed for all the time steps t satisfying xi(t) = 0 (or xi(t) = 1), leading to
P [xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)] for xi(t) = 0 (or xi(t) = 1) from SDBM A (or B). Using this strategy,
the dominant peaks at zero persist in the error distributions for the dynamical processes in category
IV, as shown in Figs. 6(g-i). For the epidemic spreading dynamics (CP and SIS) in category V,
the fixed value of P 1→0i for each node i can be acquired through P
1→0
i ≃ 〈xi(t1 + 1)〉t1 , where
〈xi(t1 + 1)〉t1 stands for the average of xi(t1 + 1) over all values of t1 satisfying xi(t1) = 1.
Through this approach, SDBM B is in fact a network without links but with each node’s bias satis-
fying µi = exp(bi)/[1 + exp(bi)], where µi is node i’s recovery rate. Figures 6(j) and 6(k) show
the error distributions of the conditional probability recovery for the spreading processes, where we
see that the errors are essentially zero. If the method of solving SDBM B in category IV is adopted
to the dynamical processes in other categories, i.e., without any prior knowledge about P 1→0i , the
resulted SDBM would have nearly identical link weight values with respect to SDBM A (in cat-
egories I-III) or have close-to-zero link weights and µi ≃ exp(bi)/[1 + exp(bi)] for category V,
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despite that their conditional probability recovery errors may be slightly larger than those in Fig. 6.
The persistent occurrence of a dominant peak at zero in error distribution implies the power of the
combined SDBMs as a universal dynamics approximator, regardless of the specific settings of the
transition probability. When limited prior knowledge about P 1→0i is available, SDBM B can be
simplified or even removed without compromising the estimation accuracy. In general, the univer-
sal approximator has a significant short-term predictive power for arbitrary types of dynamics on
complex networks.
In the terminology of machine learning, the conditional probability recovery error is called the
“training error,” since it is obtained from the same data set used to build (or “train”) the approxima-
tor. In the traditional machine learning literature, the data points generated from the same system
that have not been used in the training process can be exploited to validate or test the actual per-
formance of the trained model [39], which in our case is the approximator. As a result, the time
series generated from the original complex network system after the approximator is built can be
used as the test data set. (Absence of hyper-parameters in the reconstruction process means that
cross-validation is unnecessary.) In most cases, the training errors are generally smaller than the
test errors, since the training data set is already well-fitted by the model (the approximator) in the
training process, while the test data are new and may be out of the fitting range of the current model.
Feeding the state configurations of the test data set into the approximator, we calculate the corre-
sponding conditional probabilities using Eq. (2.5) and compare them to the true values. The results
reveal a clear advantage of the approximator built from our scheme, i.e., the training and test er-
rors are nearly identical, indicating no over-fitting issues, which are common in various machine
learning methodologies [39].
32





























































































































Fig. 6. Distributions of the Conditional Probability Estimation Errors for Various Complex Network
Dynamics. The distributions of δ = |P [xi(t+1) = 1|XRi (t)]−P est[xi(t+1) = 1|XRi (t)]| for the
dynamical processes in categories I to V from Table 1 for ER random (green bars) and BA scale-free
(blue bars) networks, where P est[xi(t+1) = 1|XRi (t)] denotes the conditional probability estimated
from the corresponding SDBM approximator through the original state configuration times series,
1 ≤ i ≤ N , and 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
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2.2.5. Model Complexity and Representation Power
As shown in Fig. 6, for dynamical processes in categories I and II, the estimation errors are
dominantly distributed at zero. For processes in other categories, besides the dominant peak at zero,
there exist multiple small peaks at nonzero error values. These small side peaks are a consequence
of the model complexity of the Markov networks.
For dynamical processes in categories I and II, the transition probabilities P 0→1i all have the
form of 1/[1 + exp(Ani+Bki)], where A and B are constants, and ni denotes the number of node
i’s neighbors whose states are 1. We have
[1 + exp(Ani +Bki)]










wimxm(t) + bi. (2.12)
In the ideal case where an absolutely accurate estimate of P [xi(t+1) = 1|XRi (t)] can be obtained,
Eq. (2.12) holds for any possible neighboring state configurations. We thus have wim = A and bi =
Bki, and the probabilities conditioned on these configurations sharing the same values of ni in the
approximator are all equal to P 0→1i . This means that, in theory, the conditional probabilities can be
reconstructed with zero errors. In fact, a one-to-one mapping between the coefficients indicates that
the model complexity of the SDBM provides the approximator with sufficient representation power
to model the dynamics processes in categories I and II. Practically, since the statistical estimations of
P [xi(t+1) = 1|XRi (t)] may not be absolutely identical under different neighboring configurations
with the same values of ni due to random fluctuations, we have wim ≈ A so that the conditional
probabilities generated by the approximator may differ from each other slightly and also from the
true probability P 0→1i . As a result, random recovery errors can occur.
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For dynamical processes in categories other than I and II, the simple coefficient-mapping rela-
tion between the corresponding xm(t) terms on the two sides of Eq. (2.12) become highly nonlinear,
due to the fact that the specific forms of P 0→1i differ dramatically from that of the SDBM. In this
case, each particular neighboring state configuration produces a distinct equation. There are 2ki
equations in total, while the number of unknown variables to be solved is only ki + 1 (wim for
m = 1, . . . , ki and bi). For ki ≥ 2, there are thus more equations than the number of unknown
variables. As a result, the representation power of the SDBM approximator is limited by its fi-
nite model complexity so that, even in theory, the approximator may not be able to fully describe
the original dynamical process. In our framework, we calculate the Markov link weights and the
node biases according to the ki + 1 most frequently appeared neighboring state configurations. A
consequence is that imprecise conditional probability estimations can arise for the configurations
with relatively lower occurring frequency, giving rise to the nonzero peaks in the error distribu-
tion in Fig. 6. However, interestingly, with respect to the precision of the conditional probabilities
produced by the approximator, the SDBM parameters do not show a significantly strong prefer-
ence towards the most frequently occurring configurations. In practice, the estimated conditional
probabilities for the majority of the less frequently occurring configurations also fall within a close
range of the true values. This phenomenon suggests the power of the approximator to work beyond
the limit set by its theoretical model complexity. This is the main reason for the emergence and
persistence of the dominant peak at zero in the error distribution.
2.2.6. Potential for SDBM as a Generative Model?
In real world applications, it is often the case that little information about the details of the
dynamical processes is available, i.e., the time series data can be regarded as from a “black box.”
Say the data generation mechanism can be uncovered based solely on the observed data, i.e., the
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black-box dynamics is simulated to reproduce the “pseudo” time series bearing the same statistical
properties of the original data. In machine learning, the model is deemed generative in the sense
that it has the same data generating mechanism as that of the original system. Such a generative
model captures the essential dynamical and statistical properties of the original system, which can
be exploited for long term statistical prediction through simulation. Here we investigate the po-
tential for the SDBM approximator to serve as a generative model of the original dynamics. A
basic requirement is that the long-term conditional probability recovery error accumulated at each
immediate time step does not drive the model behavior significantly off the trajectory generated
by the original dynamical process. Due to the stochastic nature of the original dynamical system
and its approximator, starting from a particular state configuration, reproducing similar conditional
probabilities in the immediate future does not guarantee a similar state configuration. In fact, the
deviation in the configuration at the next time step may lead to further and larger deviations, and so
on.
Figure 7 shows three examples: two positive cases where the prediction is reasonable and one
negative case where the task fails. For those examples, the approximator is initialized from a ran-
dom configuration and runs for the same amount of time as the original time series. In the positive
cases (SQ-SG and SIS), the conditional probability time series generated by the approximator are
visually similar to the original data, indicating that the observed data are qualitatively and quantita-
tively reproduced by the approximator. In addition, for each node, its conditional probability value
P [xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)] can be treated as a random variable, p, whose distributions in the true
system should be similar to that produced by the approximator if it can indeed serve as a generative
model. To characterize the similarity in the distributions, one could use some standard statistical
measures such as the Kullback-Leibler divergence [77], the Jensen-Shannon divergence [78], the
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Bhattacharyya distance [79], and the Hellinger distance [80]. However, we find that the perfor-
mance of these metrics are not stable. It is more effective to directly compare each node’s 〈p〉
and ∆p values from the original data and the approximator, e.g., for the three examples shown in
Figs. 7(c,f,i). The result is that, except for a few nodes, the values of 〈p〉 and ∆p obtained from the
data and SDBM agree with each other for the two positive cases, but there is a substantial differ-
ence for the negative case. Our calculation also shows that there are cases where the approximator
reproduces similar values of 〈p〉 and ∆p for a substantial fraction of the nodes in the network, but
with deviations for the remaining nodes. We conclude that the SDBM approximator can serve as a
generative model for some systems. Improvement is necessary to generalize the generative power of
SDBM (see Supplementary Note 3 for detailed simulation results for different types of dynamics).
2.3. Discussion
Reconstructing complex dynamical systems from data is a frontier field in network science and
engineering with significant applications. Our study was motivated by the question: is it possible
to build a universal “machine” to reconstruct, from data only, the underlying complex networked
dynamical system and to make predictions? While this paper does not provide a complete solu-
tion, significant and (in some cases) striking results are obtained, which give strong credence that
such a machine may eventually be possible. In particular, we combine compressive sensing and
machine learning to propose two concepts: universal network structural estimator and dynamics
approximator. Universality is fundamentally possible due to the fact that many dynamical pro-
cesses on complex networks are of the Markov type and the interactions among modes are local.
As a result, utilizing basic tools from machine learning and statistical physics, one can build up
an energy based Markov network model (e.g., a sparse dynamical Boltzmann machine), to con-

























































































Fig. 7. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the Ap-
proximator Using the Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series. (a,d), (b,e), and (c,f): the
conditional probability P [xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)] time series generated from the original state con-
figuration time series (upper panel) and from the SDBM approximator using the state configuration
time series generated by itself (lower panel) for SQ-SG, SIS, and Voter dynamics on ER random
networks, respectively. (g,h,i) The mean and standard deviations of p = P [xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)]
for each node i for all time steps for SQ-SG (g), SIS (h), and Voter dynamics (i), respectively, on
ER random networks, calculated from the original system (red circles) and the approximator (blue
squares), where 1 ≤ i ≤ N (the x-axis).
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and dynamics. For a large number of representative dynamical processes studied in this paper,
we demonstrate that such a universal SDBM can be reconstructed based on compressive sens-
ing and the scheme of K-means using data only, without requiring any extra information about
the network structure or the dynamical process. The working of the SDBM is demonstrated us-
ing a large number of combinations of the network structure and dynamics, including many real
world networks and classic evolutionary game dynamics. An SDBM with its parameters given
by the equations constructed from the times series along with the estimated network structure
is able to reproduce the conditional probabilities quantitatively and, accordingly, it is capable of
predicting the state configuration at least in a short term. We demonstrate that, for certain types
of dynamics, the approximator can reproduce the dynamical process statistically, indicating the
potential of serving as a generative model for long term prediction in such cases. Our work
adopts binary dynamics, while in principle, the methodology is not confined by such a restriction.
Eq. 2.4 can be easily extended to the conditional probability of each possible state value λj , that
is, P [xi(t + 1) = λj|XRi (t)] = P [xi(t + 1) = λj ,XRi (t)]/
∑
s P [xi(t + 1) = λs,X
R
i (t)]. But
the configuration space of system states grows exponentially with the choices of λj , so that given
fine amount of data, the number of time instances corresponding to each particular configuration
encounters exponential drop, and thus, the estimation precision of the conditional probability would
drop due to the lack of samples. This poses higher requirements for data amount and computational
power.
Our effort represents an initial attempt of realizing a universal estimator and approximator, and
the performance of our method is quite competitive in comparison with the existing reconstruction
schemes designed for specific types of dynamics, such as the compressive sensing technique for
evolutionary game and epidemic spreading dynamics [29–31, 37, 38], as well as methods adopt-
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ing the Bethe approximation, pseudo-likelihood, mean-field theory, and decimation operation for
static and kinetic inverse Ising problems [11–22]. In realistic applications, the data obtained may
be discontinuous or incomplete. In such cases, the short-term predictive power possessed by the
universal estimator and approximator can be exploited to overcome the difficulty of missing data,
as the Markov network nature of the SDBM makes backward inference possible so that the system
configurations during the time periods of missing data may be inferred. When long term prediction
is possible, the universal approximator has the critical capability of simulating the system behavior
and predicting the chance that the system state enters into a global absorption phase, which may
find significant applications such as disaster early warning. Another interesting reverse-engineering
problem lies in the mapping between the original dynamics and the corresponding parameter value
distribution of the reconstructed SDBM. That is, a certain parameter distribution of the SDBMmay
indicate a specific type of the original dynamics. As such, the correspondence can be used for pre-
cisely identifying nonlinear and complex networked dynamical systems. It is also possible to assess
the relative importance of the nodes and links in a complex network based on their correspond-
ing biases and weights in the reconstructed SDBM for controlling the network dynamics. These
advantages justify our idea of developing a universal machine for data-based reverse engineering
of complex networked dynamical systems, calling for future efforts in this emerging direction to
further develop and perfect the universal network structural estimator and dynamics approximator.
2.4. Materials and Methods
2.4.1. Structural Estimation Details.
For each type of dynamics, 10 different network realizations are generated for both BA scale-
free and ER random topologies. For any node in a particular network realization, the corresponding
connection weight vector VN×1 is obtained by averaging over 100 compressive sensing implemen-
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tations. The elements corresponding to the existent nodes are distinguished from the non-existent
links by feeding the averaged VN×1 into the K-means algorithm (see below), and the unweighted
adjacency matrix is then obtained.
2.4.2. Conflict Resolution.
Since the links are bidirectional, the node on each side provides a weighted solution of the same
link. The two solutions may be quite different, giving contradictory indication of the existence of
the link and resulting in an asymmetric adjacency matrix. For majority types of dynamical pro-
cesses on complex networks, compressive sensing almost always gives higher prediction accuracy
for lower degree nodes due to the higher connection sparsity, which holds true especially for nodes
with their degrees smaller than the network average. Based on this fact, when encountering contra-
dictory solutions, we determine the link existence by examining the lower degree side if the degree
value is equal to or smaller than the network average. For cases where the degrees of both sides are
larger than the network average, we find that the false negative rates are often high. This is because
compressive sensing tends to give over simplified results such as inducing a more than necessary
level of sparsity to the solution or causing large fluctuations with the non-existent links so that they
are mixed up with the existent ones. As a result, contradictory solutions are treated as positive (exis-
tent) solutions. For two types of dynamics, the SDBM dynamics and link-update voter dynamics, or
dynamics on real-world networks, treating all contradictory solutions this way, regardless of degree
values, can improve the reconstruction precision, albeit only slightly in some cases.
2.4.3. Implementation of the K-Means Algorithm.
K-means is one of the simplest and most popular clustering algorithms and has been widely
used for unsupervised clustering tasks [39]. It provides each data example a hard assignment to a
cluster within which the data examples are relatively close (or similar) between each other while
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Fig. 8. A Schematic Illustration of the K-Means Algorithm for a 2-Dimensional Data Clustering
Task. (a) The data points (solid blue circles) in a 2-D feature space to be clustered. It can be visually
distinguished that there are three clusters, thus K = 3. The K-means algorithm will assign each
data point into one of the three clusters. (b) Randomly guess 3 cluster center locations (aqua, green,
and red hollow circles), and each data point finds out which center it’s closet to. (c) The 2-D space
is divided into three regions by three decision boundaries (black dashed lines), each containing the
corresponding data points whose closest center is within this region. The data points currently in
the regions with the corresponding aqua, green, and red centers are assigned to the aqua, green,
and red clusters, respectively. At this stage, data points may be assigned to a cluster that it visually
does not belong to. (d) Each center moves to the centroid of the data points currently assigned to
it. (e) The updated cluster assignments of the data points are obtained according to the new center
locations (movements are shown by the black arrows). The steps in (c) and (d) are repeated until
convergence. (f) The final cluster assignments. Different from this illustration, the compressive
sensing solutions of the link weights wij are 1-dimensional data points, which form two clusters in
1-D space, corresponding to the existent and non-existent links, respectively. (We use the 2-D case
to illustrate the K-means algorithm instead of 1-D, due to the representation difficulty in the 1-D
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Fig. 9. An Example of Our Proposed Degree Guided Solution Substitution Operation and Final
Equation Group Construction. The target node 1 has only two neighbors, nodes 2 and 3. Without
loss of generality, we set k3 < k1 = 2 < k2 so that the link weight between nodes 1 and 3, w13,
is already obtained. The quantity PMBs = ln(1/〈x1(t + 1)〉s − 1) (s = 1, . . . , 4, as 2k1 = 4
possible (x2, x3) configurations exist in total) denotes the estimated probability for x1 = 1 under
configuration s at the next time step. The occurring probabilities of the corresponding (x2, x3)
configurations are listed as percentages in the left column of each panel. (a) All the four (x2, x3)
configurations are shown by the first two columns of the 4 × 3 matrix in the equation. (b) The
contribution of the known w13 and the configurations of x3 as marked in (a) are moved to the left-
hand side of the equation. (c) In order to solve for (w12, b1)
T, the two most precise PMBs values
(s = 2 and 4) corresponding to the most frequent (x2, x3) configurations from (b) are chosen to
build a linear 2-equation group. However, the 2 × 2 matrix on the right-hand side does not have
full rank and, hence, this equation group is ill defined (d) Configurations s = 1 and 2 are selected
to construct a 2-equation group with a full rank 2 × 2 matrix on the right-hand side with relatively
precise probability estimations, and this equation group is used to solve (w12, b1)
T.
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distant from ones in other clusters. The main steps for solving a typical 2-dimensional data clus-
tering problem via K-means are schematically presented in Fig. 8. For each vector VN×1 obtained
from averaging over multiple applications of compressive sensing, picking out the elements corre-
sponding to the existent links from the non-existent ones with their fluctuating element values is
equivalent to a one-dimensional clustering problems with two target clusters, which is one dimen-
sion lower than the case shown in Fig. 8. When implementing the K-means algorithm, we choose
the initial cluster center positions for the two clusters as the maximum and minimum values of the
vector elements with the bias bi excluded. This is justified because the compressive sensing solu-
tion of bi can have an overwhelmingly high absolute value, which does not provide any structural
information but can severely disrupt the clustering process, as demonstrated in Figs. 2(d,f). Due
to the sparsity of complex networks, the cluster with smaller number of components is regarded as
containing the solutions of the existent links, and the components of the other one correspond to the
non-existent links.
2.4.4. Link Weights and Node Biases Estimation.
For each node i, we rank the occurrence of all the existing configurations of its neighbor’s
states. Among the top ones, ki + 1 are selected to ensure that the coefficient matrix ⊖MB(ki+1)×(ki+1)
on the right hand side of Eq. (2.11) has full rank so that the solutions, wim1 , wim2 , . . . , wimki , bi,
are unique (the selected configurations are not necessarily on the exact top, since the real top ki+1
ones may not provide a full rank coefficient matrix).
Due to insufficient number of samples or some particular features of a specific dynamical pro-
cess, 〈xi(t + 1)〉, the statistical estimation of P [xi(t + 1)|XMBi (t)] (or P [xi(t + 1)|XRi (t)]), can
be 0 or 1, which respectively makes 1/〈xi(t+ 1)〉 or ln[1− 1/〈xi(t+ 1)〉] in Eqs. (2.9) and (2.11)
diverge. Without loss of generality, we set 〈xi(t+1)〉 = ǫ (or 〈xi(t+1)〉 = 1−ǫ) if 〈xi(t+1)〉 = 0
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(or 1), where ǫ is a small positive constant.
For node i of degree ki, the total number of the possible neighboring state configurations is
2ki , so large degree nodes have tremendously more configurations. The process may then regard
every particular type of configurations as useful and accordingly lead to inaccurate estimate of
P [xi(t + 1)|XMBi (t)]. Our computations show that properly setting a tolerance in the Hamming
distance that allows similar but not exactly identical configurations to be treated as the sameXMBi (t)
can improve the estimation performance. For a particular neighboring state configuration with too
fewer identical matches in the observed data, configurations with difference in one or more digits in
the Hamming distance are used instead, until a sufficient number of matches are found. For nodes
of degrees larger than, say 15, the Hamming distance tolerances within 2 or 3 usually lead to a
reasonable number of matches for estimating P [xi(t + 1)|XMBi (t)]. Extensive calculation shows
that the small inaccuracy has little effect on the reconstruction accuracy.
2.4.5. Degree Guided Solution Substitution Operation.
For node i’s neighbors, the occurrence frequency of a particular state configuration is generally
much higher for smaller values of ki. Accordingly, the probability estimation conditioned on this
configuration can be more accurate for smaller values of ki. More precise conditional probabilities
in turn lead to a higher estimation accuracy of link weights and node biases. Similar to resolving
the solution contradiction in the structural reconstruction step, for a pair of linked nodes, i and j of
different degrees, wij solved from the equation group of node i is likely to be more accurate than
wji obtained via node j, if ki < kj , even they should have the identical values in an ideal case.
As a result, using the solution obtained from a lower degree node as the value of the link weight
provides a better estimation. We run the calculation for all nodes in the network one by one in a
degree-increasing order so that the link weights of the smallest degree nodes are acquired earlier
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than other nodes. For the larger degree nodes, the link weights shared with the smaller degree nodes
are substituted by the previously obtained values, which are treated as known constants instead of
variables waiting to be solved. This operation effectively removes the contribution of the lower
degree neighbors from the equation and so reduces the number of unknown variables. A reduced
equation group in a form similar to Eq. (2.11) can be built up based on the most frequently occurring
state configurations of the remaining neighbors. When the full-rank condition is met, maximum
possible precision of the remaining unknown link weights can be achieved. Consequently, with this
substitution operation, the ki link weights of node i, which can be inaccurate if solved from the
original ki+1-equation group, can be estimated with the maximum possible accuracy. An example
of this substitution operation and the final equation group construction process is shown in Fig. 9.
Our calculations show that the application of the degree guided solution substitution operation
can significantly increase the accuracy of the estimation of the link weights and nodes biases. This
operation is thus key to making the SDBM correspondence a reliable approximator of the original
network dynamics.
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3 . RECOVERING INTERDEPENDENT STRUCTURE OF MULTI-LAYER COMPLEX
NETWORKS
3.1. Introduction
Functional, structural, or information interdependencies are ubiquitous within and between var-
ious real-world social, economic, technological, biological, and ecological systems, such as the
functional interdependence between the Internet and the power grids, the capital transition between
the real economy and the financial institutions, and the preyer-predator relation between different
animal species. These interdependencies usually serve as interaction media between systems of
different features or natures and may play critical roles in determining the properties in dynamical
synchronization [81–84], diffusion and spreading processes [85–89], evolutionary game dynam-
ics [90–93], and the stability or robustness against propagation of malfunction or burst of disas-
ters [94–100]. Since the interaction fashion between the components within a system in most cases
differ dramatically with that between multiple systems, the interrelation between different systems
is usually subtle and thus hard to extract directly from experimental data. It is hence of crucial im-
portance and urgent need to develop an interaction structure detection scheme that works for various
types of independent multiplex infrastructures with high success rate.
In a variety of fields in science and engineering, complex networked infrastructures interdepen-
dent with each other are generally modeled via multi-layer complex networks with certain types
of interactions between the layers. Previous works on structure recovery mainly focus on complex
networked systems whose interior interactions are in an identical form, i.e., the same nodal dynam-
ics is applied to each element of the system [3–10, 23–31, 35–38], and thus, effectively only one
single layer exists, while this work is aiming at uncovering not just the inner-layer topologies with
the same nodal dynamics but more importantly the interdependent connections that correspond to
47
a completely different interaction form, given only the state time series data of the system com-
ponents. We develop a two-stage compressive sensing [42, 43, 101, 102] based approach: (1) the
multi-layer system is broken down to separate layers, and the topology is solved layer by layer
via the first stage compressive sensing; (2) the components that may have interdependencies with
other layers are detected, and the second stage compressive sensing is implemented to determine the
inter-connections between these bridge-like components. This breaking-down treatment enables us
to deal with systems with large sizes, which is too costly to solve directly via compressive sensing
all at once. Without loss of generality, two representative types of inner-layer dynamical processes,
the evolutionary game dynamics and the nonlinear oscillator dynamics, respectively in discrete and
continuous domains, are adopted in our work to examine the effectiveness and robustness of our
approach. Extensive calculation show our method is capable of coping with various modeled and
realistic multi-layer complex networks with excellent topology reconstruction and parameter esti-
mation performances, even under noisy environment.
3.2. Results
For the discrete dynamical process, our work consider the classical prisoner’s dilemma game
(PDG) as an concrete representative of evolutionary game models [20–23,105]. In the evolutionary
PDG model on a single-layer complex network, each individual plays the game with all its nearest
neighbors at each time instance, while the payoff, i.e., the characterization of an individual’s profit
or gain, is calculated at the beginning of the time instance for the individual. Each individual may
choose either to cooperate, C, or to defect, D, in any one encounter. If both players choose C, both
get a payoff of R; if one defects while the other cooperates, D gets T , while C gets S; if both defect,









where the above parameters are chosen to be R = 1, T = b > 1, and S = P = 0 in our model [20],
and the model is easily changed into another type of game by simply adopting different parameter
settings. The total payoff of an individual i at time instance t is the sum of the payoffs gained





i (t) · H · Sj(t),
where the summation is over the neighborhood of i, Ωi; the 2 by 1 vectors Si(t) and Sj(t) stand
for the current strategies adopted by individuals i and j, and S(t) = (1, 0)T and (0, 1)T denotes
cooperative and defective strategies, respectively. At the strategy updating stage right after payoff
calculation, individual i randomly selects a neighbor j and imitates its strategy of the current time
instance with probability Pi→j = {1 + exp [−(Uj(t)− Ui(t))/κ]}−1, where κ is the “rationality”
of the individuals, characterizing the uncertainties in assessing the best strategy.
We define N − 1 dimensional vector Ai = (ai1, . . . , ai,i−1, ai,i+1, . . . , aiN )T as the
connection vector of node i in the network, where each element aij = 1 (or 0) indi-
cates an existent (or non-existent) connection between i and j for any j satisfying 1 ≤
j ≤ N and j 6= i. Accordingly, the payoff of individual i can be written in the




i (t)HSj(t) = Vi(t) · Ai, where Vi(t) =




i (t)HSi+1(t), . . . ,S
T
i (t)HSN (t)] is a N − 1 dimensional
vector. While acquiring the information in multiple time instances, we have Ui = Wi ·Ai, where
Ui = [Ui(t1), Ui(t2), . . . , Ui(tl)]
T is the payoff vector, andWi is a l byN−1matrix with each row
equal to vector Vi(ts) (1 ≤ s ≤ l). This form well suits the framework of the compressive sensing
technique, and the connection vector Ai and accordingly the network topology can be recovered
with high precision [31].
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Fig. 10. Schematic Illustrations of a Multi-Layer, Interdependent Network and the Compressing
Sensing Approach of Solving the Interdependent Connection Structure. (a) A 3-layer interdependent
network with 8 nodes in each layer. Nodes i11 and i12 are the bridge nodes in layer 1; nodes i21,
i22, and i23 are the bridge nodes in layer 2; and nodes i31, i32, and i33 are the bridge nodes in layer
3. The interdependent node pairs are i11 and i32, i12 and i22, i21 and i31, and i23 and i33. (b) A
schematic illustration of Eq. 3.2. The numbers of rows and columns only have schematic meaning.
The number of time instances selected (the number of rows of Uˆi andW
′
i) is usually much smaller
than the length of vector in a typical compressive sensing setting. The colored parts of matrix W′i
and vector A′i corresponds to the inner-layer connections of layer m, while the black-and-white
parts corresponds to the interdependent connections between layer m and the bridge nodes in all
other layers. Using (a) as an example, if m = 2 and i = i21, then the black-and-white components
in (b) are corresponding to the possible interdependencies between node i = i21 and nodes q = i11,
i12, i31, i32, and i33.
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For games taking place in a multi-layer interdependent structure instead of a single layer net-
work, as shown in Fig. 29(a), an individual interacts with not just its neighbors within the layer it
is located in but also with an interdependent node in another layer, if exists, and it is the inter-layer
interactions between these node pairs that introduces the interdependency between different lay-
ers. As an analogy of the widely existent diversified investment and hedge funding behavior in the
real-world, a player may simultaneously devote its effort to multiple fields, such as stock market,
futures, or real estate, characterized via the interdependent individuals in multiple network layers.
Since the funds transfer among the participating fields for balancing the gains or hedging risks is
common in reality, we device a simple but representative mechanism to capture the phenomenon:
partial payoff exchange between the interdependent node pairs, that it, node i transfers a part of
its original payoff Um1i (t) obtained solely within its home layer m1, ηiq · Um1i (t) (0 < ηiq < 1),
to its interdependent partner q in layer m2, while receiving ηiq · Um2q (t) from q, where Um2q (t)
is q’s original payoff gained within its home layer m2, and the final payoffs of nodes i and q are
Uˆm1i (t) = (1−ηiq)Um1i (t)+ηiqUm2q (t) and Uˆm2q (t) = (1−ηiq)Um2q (t)+ηiqUm1i (t), respectively.
If the compressive sensing based method for single layer network dynamics [31] is adopted to
detect the structure of a particular layer among the multiplex, while Uˆm1i (t) is treated as U
m1
i (t)
for each node i, the nodes with interdependent partners can be regarded as being affected by a
external hidden source. In previous models with external hidden attributes, the compressive sensing
solutions of them may fail in the sense of lacking sparsity and displaying strikingly higher standard
deviations compared with the other nodes [35, 36]. Thus, in our model, the bridge nodes, namely,
the nodes with interdependencies in other layers, may also be identified via analyzing their standard
deviations of their corresponding compressive sensing solutions.
With the identified bridge nodes, we propose a method of extracting their detailed interdepen-
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dencies purely from the state and payoff time series data. For a bridge node i in layer m of the
multiplex withM layers in total, its final payoff can be expressed in the following form
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i = [ (1− ηiq)ai1, . . . , (1− ηiq)ai,i−1, (1− ηiq)ai,i+1, . . . , (1− ηiq)aiN , (3.4)
ηi1ci1, . . . , ηiqciq, . . . , ηiN˜mciN˜m ]
T;
N˜m denotes the total number of bridge nodes in all layers except for layer m; U
∗
q stands for the
payoff for a bridge node q in all layers other than layer m. By this means, for l time instances, the
matrix W′i formed via vertically stacking the row vectors V
′






where Uˆi = [Uˆi(t1), . . . , Uˆi(tl)]. Apparently, this form allows A
′
i, accordingly the interdependent
connection structure between i and the bridge nodes in all other layers along with the payoff ex-
change rates ηiq, to be simultaneously recovered via compressive sensing, as shown schematically
in Fig. 29(b).
Similar approach can also be adopted to systems with continuous state dynamical processes,
such as the various types of oscillator systems.
52
This two-stage compressive sensing based approach enables us to reconstruct inner-layer and
inter-layer topology of large size multi-layer infrastructures. The previous compressive sensing
based reconstruction approach encounters difficulty in systems with large number of nodes, while
for a large size multi-layer system, our approach can firstly break it down into different single layers,
whose topology can be solved one by one, and then with the estimated structures of each layer, the
interdependencies between the layers are recovered in the second stage. (The detailed procedures
of our complete approach are presented in the Method section.)
As a concrete example, our approach is implemented on a three-layer multiplex network system
with evolutionary game dynamics. As shown in Fig. 3.2(a1,a2,a3), it is observed that the standard
deviations σ of the ordinary nodes are in the order of 10−9, while for the bridge nodes, we gen-
erally have σ > 10−3, which is over 6 orders of magnitude higher than the ordinary ones. This
provides a wide range to choose the standard deviation threshold σc for bridge node identifica-
tion, and our extensive calculations show that full identification with zero false positive rate can
be achieved as long as enough number of time instances are deployed. The detection of the inter-
layer connections between the identified bridge nodes is a challenging task, since simple correlation
measurement between a bridge node and its interdependent partner, such as the linear correlation
coefficient, does not show any distinguishable behavior against that between the bridge node and all
other bridge nodes in different layers, indicating the need for more sophisticated approaches. The
compressive sensing solutions A′i for every ordinary or bridge node i in each layer is displayed in
Fig. 3.2(b1,b2,b3). Each entry position in the augmented part corresponds to a particular bridge
node in another layer. Only bridge nodes have nonzero entries in the augmented part of A′i and
less than one but above zero entries in the non-augmented part. The presented results show that




























































Fig. 11. Bridge Node Identification and Interdependencies Reconstruction. (a1,a2,a3) The standard
deviations of the compressive sensing solution Ai for each node i within layer 1 (a1), 2 (a2), layer 3
(a3), respectively. The interdependent multiplex structure adopted in this example contains 3 layers,
each of which is built in ER-random topology with Nm = 50 nodes (m = 1, 2, and 3) and average
degree 〈k〉 = 4. The x-axis denotes the node index, and the y-axis denotes the standard deviation
σ for each corresponding node. The threshold σc = 10
−3 is used in our calculation, and the light
purple bars marks identified the bridge nodes (BN). (b1,b2,b3) The colormap of the augmented
connection vector A′i for each node i in layer 1 (a1), 2 (a2), and 3 (a3). The x-axis show the index
i, and the entry in the j’s (or the q’s) row and the i’s column stands for the connection between
node i and j (or q), where j (1 ≤ j ≤ Nm) denotes an inner-layer node, and q (q > Nm) denotes
an bridge node in another layer (below the dashed line). The dark blue back ground stands for the
non-existent connections, while the all other colored entries implies an existent connection. Only
the bridge nodes have nonzero entries ηiqciq (q > Nm) in the augmented part, while in the non-
augmented part, a nonzero entry of an ordinary node has the value aij = 1 (dark red), while that of
a bridge node has the value (1− ηiq)ciq < 1 (green, yellow, orange, or light red).
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all correspond to sharp σ peaks in the same horizontal positions of the corresponding upper panels,
indicating the correct bridge node identification. In our model, partial payoff exchange takes place
between each pair of interdependent nodes in two different layers, namely, each bridge node has
only one external connection, so that the augmented part ofA′i for a bridge node always display ex-
actly one nonzero entry, and the position of this entry does stand for the correct independent partner
of the bridge node, which in turn demonstrates the effectiveness of our interdependency detection
method. It is verified that the values of the payoff exchange rate ηiq are also estimated in high
precision in this example.
The detailed performance of our reconstruction approach under evolutionary game dynamics
obtained via extensive numerical calculations under various scenarios are presented in Fig. 3.2.
Since evolutionary game dynamics renders dramatically differed dynamical behavior under differ-
ent in population interaction structures [105], three 2-layer infrastructures under different topology
settings are applied in order to examine the adaptivity of our method: (1) both layer are topologi-
cally homogeneous; (2) both layer are topologically heterogeneous; (3) one layer with homogeneous
topology is interdependent with another heterogeneous layer. The relative error rate ǫC, i.e., the ra-
tio between the correct link existence (or non-existence) detections and the total number of existent
(or non-existent) links, and the absolute error eW = |ηestimation − ηtrue| between the estimated link
weights (the interdependent payoff exchange rates) and their true values can play the role of per-
formance indicators. Generally, perfect or almost perfect reconstruction of both the interdependent
connection structure and the payoff exchange rates can be achieved as the normalized number of
measurements RM = l/Nm ≥ 0.4 in call cases, implying excellent functionality of our method
under diverse situations.
Data obtained in reality is easily contaminated by noise so that the capability of extracting
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Fig. 12. The Interdependent Connection Structure Recovery and the Payoff Exchange Rate Es-
timation Performance Under Evolutionary Game Dynamics. (a,b,c) The relative interdependent
connection reconstruction error rate ǫC for the nonzero terms (“NZ”, i.e., the existent links, shown
in purple) and the zero terms (“Z”, i.e., the non-existent links, shown in green) versus the normal-
ized number of measurements RM = l/Nm under noise level µN = 0 (triangles pointing up), 10
−4
(circles), 10−3 (squares), and 10−2 (triangles pointing left). (d,e,f) The absolute estimation error
eW = |ηestimation − ηtrue| of the interdependent payoff exchange rate ηiq averaged over all the
interdependent node pairs versus RM under the four different noise levels as in (a,b,c). The results
are obtained on three 2-layer multiplex networks: (a,d) both layers have ER-random topology; (b,e)
both layers have BA scale-free topology; (c,f) one layer has ER-random topology, while another
one has BA scale-free topology. All layers in all cases are in size Nm = 100 with average degree
〈k〉 = 4. 10% randomly selected nodes in each layer are bridge nodes, each of which owns an
interdependent partner in another layer, and there are accordingly 10 interdependent links in each
multiplex system. Each data point is averaged over 10 network realizations, each with 10 compres-
sive sensing implementations.
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valuable information from unprecise data is of crucial importance. Thus, multiple levels of noise is
introduced into the payoff of each node in order to test the effectiveness of our structure extraction
approach against noise. Figure 3.2 show the reconstruction errors obtained under the relative noise
levels from µN = 10
−4 to 10−2 in the sense that node i’s payoff is changed to (1±µN) · Uˆmi , where
+ and − appear with even chance, and µN = 0 indicates the case without noise. It is observed
in Fig. 3.2 that in all cases, the increasing levels of noise do not cause obvious increment in the
estimation errors, and the curves corresponding to different noise levels almost over lap with each
other, indicating the robustness of our method against noise contamination.
Complex networks existing in reality may differ dramatically with modeled networks in the
aspect of structural properties, such as the wide existence of some special motifs that may drive some
reconstruction schemes to failure. To test the performance of our method on real-world complex
networks, we construct 6 multi-layer structures of 2 ro 3 layers with each layer selected from 11
real-world networks in four categories, including social networks, food webs, protein interaction
networks, and logic circuits. For 4 out of the 6 multiplex structures, each are built with networks
in the same category, while the other two are mixtures consisting layers from multiple categories.
As presented in Table 7, highly accurate independency and parameter estimation is achieved in
all cases, indicating the effectiveness of our compressive sensing based approach in not only the
modeled systems but also the realistic structures.
3.3. Discussion
To sum up, in this work, we developed a two-stage compressive sensing based method, which
is able to successfully reconstruct the inner-layer and inter-layer connection structures and esti-
mate the relevant interaction parameters with high accuracy for multiplex systems consisted of both
modeled and real-world complex network layers by using clean or noise contaminated time series
57
TABLE 5
The Interdependency Reconstruction and Parameter Estimation Performance on 6Multi-Layer
Networks Structured Via 11 Real-World Complex Networks. Four categories of real-world
networks are adopted: (1) three social networks [4, 5], (2) three food webs [9, 10], (3) three protein
interaction networks [5], and (4) two logic circuits [6]. 10% ×Nmax randomly selected nodes in
each layer are chosen as bridge nodes, where Nmax denote the total number of nodes in the layer
with the largest size. The relative error rate ǫC of detecting interdependent connections for nonzero
terms (NZ, the existent links) and zero terms (Z, the non-existent links) and the parameter
estimation error eW for both evolutionary game dynamics and nonlinear oscillator dynamics are
presented in the table. RM = 60% is adopted for all calculations.
Network type Social Food web Protein interaction
Layer 1 St Martin Seagrass 1eawInter
(N = 45) (N = 49) (N = 53)
Layer 2 Consulting Grassland 1a4jInter
(N = 46) (N = 88) (N = 63)
Layer 3 Prison inmate Ythan 1aorInter
(N = 67) (N = 135) (N = 97)
ǫC (NZ) 0 0 0
ǫC (Z) 0 0 0
eW 1.1× 10−7 6.4× 10−8 2.2× 10−8
Protein interaction Logic circuit Mixture 1 Mixture 2
Layer 1 S208 St Martin Ythan
(N = 122) (N = 45) (N = 135)
Layer 2 S420 Seagrass 1aorInter
(N = 252) (N = 49) (N = 97)
Layer 3 * 1eawInter S420
(N = 53) (N = 252)
ǫC (NZ) 0 0 0
ǫC (Z) 0 0 0
eW 4.9× 10−9 1.5× 10−8 1.1× 10−8
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data. The layer-wise treatment enables the method to cope with very large systems, which is hard
to directly implement the one-stage compressive sensing for the entire infrastructure as in previ-
ous works. This contribution presents a concrete trial that helps to fulfill the urgent requirement
of interdependency uncovering in a variety of realistic social, economic, financial, technological,
biological, or ecological systems and facilitates further purposes, such as dynamical process control
and behavior prediction.
3.4. Methods
Inner-layer and inter-layer connection structure reconstruction procedures for systems with evo-
lutionary game dynamics. Given the time series of each node’s state and payoff and the information
on which layer each node belongs to, the procedures of recovering the topology within each layer
and the interdependent connection structure between different layers in a multi-layer complex net-
worked system the are as following: (1) Reconstruct the network topology of each layer via the
compressive sensing technique with the state S(t) and payoff Uˆ(t) time series data corresponding
to the layer; (2) Identify the bridge nodes by comparing the standard deviation σi of the compressive
sensing solution Ai for each node i and picking out the ones with substantially higher magnitude
of σ; (3) Calculate the inner-layer payoff Umi (t) of all the bridge nodes in each layer by using
the state time series and the inner-layer connection structure recovered in (1) (the connections of a
bridge node is obtained via its immediate neighbors, which overcomes the difficulty in extracting
the connection information due to the high variance of its compressive sensing solution); (4) For the
bridge i in layer m, build the augmented base matrix W′i with the inner-layer payoff U
∗
q (t) of all
layers other than m and the payoff vector Uˆi by randomly selecting l out of the L time instances;
(5) Recover the augmented connection vectorA′i in Eq. 3.2 via compressive sensing for each bridge
node i in each layer m and obtain interdependencies ciq between the bridge nodes by identifying
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the non-zero terms in the augmented part of each A′i; (6) The interdependent payoff exchange rate
ηiq can be obtained not only by recognizing the nonzero terms ηiqciq in the augmented part ofA
′
i as
ηiq due to ciq = 1 but also by solving it from the nonzero entries (1− ηiq)aij in the non-augmented
part, and in our results, the average of the two approaches is taken as the estimated value of ηiq .
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4 . THE PARADOX OF CONTROLLING COMPLEX NETWORKS: CONTROL INPUTS
VERSUS ENERGY REQUIREMENT
4.1. Introduction
The past fifteen years have witnessed tremendous advances in our understanding of complex
networked structures in various natural, social, and technological systems, as well as the dynamical
processes taking place on them [3, 112–126]. The significant issue of control arises naturally, but
this remains to be outstanding and extremely challenging, since nonlinear dynamical processes
generally take place on complex networks. Control of nonlinear dynamics, especially when chaos
is present, can be done but only for low-dimensional systems [127, 128]. Despite the development
of nonlinear control methods [129–134] in certain particular situations such as consensus [135],
communication [136, 137], traffic [138] and device networks [129, 139], a general framework of
controlling complex nonlinear-dynamical networks has yet to be developed. A natural approach is
to reduce the problem to controlling complex networks with linear dynamics based on traditional
frameworks from control engineering [140–144].
In the past a few years, great progress was made toward understanding the linear controllability
of complex networks in terms of the fundamental issue of the minimum number of driver nodes
required to steer the whole network system from an arbitrarily initial state to an arbitrarily final
state in finite time [2,2,145–149]. In particular, Liu et al. successfully adopted the classic structural
controllability theory developed by Lin [141] to complex networks of various topologies [2], for
which the traditional Kalman’s rank condition [140] is difficult to be applied [145]. The ground
breaking results show that, the structural controllability of a directed network can be assessed by
using the maximummatching [150–152] algorithm. The effects of the density of in/out degree nodes
were incorporated into the structural controllability framework [153], which has also been applied to
61
protein interaction networks [154]. Recently, based on the classic Popov-Belevitch-Hautus (PBH)
rank condition [155] in traditional control engineering, a variant of the structural-controllability
theory, the so-called exact controllability framework, was developed [156].
Both the structural- and exact-controllability frameworks consider the standard setting of linear
dynamical systems under control input [2, 145, 156]:
x˙ = Ax+Bu, (4.1)
where x = [x1(t), . . . , xN (t)]
T is the state variable of the whole network system, the vector
u = [u1(t), . . . , uM (t)]
T is the control input or the set of control signals, A = {aij} is the N ×N
adjacency matrix of the network, and B = {bik} is the N ×ND control matrix specifying the set of
“driver” nodes [2], each receiving a control signal (corresponding to one component of the control
vector u). The aim is to determine the minimum number of driver nodes, ND, for networks of vari-
ous topologies. However, we have encountered unexpected difficulties in carrying out actual control
of complex networks by using the minimum set of driver nodes as determined by the controllability
frameworks. This concerns effectively the issue of guiding the network system to approach a final
state with acceptable proximity error. In particular, given an arbitrary complex network, once ND
is determined, we can calculate the specific control signals by using the standard linear systems
theory [157] and apply them at various unmatched nodes. A surprising finding is that, quite often,
the actual control of the system is difficult to be achieved computationally in the sense that in any
finite time, it is not possible to drive the system from an arbitrary initial state to an arbitrary final
state, i.e., the actual state the system finally reaches is unreasonably far from the designated one.
This difficulty in realizing actual control, which has not been formerly addressed in any other works,
persists for a large number of model and real-world networks, prompting us to study if the devel-
oped controllability frameworks can ensure actual control with given finite computational precision
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and, more importantly, to consider the issue of control energy.
In this paper, we investigate the issue of control energy in the framework of structural control-
lability theory. We find that, the energy required to steer a system from a specific initial state to a
target state in finite time follows a fat-tail distribution, indicating the existence of extraordinarily
high energy requirement. In extreme but not uncommon cases, the energy is practically divergent.
This phenomenon signifies the emergence of a paradox in controlling complex networks: although
a small fraction of driver nodes can guarantee full control of the network system mathematically,
the energy required to achieve control is often unbearable. We resolve the paradox by presenting
the idea of control chains (not to be confused with control signal paths corresponding to maximum-
matching [2]), in which the fat-tail distribution of the energy can be derived as a key structural
feature. The theory of control chains enables us to offer simple strategies to significantly reduce
the control energy through small augmentation of the number of control signals beyond ND. In
this regard, the quantity ND, on which the structural controllability theories focus, can effectively
be regarded as the lower bound of the actual number of control signals required. To realize actual
control of a complex network, it is imperative to find the trade-off between the number of external
input signals and feasible energy consumption.
Remark. In Ref. [147], partial theoretical bounds for the control energy were derived. The
bounds are partial because, for example, for networks whose lower bounds can be obtained, the up-
per bounds typically diverge. This property of divergence was puzzling: does it mean that the actual
energy required would diverge as well and, if so, can a complex network actually be controlled? The
present work was largely motivated by these questions, in which we obtain a detailed understand-
ing of the physically important issue of practical controllability of complex networks through the
discovery of a general scaling law for the distribution of the energy required for control. The exis-
tence of control chain is also uncovered, enabling us to articulate practical strategies to significantly
reduce the control energy.
4.2. Resolution of Control Paradox
4.2.1. Gramian Matrix and Quantification of Control Energy.
Optimal control of a linear network in the sense that the energy is minimized can be achieved
when the input control signals ut are chosen as [158]: ut = B





eAτB · BT · eAT τdτ (4.2)
is the Gramian matrix, a positive-definite and symmetric matrix [157], which is the base to deter-
mine, quantitatively, if a system is actually controllable. In particular, the system is controllable
only when W is nonsingular (invertible) [157, 158]. The energy required through the control input







where control is initiated at t = 0. We use the Erdos-Renyi (ER) type of directed random net-
works [159, 160] and the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) type of directed scale-free networks [120] with a
single parameter Pb. Specifically, for a pair of nodes i and j with a link, the probability that it points
from the smaller-degree to the larger-degree nodes is Pb, and 1− Pb is the probability that the link
points in the opposite direction (if both nodes have the same degree, the link direction is chosen
randomly). (See Supplementary Note 1 for analytical treatment of the in- and out-degree distribu-
tions.) To determine the set of driver nodes, we use the maximum-matching algorithm [141], which
gives the control matrix B. For each combination of A and B, we first randomly choose the initial
and final states. We then calculate the corresponding Gramian matrix W , the input signal ut, the
actual final states x⋆tf (equation (4.1)), and finally the control energy E(tf). Repeating this process
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for each and every independent network realization in the ensemble entails an extensive statistical
analysis of the control process.
4.2.2. Resolution of Control Paradox.
Mathematically, if the Gramian matrix W is singular, the energy diverges. Through extensive
and systematic numerical computations, we find that, even when W is non-singular in the mathe-
matical sense, for typical complex networks its condition number can be enormously large [161],
making it effectively singular as any physical measurement or actual computation must be associ-
ated with a finite precision. Say in a physical experiment the precision of measurement is ε. In a
computational implementation of control, ε can be regarded as the computer round-off error. Con-
sider the solution vector X of the linear equation: W ·X = Y, whereY is a known vector. Let CW
be the condition number ofW . The accuracy of the numerical solution ofX, denoted by eX = 10
−k
(k is a positive integer), is bounded by the product between CW and ε [1]. We see that, if CW is
larger than 10−k/ε ≡ C¯W , it is not possible to bring the system to within 10−k of the final state, so
control cannot be achieved in finite time.
For a large number of networks drawn from an ensemble of networks with a pre-defined topol-
ogy, the condition numbers of their Gramian matrices are often orders of magnitude larger than C¯W
(see Supplementary Fig. 1 in Supplementary Note 2.1 for the relation between CW and eX). For
these networks, not only is the control vector unable to drive the system to the target state, but the
associated energy can be extremely large. These observations suggest the following criterion to de-
fine controllability in terms of the control energy: a network is controllable with respect to a specific
control setting if and only if the condition number of its Gramian matrix is less than C¯W , a critical
number determined by both the measurement or computational error and the required precision of
control. Quantitatively, for a given set of network parameters (hence a given network ensemble)
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and control setting, the probability that the condition number of the Gramian matrix is less than
C¯W , P (C¯W ), can effectively serve as a new type of controllability, which we name as practical
controllability. Increasing the precision of the computation, e.g., by using special simulation pack-
ages with round-off error orders of magnitude smaller than that associated with the conventional
double-precision computation, would convert a few uncontrollable cases into controllable ones, but
vast majority of the uncontrollable cases remain unchanged.
Figures 13a,b show the percentage of driver nodes nD ≡ ND/N versus the directional link prob-
ability Pb. We see that nD is minimized for Pb ≈ 0.5, indicating that, mathematically, only a few
control signals are needed to control the whole network, leading to optimal structural controllabil-
ity. But can practical controllability be achieved in the same parameter regime where the structural
controllability is optimized?
Figure 13c show, for the same networks as in Fig. 13a, the measure of control energy, i.e.,
the probability P (C¯W ), versus the network parameter Pb. We see that, for both regimes of small
and large Pb values where the structural controllability is weak (corresponding to relatively high
values of nD in Fig. 13a), the practical controllability is relatively strong. In the regime of small Pb
values, most directed links in the network point from small- to large-degree nodes. In this case, the
network is more practically controllable, in agreement with intuition. The surprising result is that,
in the regime of intermediate Pb values (e.g., Pb around 0.5) where the number of driver nodes to
control the whole network is minimized so that the structural controllability is regarded as strong,
the practical controllability is in fact quite weak, as the probability of the condition number being
small is close to zero. For example, for 〈k〉 = 4, the minimum value of P (C¯W ) is only about
0.1 for Pb ≈ 0.6; for 〈k〉 = 6 and 〈k〉 = 8, the minimum values are essentially zero. A striking
phenomenon is that the minimum value of P (C¯W ) occurs in a wide range of the parameter Pb,
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Fig. 13. Structural and Practical Controllability Measures in Directed Networks. Structural con-
trollability measure nD versus directional edge probability Pb for (a) ER random networks and (b)
BA scale-free networks of size N = 1000 and three values of the average degree (〈k〉 = 4, 6, and
8). The dash-dotted lines represent the results obtained by the cavity method [2,2], and the squares,
triangles, and circles are the simulation results from the maximum matching algorithm [2]. (c, d)
Measure of practical controllability P (C¯W ) for ER random and BA scale-free networks of size
N = 100, respectively, where P (C¯W ) is the probability that the condition number of the Gramian
matrix is less than some physically reasonable threshold value versus Pb. Comparing a with c, or
b with d, we observe the striking phenomenon that, in the parameter regime where the number of
driver nodes is minimized so that the corresponding networks are deemed to be most structurally
controllable, they are practically uncontrollable. The phenomenon persists regardless of the net-
work size and type. All nodes are self-loop free. The qualitative behavior is robust against the value
of C¯W .
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e.g., [0.3, 0.8] and [0.2, 0.9] for 〈k〉 = 6 and 〈k〉 = 8, respectively. This indicates that the network
is practically uncontrollable for most cases where the structurally controllability is deemed to be
optimal. The same phenomenon holds for different network sizes (see Supplementary Fig. 2 in
Supplementary Note 2.2). Another interesting finding in Fig. 13 is that ND is symmetric about
Pb = 0.5. However, the symmetry is broken for P (C¯W), indicating that there is no simple negative
correlation between ND and P (C¯W). This prompts us to find more essential structural properties
responsible for the smallness of P (C¯W).
4.3. Distribution of Control Energy and Concept of Control Chains
Suppose the network is practically controllable so that the required control energy is not un-
realistically large. For an ensemble of randomly realized network configurations with the same
structural properties and for different control settings, the control energy can be regarded as a ran-
dom variable. What is then its probability distribution? To gain insights, we generate directed
networks with different values of 〈k〉 and Pb. We then implement the maximum matching algo-
rithm [2] to obtain the control matrix B and calculate the minimum energy by using equation (4.3)
for final time tf. For each network, the initial states x0 and desired final states xtf are randomly cho-
sen. The calculation of energy is done only for those networks with condition number smaller than
C¯W , and a variety of C¯W values are adopted. Representative results are shown in Fig. 14, where
an algebraic (power-law) scaling behavior with fat tails is observed for all cases with the scaling
exponent approximately equal to 1.5. The scaling is robust against various C¯W values (Figs. 14a,c)
and network sizes (see Supplementary Fig. 3 in Supplementary Note 2.3). From Figs. 14a,c, we see
that different values of C¯W result in different groups of practically controllable networks, and the
required control energy in general increases with C¯W . In Figs. 14b,d, the value of C¯W is fixed and
the control energy required is larger for larger value of Pb as compared with the case of Pb = 0.
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Fig. 14. Distributions of Control Energy for Practically Controllable Networks. (a, c) Energy
distributions under different values of the threshold condition number C¯W for Pb = 0.1 and tf = 1.
〈k〉 = 6 for random networks (a) and 〈k〉 = 8 for scale-free networks (c). (b, c) Energy distributions
for different values of the average degree 〈k〉 and the directional connection probability Pb under
C¯W = 10
12 and tf = 1 for ER random and BA scale-free networks, respectively. In all cases, we
observe an algebraic (power-law) scaling behavior.
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This is intuitively correct as, for Pb = 0, all directed links point from small- to large-degree nodes,
facilitating control of the whole network.
We develop a physical understanding of the large control energy required and also the algebraic
scaling behavior in the energy distribution. To gain insights, we first consider a simple model: an
unidirectional, one-dimensional (1D) string network, for which an analytic estimate of the control
energy can be obtained (see Supplementary Note 3) as
El ≈ λ−1Hl , (4.4)
where El denotes the energy required to control a 1D string of length l (the number of nodes on
the string) and λHl is the smallest eigenvalue of the underlying H-matrix, denoted by Hl, which
is related to the Gramian matrix by H ≡ e−AtfWe−AT tf . The condition number of the 1D chain
system increases exponentially with its length. For example, the value of CW of a chain of length
larger than 7 has already exceeded C¯W = 10
12. This indicates that, even for a simple 1D chain
network, the energy required for control tends to increase exponentially with the chain length. Nu-
merical verification of equation (4.4) is presented in Figs. 15a. Although equation (4.4) is obtained
for a simple 1D chain network, we find numerically that it holds for random and scale-free network
topologies (See Supplementary Fig. 5 in Supplementary Note 4).
In a networked system, control signal and energy originated from the driver nodes travel through
1D-string-like paths towards each of the non-driver nodes. As discussed, identifying maximum
matching so that the network is deemed structurally controllable is independent of the control en-
ergy. However, when maximum matching is found, we can divide the whole network into ND
control signal paths (CSPs), each being a unidirectional 1D string led by a driver node that passes
the control signal onto every node along the path, as illustrated by the vertical paths in Fig. 16a.
CSPs thus provide a picture indicating how the signals from the ND external control inputs reach
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Fig. 15. Relationship Among 1D Chain Energy, the Smallest Eigenvalue ofH-Matrix, and Network




support for the analytic result equation (4.4). (b) Correlation between 〈E〉, the average of control
energy for networks with the same LCC length, and EL, the energy of a LCC with length DC = L
(L = 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 for ER and L = 3, 4, 5, and 6 for BA networks), calculated from ensembles
of 10000 networks.
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every node in the network to ensure full control (in the sense of structural controllability).
We can distinguish two types of links: one along and another between the CSPs, as shown in
Fig. 16a. It may seem that the latter class are less important as the control signal and energy flow
along the former set of links. However, due to coupling, a node’s dynamical state will affect all
its nearest neighbors’ states which, in turn, will affect the states of their neighbors, so on, and vice
versa. In principle, any driver node connects with nodes both along and outside its CSP. Corre-
spondingly, an arbitrary node in the network is influenced by every driver node, directly through the
CSP to which it belongs, or indirectly through the CSPs that it does not sit on. Intuitively, the ability
of a driver node to influence a node becomes weaker as the distance between them is increased. In
order to control a distant node, exponentially increased energy from the driver is needed. The chain
starting from a driver node and ending at a non-driver node along their shortest path is effectively
a control chain. In an intuitive picture, control energy flows through control chains, while control
signal is transported via CSPs. We can define the length of the longest control chain (LCC),DC, as
the control diameter of the network, as shown in Fig. 16b.
There can be multiple LCCs. The node at the end of a LCC is most difficult to be controlled in
the sense that the largest amount of control energy is required. The number m of such end nodes
dictates the degeneracy (multiplicity) of LCCs. An example is shown in Fig. 16b, where we see
that, although there can be multiple LCCs, the ends of them converge to only three nodes, leading
to m = 3. Since the energy required to control a 1D chain grows exponentially with its length in
such a way that even one unit of increase in the length can amplify the energy by several orders of
magnitude (Fig. 15a), the energy associated with any chain shorter than the LCC can typically be
several orders of magnitude smaller than that with the LCC. Thus, the total energy is dominated by
the LCCs. Due to the low value of typical m (see Supplementary Fig. 6 in Supplementary Note
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5.1), a single LCC essentially dictates the energy magnitude of the whole system. As shown in
Fig. 15b, actual network control energy shares strong positive correlation and similar magnitude to
the LCC energy EL, defined as the energy of a LCC of the corresponding network, especially for
networks with long LCCs. Intuitively, the probability to form long LCCs is small. Accordingly, a
longer LCC tends to have smaller value of degeneracym. As a result, the longest LCCs have almost
no degeneracy (m = 1) so that they effectively rule the control energy of the whole network (see
Supplementary Note 5.1).
Under the theory of structural controllability, a network is deemed more structurally controllable
if ND is smaller [2]. However, as the number of driver nodes is reduced, the length of the chain of
nodes that each controller drives on average must increase, leading to a growth in LLC length and
accordingly an exponential growth in the control energy. In the “optimal” case of structural con-
trollability whereND = 1 is achieved, the LLC length will be maximized, leading to unrealistically
large control energy that prevents us from achieving actual control of the system.
The idea of exploiting the length of control chain can be used to explain the algebraic scaling
behavior in the energy consumption. The construction in Fig. 16 thus provides a structural profile to
estimate the control energy. In particular, a network can be viewed as consisting of a set of structural
elements, the control chains, interacting with each other via the links among them, and interactions
among these basic structural elements usually play an important role in determining the properties
of a physical system. Hence, the total energy E required has two components: E1, the sum of ener-
gies associated with all control chains, and E2, the interaction energies among the chains. Observed
from Fig. 15b, E2 is especially important for networks with short LCCs (higher m values). The
energy scaling relation shown in Fig. 14 can be derived by devising appropriate models to analyze
the contributions from the two components. We have developed two such models. The first is the
73
LCC-skeleton model, which only takes E1 into account and provides an analytic estimate of the
control energy distribution function as well as the scaling exponent. The second is the double-chain
interaction model, in which a system consisting only two interacting control chains captures the key
features of the entire network by characterizing the essential effect of interaction energy among the
structural elements. Moreover, shown by the the double-chain interaction model, the structural fac-
tors other than LCCs could also affect control energy significantly and lead to the energy deviations
between BA and ER networks with the sameDC. These two models combined serve as a framework
to determine the energy profile associated with controlling a complex networked system, providing
a deep understanding of practical controllability (see Supplementary Note 5 for details of the two
models).
4.4. Control Energy Optimization of Modeled and Real-World Networks
4.4.1. Practical Controllability of An Electrical Circuit Network.
To further test the concept and framework of practical controllability, we consider a real one-
dimensional cascade parallel R-C circuit network, as schematically illustrated in Fig. 17a. (See
Supplementary Note 6.1 for how the network representation of a circuit is obtained.) The network
can be represented by a bidirectional 1D chain with self-loops for all the nodes, as shown in Fig. 17b.
The network size can be enlarged, say by one unit, by attaching an additional branch of resistor and
capacitor at the right end of the circuit. The state ui(t) of node i at time t is the voltage of capacitor
i, and the input voltage u(t) represents the control signal. The purpose of control is to drive the
voltages of the capacitors from a set of values to another within time tf through the input voltage
u(t). The control energy can then be calculated by equation (4.3). The actual energy dissipated in




U(t) · I(t)dt, (4.5)
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where U(t) ≡ u(t) and I(t) are the input voltage and current at time t, and Ereal is in units of
Joule. By making the circuit equivalent to a 1D chain network, we have three types of energy:
the control energy of the actual circuit calculated from equation (4.3), the dissipated energy of the
circuit from equation (4.5), and the control energy of the 1D equivalent network. Figure 18a shows
that the control energy and the dissipated energy of the circuit do not differ substantially from the
energy calculated from unidirectional 1D chain. Among the three types of energy, the energy cost
associated with the control process, as calculated from equation (4.5), is maximal.
4.4.2. Strategies to Balance Control Energy and Extra Inputs.
Our finding of the LCC structure associated with the control and the exponential growth of
energy with the length of LCCs suggest a method to reduce the energy significantly. Since the
key topological structure that determines the control energy is LCCs, one possible approach is to
reduce the length of all the LCCs embedded in a network by making structural perturbations to the
network. This, however, will inevitably modify the network structure, which may not always be
practically viable. Is it possible to reduce the control energy without having to change the network
structure? One intuitive method is to apply additional controllers beyond those calculated from
the structural-controllability theory, which we name as redundant controllers. A straightforward
solution is to add some redundant control signals along the LCCs. (See Supplementary Note 6.2
for how the redundant control input is planted in a circuit system.) To gain insights, we consider a
unidirectional 1D chain and add a redundant control input at the ith node. As shown in Fig. 18b, the
magnitude of control energy is reduced dramatically. The optimal location to place the extra control
should be near the middle of the chain so as to minimize the length of LCCs using a minimal
number of redundant control signals. As can be seen from Fig. 18b, this simple strategy of adding
one redundant control signal can reduce the required energy by nearly seven orders of magnitude.
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More specifically, the redundant control signal to node i breaks a chain of length L into two shorter
subchains: one of length i − 1 and another of length L − i + 1. Roughly, the control energy is
the sum of energies required to control the two shorter components, which is dominated by energy
associated with the longer component owing to the exponential dependence of the energy on the
chain length. By choosing i around L/2, the length of the longer part is minimized. For the circuit
network in Fig. 17, the redundant control input can be realized by inducing external current input
into a capacitor. As shown in Fig. 17b, a reduction in energy of nearly 10 orders of magnitude is
achieved. Applying a single redundant control input can thus be an extremely efficient strategy to
reduce the required control energy for the one-dimensional chain network.
4.4.3. Control Energy Optimization of Modeled Complex Networks.
For a complex network, there often exist multiple LCCs, requiring multiple redundant control
inputs. Say we wish to introduce a small number of extra control signals. Due to them degeneracy
in the end nodes LCCs, it seems that the number of redundant control inputs should exceed m if
every LCC receives one such signal. However, since even a unity deduction in the LCC length can
significantly lower the control energy, a simpler strategy is to place one redundant control input
at each of the m end-nodes to which all possible LCCs converge. In this case, each LCC in the
network is broken into a chain of length L− 1 and a single node, and consequently, the control en-
ergy is now determined by one-dimensional chains of length L− 1 instead of length L. Figure 19a
shows the effects of two optimization strategies to introduce redundant control signals on the energy
distribution: applying one redundant control signal (I) at the middle and (II) at the end of each and
every LCC, respectively. For comparison, for each strategy, the same number of redundant control
inputs are also applied randomly throughout the network. The ratio between the control energy
under optimization strategy, Ex, and the original control energy E characterizes the effectiveness of
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the optimization strategies. In particular, if the distribution of Ex/E is concentrated on small values
of Ex/E, then the corresponding optimization strategy can be deemed to be effective. As shown
in Fig. 19a, for relatively small Ex/E values, P (Ex/E)s corresponding to the optimization strate-
gies are systematically higher than under random control signal augmentation, while the opposite
situation is observed for regions with relatively larger Ex/E. Thus, both optimization strategies out-
perform the random strategies, with strategy (I) performing slightly better than (II). The networks
requiring proper optimization to be practically controlled are typically those with long control diam-
eters. Figures 19b-d show that this is indeed the case: for networks with larger DC, the performance
of our optimization strategies deviate more significantly from random selections.
4.4.4. Practical Controllability of Real-World Networks.
Can real-world complex networks be actually controlled? In Ref. [2], the structural controlla-
bility of a large number of real-world networks were investigated, with the conclusion that optimal
control of most of the networks can be achieved with only a few control signals. We investigate
control energies of the same set of real-world networks (see Supplementary Table 1 in Supple-
mentary Note 7 for network details) and find that, when optimal control is applied according to
maximum matching, most of the networks require unrealistically high energies. In fact, 15 out of
the 18 networks are practically uncontrollable. The main reason lies in the large LCCs of most of
these networks. Another factor is that there are subgraphs that are not connected with each other
and/or a large number of topological motifs such as loops, self-loops, or bidirectional edges. More
strikingly, even with unlimited energy supply, the number of driver nodes as determined by the
maximum matching algorithm from the structural controllability theory is generally insufficient to
fully control the whole system, where there exists a number M⋆ of nodes that never converge to
their target states. These observations lead to the speculation that, in order to fully control a real-
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istic network, more driver nodes are needed than those identified by the structural controllability
theory. That is, more independent control signals are needed than those determined by maximum
matching to drive all nodes in the network to their target states. The M⋆ uncontrollable nodes
are thus the required augmented set of driver nodes, each with an external control input. In total,
N⋆D = ND +M
⋆ driver nodes need to be deployed to gain full control of the system (see Fig. 20a




D/N for the 18 real-world networks). Applying control signals to the nodes
as determined by maximum matching and to the augmented driver nodes, we find that 17 out 18
real-world networks become practically controllable (see Supplementary Table 2 in Supplementary
Note 7).
We also test the enhancement strategies using the 18 real-world networks, with the result that
their practical controllability can be markedly enhanced (especially for those with large control di-
ameters), as shown Figs. 20b,c. We see that, for each of the real-world networks with unrealistically
large energy requirement (see Supplementary Table 2 in Supplementary Note 6), the optimized
control energy E⋆mid (or E
⋆
end) is several orders of magnitude smaller than the value of the original
energy E⋆ (the control energy withM⋆ augmented driver nodes but without any redundant control
input). This indicates the effectiveness of our optimization strategies. (In fact, strategy (I) works
better than (II) in most cases.) The energy reduction due to random control signal augmentation is
dramatically less effective than our strategies in most cases (almost equally effective in other cases),
shown in Figs. 20b,c, which also indicates the control energy of real-world networks are indeed
determined by their LCCs in general. For the networks with small control diameters, even with-
out applying any enhancement strategy the control energies required are already much smaller than
those for the other networks. For these networks energy optimization is practically unnecessary (see
also Supplementary Table 2 in Supplementary Note 7).
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4.5. Discussion
As stated in Ref. [2], the ultimate proof that one understands a complex network completely
lies in one’s ability to control it. We discover a paradox arising from controlling complex networks
with respect to control energy and the number of external input signals. To resolve the paradox, we
focus on the situation where the structural-controllability theory yields a minimum number of exter-
nal input signals required for full control of the network, and determine whether in these situations
the control energy is affordable so as to realize actual control. Our systematic computations and
analysis reveal a rather unexpected phenomenon: due to the singular nature of the control Gramian
matrix, in the parameter regimes where optimal structural controllability is achieved in the sense
that the number of driver nodes is minimized, energy consumption can be unbearably large. To
obtain a more systematic understanding, we identify the fundamental structures in a network un-
der the action of control signals, the longest control chains (LCCs), and argue that they essentially
determine the control energy. We articulate and validate that the required energy increases expo-
nentially with the length of the LCCs. In situations where the required number of controllers is
few as determined by the structural controllability theory, the length of LCCs tends to be long,
leading to practically divergent control energy. Another finding is that, for minimum input signals,
the required energy exhibits a robust algebraic scaling behavior, which can be explained by ana-
lyzable models constructed based on interacting LCCs. The discovery of the LCCs associated with
controlling complex networks leads naturally to a simple method to resolve the paradox: increas-
ing the number of controllers by placing extra control signals (beyond the number determined by
the structural-controllability theory) along the LCCs. Indeed, test of a large number of real-world
networks shows that, while they are structurally controllable [2], most of them exhibit enormous
energy consumption. They can actually be controlled by placing more drivers than determined by
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the structural-controllability theory at proper locations along the LCCs.
Our work indicates that the difficulty of achieving actual control of complex networks associ-
ated with even linear dynamics is beyond the current knowledge in the field of network control.
Although the controllability theory offers a theoretically justified framework to guide us to apply
external inputs on a minimum set of driver nodes, when we implement control to steer a system to
a desired state, the energy consumption is likely to be too large to be affordable. This finding sug-
gests that, to achieve control of a complex networked system, the existing controllability framework
merely offers a necessary rather than a practically feasible condition to assure actual control. We
thus demand a more comprehensive and practically useful theoretical framework for addressing the
extremely important issue of controlling complex networks. However, it is difficult to develop such
a framework at the present and we do not even know if a mathematically justified theory is available
based on the current knowledge. Another issue is that for general networked nonlinear systems,
we continue to lack the necessary condition based on the present controllability framework, as well
as an understanding of required control energy. So far, we still know too little about controlling
complex networked systems, and further effort is needed to address this challenging but greatly
important problem shared by a wide range of fields.
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Fig. 16. Schematic Illustration of Various Concepts to Characterize and Understand the Practical
Controllability of a Network. (a) Control-signal paths (CSPs) of a random network obtained from
maximum matching in structural controllability theory, where a control signal enters a CSP via the
corresponding driver node (yellow), the starting node of the path, and goes through each matched
node (blue) along the path. In this example, the network has nD = 10 CSPs of different lengths.
Non-path links, links that are irrelevant to matching, are displayed in green. (b) All possible LCCs
in the network. Typically there are multiple LCCs of the same length. In this example, the length
of the LCCs is 4, which is defined as the control diameter of the network. Two LCCs sharing no
common nodes are marked by red nodes and solid red arrows. Links belonging to other LCCs
are marked by red dashed arrows. CSPs are denoted using letters a to j from the left to the right.
Each node is specified using its path number and its position along the path sequentially from top
to bottom. For example, node e1 is the driver node of path e, and node h2 is the node right after
the driver node on path h. The two LCCs with solid arrows are listed in bold. Eight LCCs in the
network converge to only three end-nodes, e6, f5, and f6 (marked by red dashed circles), leading
to LCC degeneracy m = 3. The control energy is determined by any randomly chosen m LCCs
among all existent ones.
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Fig. 17. Cascade Parallel R-C Circuit and Its Corresponding Network Presentation. (a) A cascade
parallel R-C circuit with L = 7 resistors (R1, R2, . . ., and RL, each of resistance 1Ω) and 7 ca-
pacitors (C1, C2, . . ., and CL, each of capacitance 1F). External voltage input u(t) is applied onto
the left side of the circuit, and the voltage of capacitor Ci is ui(t)(1 ≤ i ≤ L). (b) Network repre-
sentation of the circuit in a as a bidirectional 1D chain network of seven nodes, where the external
voltage input u(t) is injected into node 1 (yellow driver node, the controller). The dynamical state
of node i is described by the voltage on its capacitor, ui(t). Links (blue) between nodes are bidi-
rectional and have uniform weight 1 in either direction. Each node has a self-link (red) of weight
−2, except the ending node (node 7) whose self-link has weight −1. (c) The circuit network in b
with an extra external current input ie(t) into the capacitor C3, where i3 and i4 denote the currents
through resistors R3 and R4, respectively. In the absence of the extra current input, i3(t)− i4(t) is
the current through the branch of C3. (d) The extra external current input ie(t) serves as a redundant
control input injected into node 3 of the network in b. Now there are two driver nodes (yellow) in
the network, nodes 1 and 3.
82





























Fig. 18. Control Energy and Optimization for 1D Chain and Cascade Parallel R-C Circuit. (a)
Energy required for controlling a unidirectional chain (red) and the corresponding circuit (blue) as
well as the dissipated energy of the circuit calculated from equation (4.5) versus the chain length L.
(b) Control and dissipated energies in the presence of a redundant control signal to node i (i > 1),
which breaks the chain into two subchains of lengths i and L− i, respectively.
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Fig. 19. Effects of Redundant Control Inputs. (a) For control diameter DC = 2, distribution of the
energy ratio Ex/E under optimization strategies (I) (Mid, red circles) and (II) (End, blue squares),
where Ex and E are the required energies with and without redundant control, respectively. Results
from two randomized optimization strategies are marked by R-Mid (black triangles) and R-End
(gray diamonds), corresponding to strategies (I) and (II), respectively. The values of Ex/E are
collected from practically controllable networks from an ensemble of 10000 ER random networks
(〈k〉 = 6, Pb = 0.1). For each network, if strategy (I) [or (II)] requires r redundant controls,
r additional random control inputs are applied to the system 10 times to average out the random
fluctuations. Panels (b-d) show the Ex/E distributions for networks with control diameter DC = 3,
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Fig. 20. Augmented Control Inputs and Energy Optimization. (a) Densities of the original driver
nodes nD (dark purple) and of the augmented controls n
⋆
D (light purple). (b) Normalized energy
reduction ∆E⋆mid/E
⋆ = (E⋆ − E⋆mid)/E⋆ (light blue) when an additional control signal is added
to the middle of each LCC [strategy (I)] and normalized energy reduction ∆E⋆R-mid/E
⋆ = (E⋆ −
E⋆R-mid)/E
⋆ (dark blue) when the same number of control signals are randomly added into each
network. (c) Normalized energy reduction ∆E⋆end/E
⋆ = (E⋆ − E⋆end)/E⋆ (light green) when an
additional control signal is added to the end node of each LCC [strategy (II)] and normalized energy
reduction ∆E⋆R-end/E
⋆ = (E⋆−E⋆R-end)/E⋆ (dark green) when the same number of control signals
are randomly added into each network. All colored bars (light/dark purple, light/dark blue, and
light/dark green) start from 0, and the darkly colored bars overlap with the corresponding portions
of the lightly colored bars. For the bars with only dark colors, the lightly colored bars are in the
same height but covered by the dark ones in front of them. In majority cases, our optimization
strategies work better than random control signal augmentation, and in 7 out of 17 networks, the
energy reduction under our strategies is one or several order of magnitude greater than under random
augmentation.
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5 . CONTROLLING EXTREME EVENTS ON COMPLEX NETWORKS
5.1. Introduction
Extreme events occur on a large variety of complex networked systems, examples of which
include sudden bursts of packet flows in the Internet, jamming in computer or transportation net-
works, abrupt rise of web requests, and power blackouts in electrical power grid, etc. The intrinsic
dynamics responsible for extreme events are network traffic or flow dynamics [163–175] and the
corresponding flux-fluctuation behaviors [48, 176–183]. Especially, abnormally large fluctuations
in the flow exceeding the nodal or link capacities can lead to extreme events, which either can be
triggered by external disturbances or are a type of intrinsically emergent behavior. Extreme events
can have catastrophic consequences, demanding the articulation and development of effective con-
trol strategies [48, 184, 185]. This problem, despite its uttermost importance to many disciplines,
has not been addressed. The purposes of this report are to present an efficient and physically imple-
mentable method and to derive an analytic theory to understand its working.
This work aims to develop a physically practical control scheme against extreme events emerged
from the intrinsic dynamic factors by using a simple but extensively representative model that cap-
tures the essential mechanism of many complex networked systems with information, material, or
energy transportation. Within this model, as presented in theMethods Section, the random variables
essential to the emergence extreme events are sums of random variables distributed in a binomial
fashion (thin-tailed) which have well-defined first and second order moments. Thus, these sums fol-
low the Le´vy-alpha-stable distribution gα(x) with α = 2 [186,187], and we do not expect the model
to characterize all properties observed in reality, such as the ”fat-tailed” distributions corresponding
to α < 2.
Our principal idea of controlling extreme events is to make the whole network system time-
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dependent in that every node is mobile and consequently the associated set of links is time-varying.
The mobility of the nodes can be characterized by a velocity-like parameter. The system can thus be
modeled as a mobile network in which agents move in random directions but with constant veloc-
ity. Between any pair of agents, a link is established to enable exchange of packets only when their
physical distance is within a pre-defined communication radius. We find that, the number of extreme
events depends on the velocity and, strikingly, it exhibits a bell-shape, resonant-type of functional
relation, as exemplified in Fig. 21. That is, there exists an optimal velocity for which the number of
extreme events can be significantly reduced as compared with that in a static network. This finding
suggests a practical control scheme: the occurrence of extreme events can be suppressed by making
the network mobile with proper agent velocity. To understand this striking phenomenon, we develop
a detailed analytic theory. To extend the control, we find a generalized mobility capable of dramat-
ically lowering the control cost. We also develop a low-cost “intermittent strategy” that harnesses
extreme events not only in mobile networks, but also in the classical ER-random networks [159].
Since extreme events encompass catastrophic situations such as large-scale breakdown induced by
random failures of nodes or attacks, the general principle that dynamic networks can be immune to
extreme events can have significant applications in the field of security and robustness of complex
systems.
We emphasize that our work is focused on controlling extreme events caused by the intrinsic
randomness of the system, rather than external attacks. More sophisticated mechanisms such as
failures and load redistribution, e.g., as triggered by external attacks, would be an interesting topic
of study. Instead of analyzing the extreme value distributions above the threshold as determined by
the extreme value theory [188,189] under the peak-over-threshold setting, our work concentrates on
calculating the total number of events that exceed a certain threshold for the purpose of control.
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Fig. 21. The Number of Extreme Events Versus Velocity and Mobility. For a network ofN = 1200
nodes in a square domain of size L = 10 (arbitrary unit), a, The number of extreme events nex
versus the agent velocity v for W = 50N , 80N , and 100N ; b, nex of extreme events versus
velocity v when nodes execute random walk (R) or deterministic motion (D) within square, circular,
and stadium-shaped domains. The areas of the circle and the stadium are chosen to be equal to the
area of the square L × L. c, Robustness of control with respect to heterogeneity in the nodal
communication range: nex versus v for β = −1, 0, and 1, where β is a parameter characterizing the
distribution of nodal communication range. d and e, robustness of control with respect to packet-
transportation protocol: nex versus velocity v when packet generation and annihilation are taken
into account for two situations where d the total number of packets is fixed atW and e the number
of newly generated packets at each time step is fixed to be W/N . f, Generalization of mobility:
nex versus mobility, defined as the probability that a node moves with velocity v, for a number of v
values. All simulation results are obtained using 100 realizations in T = 1000 time steps. The error
bars in nex from different realizations have relatively small and similar magnitude in (a-e), and it
monotonously increases with velocity v, as shown in panel a [the error bars in (b-e) are omitted for
clear visualization]. Here, the definition of an extreme event on a node is that its number of packets
is at least four standard-deviations above the average.
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5.2. Results
We consider a square domain of size L× L in which N agents move at speed v but in random
directions. The communication radius of each agent is a ≪ L, and the total number of packets on
the network at any given time is W . At time t, the number of packets carried by a node is w(t),
and each packet is delivered to a randomly selected neighboring node at time t + 1. In contrast to
previous works on synchronization in mobile-agent networks [190–192] where periodic boundary
conditions were often used, we use the “hard-wall” boundary condition for the consideration that a
cross-boundary link connecting two nodes close to the same boundary but physically distant from
each other is not physical in an actual traffic-flow network, which is discussed in a later section. We
will see that boundary effect plays a crucial role in the dynamics of extreme events, a fact that will
be fully exploited in our development of the analytic theory.
5.2.1. The Existence of Optimal Mobility and Its Robustness
Our extensive computations indicate that the existence of an optimal moving velocity to suppress
extreme events is general: it holds under a variety of boundary shapes, motion schemes, and even
heterogeneously distributed communication radii, as shown in Figs. 21a,b, and c. This indicates that
the characteristic, non-monotonous relation between nex and velocity v that underlies the control of
extreme events is in fact robust with respect to variants in the system setting such as the geometric
shape of the domain, the manner by which the individual nodes move, heterogeneity in the nodal
communication range, and packet transportation protocol.
As can be seen from Fig. 21a, different W values do not affect the existence of the optimal
moving velocity. Figure 21b shows, for a number of variants in the geometric shape of the domain
(square, circle, and stadium), the relation between nex and v. We observe that the non-monotonous
behavior holds for all geometric shapes considered. As shown, the particular manner by which
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Fig. 22. Geometrical Setting and the Theory Result. a, Illustration of various geometrical quantities
used in the analysis: communication radius a, distance b from the middle of the square to the target
node, distance bn from the middle of the square to a neighbor of the target node, the width∆bn of the
bar region, and the cutoff region of the communication circle. b, Results of Eq. 5.2 for db = 0.01
and ∆bn = 0.002 (the main features do not depend on the specific values of db and ∆bn).
nodes in the network move in the space has little effect on the non-monotonous behavior. In par-
ticular, both random walk and deterministic motion are considered, where for the latter, random
moving directions are chosen initially but at time t, a node moves along the direction of the velocity
at time t − 1. Figure 21b indicates that the existence of an optimal velocity to minimize the num-
ber of extreme events is highly robust regardless of the domain geometry, random or deterministic
movements.
In realistic systems, mobile agents’ ranges are not homogeneous. To model heterogeneity in
the nodal communication range, we randomly assign each node a weight µ according to the distri-







where A0 = πa
2 is the average communication area over all nodes, µi and µl are the assigned
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weight values corresponding to nodes i and l, and β is an adjustable parameter characterizing the
heterogeneity of Ai. The distribution of Ai is thus P (Ai) ∼ A−3/βi . For β > 0, majority of nodes
have relatively small communication circles except for a few, and the opposite situation occurs for
β < 0. For β = 0, the communication circles are all identical: namely Ai = A0 and ai = a
for i ∈ [1, 2, . . . , N ]. Since the degree of a node is proportional to its communication area, it is
equivalent to a power-law degree distribution of the mobile network with the fixed average degree
〈k〉 = N/L2A0. The physical meanings of positive and negative values of β are the following. In a
realistic wireless sensor network, for example, there are usually anchor nodes that have much larger
communication ranges and play the role of central controllers of the whole network. This situation
can be characterized by some positive value of β. There can also be a few nodes that malfunction or
run low on power supply. These nodes would have nearly zero communication ranges while most
nodes in the network have finite communication ranges. This corresponds to the case of a negative β
value. Figure 21c shows that the non-monotonous behavior in the nex-v relation holds regardless of
whether the value of β is positive or negative, indicating the robustness of mobility-based strategy
to harness extreme events in the presence of nodal heterogeneity.
We also consider realistic variants of the packet-transportation model by randomly assigning
each packet a destination node where the packet annihilates upon its arrival at the destination, and
new packets are generated to balance the annihilation effect. Two packet generation schemes are
studied: (1) the total amount of packets W is kept constant by generating the annihilated number
of packets at randomly selected nodes; (2)W/N newly generated packets are randomly distributed
to nodes to keep W statistically constant but with fluctuations (the average number of annihilated
packets is W/N for high velocity). As shown in Figs. 21d and e, nearly identical behavior in
the nex-v relation is observed, regardless of the specific packet-transportation protocol, providing
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further support for the robustness of our control method.
While so far we have focused on dynamic networks where agents move with certain velocity, the
idea of making a network mobile to control extreme events can be generalized to different forms of
“mobility.” Here we discuss one variant, in which the mobility is defined as the probability that any
node moves with velocity v. For relatively high values of v, there exists an optimal mobility value
at which the number of extreme events is minimized, as shown in Fig. 21f. Notice that the optimal
mobility is near zero, indicating that only a small fraction of the nodes actually move and vast
majority of the nodes remain stationary. The implication is that extreme events can be effectively
mitigated by moving a few nodes, which is advantageous from the consideration of control cost.
5.2.2. Explanation and Boundary Effect
In the following, we focus on the development of analytical understanding of the phenomenon.
To begin, we note that, since each node receives packets at time t from its neighbors that equally
distribute all the packets obtained at t − 1 to all their neighbors, a node’s flow w(t) at time t is
contributed to by its neighbors’ flow at time t − 1, denoted by wn(t − 1). In a static network, the
ensemble averaged flow through a node at last time step is proportional to its degree 〈w(t − 1)〉 =
Wk/(2E). However, in a time-varying network, this relation no longer holds. In particular, the
flow would be independent of the degree, leading to 〈w(t − 1)〉 = W/N . We thus hypothesize the
following general relation between 〈w(t− 1)〉 and node degree for different regimes of the velocity
v:
〈w(t− 1)〉 = ξ(v) · k(t) + η(v), (5.1)
where ξ(v) and η(v) are parameters that depend on the velocity only, and the first and second terms
correspond to the velocity-dependent and velocity-independent flow components, respectively. Gen-
erally, the quantity ξ(v) decreases with v, since higher mobility tends to yield a weaker flow-degree
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Fig. 23. Boundary Effect. a1, b1, c1, Behavior of 〈w(t)〉b versus b from direct simulation (blue
squares) and predicted by Eq. (5.8) (solid black lines) for v = 0, 0.5 and 3.0, respectively. Note that
v ≈ 0.5 is the optimal value of the velocity that minimizes nex in Fig. 21, and v = 3.0 represents
a relatively high velocity value for the system of size L = 10 and communication radius a = 1.
For a1, we have η(v = 0) = 0. Since Eq. (5.8) indicates a smooth dependence of 〈w(t)〉b on b
and since a detailed interdependence between η(v) and v is unknown, we find η(v) = 15 best fits
the case in b1. For c1, we have η(v = 3.0) → η(v → ∞) = 50. The red dashed line indicates
the position of the peak in the curve of 〈w(t)〉b versus b. a2, b2, c2, Positions of all extreme events
occurred in square domain for v = 0, 0.5, and 3.0, respectively. a3, b3, c3, Positions of all extreme
events occurred in circular domain for v = 0, 0.5, and 3.0, respectively. a4, b4, c4, Positions of
all extreme events occurred in stadium domain for v = 0, 0.5, and 3.0, respectively. All results are
obtained from 20 independent statistical realizations.
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correlation. However, η(v) tends to increase with v due to the increasing degree of randomness in
the dynamics. Thus, for v → 0, the steady network exhibits a high flow-degree correlation and
little randomness, so we have ξ(v) = W/(2E) and η(v) = 0. For v → ∞, the correlation is lost,
leading to ξ(v) = 0 and η(v) = W/N . Eq. (5.1) thus represents a universal empirical law, which
we have verified computationally through various models (see the Methods section). Conservation
of the total number of data packets imposes the following constraint on the parameters ξ(v) and
η(v): W = N
∑N−1
k(t)=0〈w(t − 1)〉P (k) ⇒ ξ(v) = [W − N · η(v)]/(2E). Setting η(v) = 0 (or
η(v) = W/N ) yields ξ(v) = W/(2E) (or ξ(v) = 0). We see that Eq. (5.1) contains the results for
v = 0 and v →∞ as two limiting cases.
With the help of Eq. (5.1), the probability for the node at location b (illustrated in Fig. 22a)
to carry w packet, Ψ(w(t))b, is obtained. This distribution Ψb(w(t)) serves as a centro-symmetric
probability field for each dimension of the two-dimensional space. For a static node located at b0,
the PDF of its flow is Ψb0(w(t)). For any moving node (v > 0) initially at b0, the PDF of its flow,
ΨB(w(t)), is contributed by the Ψb(w) fields at all the locations it has visited, and thus can be
expressed as an integral of Ψb(w). In turn, the total number of extreme events occurred within T










where qB is the extreme event threshold. Since η(v) monotonously increases with v, Figure 22b
shows that Eq. (5.2) successfully explains the numerically observed non-monotonous behavior as
exemplified in Fig. 21a, providing the theoretical foundation for mobility-based control of extreme
events.
Our theory provides a detailed understanding of the effect of velocity on the occurrence of
extreme events. To further demonstrate this, we exploit the effect of domain boundary on the
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emergence of extreme events by examining the behavior of 〈w(t)〉b versus b, as exemplified in
Figs. 23a1,b1,c1, where a good agreement between our theory and simulation for various velocity
values can be seen. Note that bf =
L
2 − a specifies the position of one communication radius away
from the boundary. For v = 0, 〈w(t)〉b is constant for b ∈ [0, bf ] and decreases with b in the interval
[bf ,
L
2 ]. As v is increased, a peak in 〈w(t)〉b arises for b = bf , but on the left and right sides of
the peak, 〈w(t)〉b is approximately constant and a decreasing function of b, respectively. For conve-
nience, we call [bf ,
L
2 ] the boundary region. As a node moves closer to the boundary, more portion
of its communication circle is cut off, leading to lower values of 〈k(t)〉 and 〈w(t)〉b. For v → 0,
ΨB(w(t)) is highly localized so that ΨB(w(t)) → Ψb(w(t)). For the static network, extreme
events are approximately equally probable in the domain, except in the boundary region, as shown
in Fig. 23a2. As velocity is increased from zero, ΨB(w(t)) depends more strongly on Ψb(w(t))’s
and the peak in 〈w(t)〉b about bf generates a higher value of qB in the neighborhood region of bf ,
reducing the probability of extreme events. In the part of the boundary region where low values of
〈w(t)〉b meets with high value of qB, there are no extreme events, as shown in Fig. 23b2. For high
velocity, each node appears in the domain with approximately equal probability and ΨB(w(t)) is
completely delocalized, so we have ΨB(w(t)) = (8/L
2)
∫ L/2
0 b ·Ψb(w(t)) db. In this case, there is
little difference in the dynamical behavior of nodes. When a node is near bf , the sudden increase in
the flow can cause an extreme event, which is the mechanism responsible for high concentration of
extreme events about b = bf , as shown in Fig. 23 c2.
Figs. 23a3, b3, c3, and a4, b4, c4 show the patterns of the locations of the extreme events occur-
ring on nodes for v = 0, 0.5, and 3 within the circular and stadium-shaped domains, respectively,
where the motions of nodes are completely random. For deterministic motions of the nodes, the
patterns are similar. Regardless of the geometrical shape of the domain, a frame of extreme events
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emerges about one communication radius away from the domain boundary for high velocity, pro-
viding visual support for the basic idea underlying our theory: the boundary plays an important role
in the emergence of extreme events.
To intuitively understand the non-monotonous phenomenon, we name the nodes within the
boundary region (region between the boundary and the flame) as boundary nodes (BNs), the nodes
sitting on the frame as frame nodes (FNs), and the nodes within the frame as inside nodes (INs).
Each node moves continuously in the space and acts as one of the three types of nodes from time
to time. Due to the cutoff in the communication circles in the boundary region, the BNs have lower
average degree than the FNs and INs, namely 〈kBN〉 < 〈kIN〉 = 〈kFN〉. At high velocity, most
BNs are in fact originally INs from the inside carrying 〈wIN〉 packages, where 〈wIN〉 is the aver-
age flow of the INs. Apparently, we have 〈wIN〉/〈kIN〉 < 〈wIN〉/〈kBN〉. Thus, for BNs, each of
their links delivers more packages out than the INs. As recipients, FNs and INs have the same
average degree (〈kIN〉 = 〈kFN〉) while FNs have more BN neighbors than INs have. We then have
〈wFN〉 > 〈wIN〉, i.e., FNs receive more packages. In addition, the FNs have more neighbors than the
BNs, and thus we have 〈wFN〉 > 〈wBN〉. This mechanism produces the frame with higher density
of extreme events due to a sudden increase in the flow when BNs and INs move into the region of
FNs. However, the frame so generated also increases the threshold qB and accordingly decreases the
probability of occurrence of extreme events. Consequently, the coexistence of the two competing
mechanisms generates the non-monotonous behavior, leading to an optimal velocity. Our theory,
albeit non-rigorous, quantifies the relative strength of the two mechanisms and determines whether
extreme events are facilitated or suppressed as velocity is increased.
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Fig. 24. Effect of Long Range Links. a, effect of periodic boundary condition: nex versus v when
0% (green circles, no PBC), 30% (aqua triangles), 50% (pink triangles), and 100% (purple triangles,
complete PBC) randomly selected cross-boundary links are applied. b, Effect of communication
wormhole on control: nex versus v when a wormhole link is applied to any pair of nodes closer than
dHW = 13.0, 12.5, 12.3, and 12.0 for pHW = 0.4%, 2%, 3%, and 5%, respectively.
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5.2.3. The Effect of Wormholes
In fact, consider an artificial system in which a fraction of links can be made cross-boundary.
We find that, as the number of such “periodic-boundary-condition type” of links is increased, the
ability for the mobile network to suppress extreme events is degraded dramatically, as shown in
Fig. 24a. This finding inspires significant applications in the emerging field of cybersecurity. Here
we present one example by arguing that our control strategy can be used to detect wormhole attacks
on mobile networks. In particular, a communication wormhole is a long-range link connecting two
nodes beyond each’s communication range, a recently developed concept in the field of network
security [193–195]. Suppose any pair of nodes with distance over dwh are connected by a wormhole.
A smaller value of dwh will then introduce more wormholes into the system. Let pwh be the ratio
between the number of wormholes and the total number of edges E in the network. As shown in
Fig. 24b, for moderate or relatively high velocity, a slight decrease in dwh can trigger an explosive
increase in nex but there is only incremental change in pwh. Thus, abnormally large number of
extreme events in a mobile network are strong indication that the network is under wormhole attack.
Likewise, instilling a small number of wormholes into an adversary mobile network can effectively
destroy its functions through the generation of a large number extreme events.
5.2.4. Suppression of Extreme Events in Intermittently Mobile Networks
A network can be made mobile but only intermittently by introducing a “frozen” time interval
∆T during which the network structure is fixed. Specifically, each time after certain nodes in the
network have moved, the network structure remains invariant for ∆T time steps before the next
movement. For ∆T = 0, the network structure changes at every time step. Regardless of whether
nodes are moving, the packet flow on the network is not interrupted. As shown in Figs. 25a-d, the
number nex of extreme events exhibits a non-monotonous behavior with velocity v (for fixed values
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Fig. 25. Number of Extreme Events in Intermittently Mobile Networks. a and b, For a mobile
network with hard-wall boundary conditions, nex versus v and for a number of fixed values of the
frozen time ∆T and versus ∆T for three values of v. c and d, Corresponding results for periodic
boundary conditions. e and f, For a classic ER-network under intermittent random rewiring (a kind
of generalized mobility), nex versus the rewiring probability PR (for a number of fixed values of
∆T ) and versus ∆T (for PR = 0.5, 0.8, and 1.0), respectively.
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of∆T ) or with∆T (for fixed value of v). In particular, Figs. 25a,b show, under hard-wall boundary
conditions, nex versus v for a number of fixed values of ∆T and versus ∆T for three values of the
velocity, respectively. We observe that, increasing ∆T slightly above 0 leads to a sharp decrease
in nex, indicating that making the network intermittently mobile can be a cost-effective strategy to
suppress extreme events. This holds regardless of the boundary condition. In fact, an intermittently
mobile network system under periodic boundary conditions possesses a similar ability to suppress
extreme events, as shown in the corresponding plots in Figs. 25c,d. All these indicate mobility as a
general and effective strategy to suppress extreme events.
While the concept of “mobility” can readily be generalized to static networks in which the
nodes are not allowed to move physically, the existence of a physical boundary plays a critical role
in controlling extreme events. For example, a network can be regarded as “mobile” insofar as its
connection topology is time-varying, which can be realized, for example, by random rewiring of a
subset of links from time to time in a computer network. In this case, an actual physical domain for
the network cannot be properly defined. To demonstrate the importance of a physical boundary, we
consider a classic ER network [159] with random rewiring. Let PR be the rewiring probability, the
probability that an arbitrary link in the network is removed while a new link is established between
a randomly selected pair of nodes that were not previously linked. Since the ER random network
has no spatial structure, it is the change of nodal degree that leads to the variation in nex as PR is
increased. As shown in Fig. 25e, nex cannot be minimized by PR, indicating inability for random
rewiring to suppress extreme events. Simulations also show that the number of extreme events is not
affected by the detailed rewiring mechanism, insofar as the nodal degree is unchanged. However,
intermittent rewiring can reduce nex to certain extent, as shown in Fig. 25f. For high value of PR
in the ER random network, the number of extreme events, nex, can be solved analytically via the
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Fig. 26. Degree Bias and Scaling. For a mobile network in a square domain with hard-wall boundary
conditions, a, number nex of extreme events occurring on small (red circles) and large (blue squares)
degree nodes versus v, and b, nex versus the total number of packets W for various velocity values.
approach of self-consistent equation (seeMethods Section).
5.2.5. Degree Bias and Scaling
A previous result [48] indicated that, in static networks, extreme events tend to occur more
frequently on low-degree nodes. However, in any real-world network, certain degree of mobility is
expected. Our computation indicates that, insofar as the network is mobile, extreme events tend to
occur on highly connected nodes whose degrees are larger than the average degree of the network,
as shown in Fig. 26a for a mobile network with hard-wall boundary conditions. Similar behaviors
have been observed for mobile networks with periodic boundary conditions and for ER-random
networks as well. We also find a scaling phenomenon between nex and the total number of packets
W , as exemplified in Fig. 26b.
5.3. Discussion
To summarize, we find that extreme events in a complex network can be effectively controlled
by making the network mobile, where the concept of mobility is general and can be implemented
in various ways. A straightforward manifestation is that every node moves at a certain velocity but
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in random directions in a finite physical domain, in which case an analytic theory is developed to
understand the existence of an optimal velocity to minimize the number of extreme events. Variants
of the mobile schemes can also be considered, proving the generality of our control strategy. Our
theory has significant applications in the field of cybersecurity, where we articulate and demonstrate,
for example, that wormhole attack on a mobile network can be detected through the monitoring of
extreme events. Control of extreme events is an extremely important and challenging problem in
science and engineering, and our work may stimulate further efforts.
5.4. Methods
5.4.1. Relation Between ξ(V ) and η(V )
Figure 27 show the relationship between a node’s flow w(t − 1) at time t − 1 and its degree
k(t) at time t for different velocity values, the basic relation employed in our theoretical analysis
in the main text, and the function η(v) is shown in Fig. 27d. We observe a robust linear relation
for mobile networks with periodic boundary conditions and for ER-random networks [159]. For
mobile networks with hard-wall boundary conditions, the relation is still linear, especially for low
or high velocity values. For moderate velocity values, there is deviation from the linear behavior,
due to the boundary effect as shown in Fig. 3. (This boundary effect does not exist in mobile
networks with periodic boundary conditions and in ER-random networks.) In general, we observe
an approximately linear relation between w(t− 1) and k(t), which can be taken as an empirical law
for our analysis of the extreme-event dynamics in mobile networks.
We present a detailed derivation of the relation between ξ(v) and η(v). The starting point is the
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Fig. 27. Linear Relation Between 〈W (T − 1)〉 and k(T ). a-c), Linear relation between 〈w(t −
1)〉 and k(t) for mobile networks with hard-wall and periodic boundary conditions, and for ER-
random networks, respectively. d, Dependence of η(v) on v for mobile networks with hard-wall
and periodic boundary conditions, and η(PR) versus PR for ER-random networks (inlets). All
results are averaged over 20 statistical realizations.
103






















= ξ(v) · 〈k(t)〉 + η(v)
⇒ ξ(v) = W/N − η(v)〈k(t)〉 .





W −N · η(v)
2E
(5.4)
5.4.2. Detailed Analytical Explanation to the Non-Monotonous Behavior
As illustrated in Fig. 22a, the probability that z packets are delivered to the focal node located
at b from a neighbor of degree kn(t) located at bn and carrying wn(t− 1) packets is given by





 [ 1kn(t) ]z (5.5)
·[1− 1
kn(t)
]wn(t−1)−z · Pk(kn(t)) · P (wn(t− 1)),
where Pk(kn(t)) is the degree distribution of the neighboring nodes:
Pk(kn(t)) =

 N − 2
kn(t)

 [S(bn)L2 ]kn(t)[1− S(bn)L2 ]N−2−kn(t),
and S(bn) is the circular communication area of the neighbor located at bn. For bn ≤ L/2− a, the
area is a complete circle with S(bn) = πa
2. However, for L/2 − a < bn ≤ L/2, a cutoff by the
boundary leads to S(bn) = πa
2(1−α/π)+a sinα·(L/2−bn), where α = arccos((L/2−bn)/a), as
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shown in Fig. 22a. The quantity P (wn(t−1)) is the probability density function (PDF) ofwn(t−1),
which depends on the velocity v and further analysis is needed to determine its mathematical form.
Using Eq. (5.1), we can write the probability for a packet to visit a node as 〈w〉/W =
(1/W )[ξ(0) · k + η(0)] for v = 0. For v 6= 0, the probability for a node at bn to be vis-







 pwn(t−1)n (1− pn)W−wn(t−1) ·P (kn(t)). Substituting this expression into






P (z, kn(t), wn(t − 1))].
Consider any one of the boundaries of the square domain, as shown in Fig. 22a. For the fo-
cal node located at b, Z =
∑m
i=1 zi packets will be delivered to it from its m neighbors lo-
cated in the bar-shaped region of width ∆bn → 0 at bn. The PDF of Z associated with bn
is the convolution of the m PDFs, taking into account all possible values of m: Pbn(Z) =∑N−1




 N − 1
m

 (SbarL2 )m(1− SbarL2 )(N−1−m) (5.6)
with area given by Sbar = 2∆bn
√
a2 − (bn − b)2 for small ∆bn. The flow w(t) of the node
at time t is the sum of the incoming packets from nodes in all the bar-shaped regions within its
communication circle: w(t) =
∑M
j=1 Zj , where the contribution from each region can be treated
independently and M = [min(L2 , b + a) − (b − a)]/∆bn. The PDF of w(t) can then be ex-
pressed as the convolution of all Pbnj (Zj)’s for bnj ∈ [b − a,min(L/2, b + a)], as Ψb(w(t)) =
Pbn1(Z1) ∗ Pbn2(Z2) ∗ . . . ∗ PbnM (ZM ).
For a static node located at b0, the PDF of its flow is Ψb0(w(t)). For any moving node (v > 0)
initially at b0, the PDF of its flow is contributed by the Ψb(w) fields at all the locations it has visited,
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i.e., the circular region centered at b0 with estimated radius R(v). The PDF of this node’s flow
thus contains the contributions from all Ψb(w(t))’s for b ∈ [b0 − R(v),min(b0 + R(v), L/2)].
The random walk radius R(v) increases with v, and R(v) → 0 for v → 0 and reaches L/2 (the
upper bound of b) for v → ∞. Since R(v) and η(v) both increase monotonically with v, we have,
approximately, R(v) ≃ η(v)/(2W/NL). Consequently, the flow PDF of a node initially at location










where 8bdb/L2 is the probability that a node is in the region about the location b via random
walk, and the denominator on the right side is a normalization factor. The quantity ΨB(w(t))
determines the threshold qB = 〈w(t)〉B + 4δwB over which extreme events take place, where
〈w(t)〉B =
∑W
w(t)=0 w(t) ·ΨB(w(t)) and δwB =
√∑W
w(t)=0[w(t)− 〈w(t)〉B]2. Finally, we obtain










which is a function of η(v).
In the derivation of Eq. (5.2), the degrees of the neighboring nodes are treated independently
in Eq. (5.5) and the expression of P (wn(t − 1)), which is an approximation because nodes that
are spatially close tend to be degree-correlated. The spatial degree correlation represents the main
discrepancy between our moving random-network model and a mobile network in the real physical
space (see the following for a detailed discussion about the effect of spatial correlation). Notwith-
standing, the degree correlation has no dependence on the velocity and, hence, there is little effect
on extreme-event generation in the system for different values of the velocity.
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Fig. 28. PDF of Flow P (W ) in Simulation and in Different Theory Assumptions. a, For the classic
ER random networks with rewiring probability PR = 1, PDF of flow P (w) obtained from direct
simulation (red squares) and self-consistent equation (solid blue line). b, PDF of flow P (w) from
direct simulation (red squares), from theory without taking into account spatial degree correlation
(black circles), and from theory with degree-degree correlation (solid blue line).
The average flow 〈w(t)〉b at location b can be obtained via Ψb(w(t)) as well as the mean-field
theory:














πa2(1− βπ ) + a(L2 − a− b) sin β
L2
· 〈wn(t− 1)〉〈kn(t)〉
where β = arccos[(L/2 − a − b)/a], 〈wn(t − 1)〉 = ξ(v) · 〈kn(t)〉 + η(v), and 〈kn(t)〉 =∑N−2
kn(t)=1
kn(t) ·Pk(kn(t)). The first term on the right side is the contribution from the neighboring
nodes with their communication circles partially cutting off by the boundary, while the second term
represents the contribution from neighbors with complete communication circles.
107
5.4.3. Self-Consistent Equation to Estimate the Number of Extreme Events in ER Random
Networks
For high value of PR in the ER random network, the number of extreme events, nex, can be
solved analytically via the approach of self-consistent equation. Regarding PR as corresponding to











 ( k2E )w(1− k2E )W−w]Pk(k), (5.9)
where q is the threshold by which extreme events are defined, and the degree distribution P (k) of
the network can be written in a binomial form:
Pk(k) =

 N − 1
k

 pk(1− p)N−1−k. (5.10)
To map the ER random network into a two-dimensional mobile network, we set the link probability
to be p = πa2/L2. Eq. (5.9)yields nex ≃ 125, which matches the simulation result for v = 0 well.
For high velocity, the PDF of flow P (w) becomes independent of k and identical for all nodes,
which can be solved analytically by the self-consistent equation method. In particular, the number z













 ( 1kn )z(1− 1kn )w−z]Pk(kn), (5.11)
where Pk(kn) is the degree distribution of the neighboring node given by Eq. (5.10), and P (w) can




[P (z1) ∗ P (z2) ∗ . . . ∗ P (zk)] · Pk(k). (5.12)
By substituting any form of P (w) that satisfies
∑W
w=0w ·P (w) = W/N into Eq. (5.12), we obtain
an updated form of P (w) via Eq. (5.11). The solution of P (w) can be obtained by iterating the
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self-consistent equation until the root-mean-square deviation between P (w) and its updated version
falls below a small threshold ǫ (e.g., ǫ = 10−4). Figure 28a shows a good agreement between P (w)
from direct simulation and from the self-consistent approach. The number of extreme events can
then be estimated, yielding nex = NT
∑W
w=q+1 P (w) ≃ 238, which agrees quite well with the
value from direct simulation.
5.4.4. Effect of Degree-Degree Correlation
The probability p∆ that a given node i and one of its neighbors j share a neighbor in the ER-
random network of link probability p is p2. For a mobile network in a two-dimensional domain, this









where r denotes the distance between node i and its neighboring node j, and Sij(r) is the overlap-











Numerical calculation reveals that p∆ ≫ p2, indicating that a node’s degree is much more likely to
have a value similar to that of its neighbor, giving rise to a strong correlation between the degrees
of neighboring nodes, or the phenomenon of degree-degree correlation. Namely, node i’s degree k
is correlated with its neighbor’s degree kn, the so-called k-kn correlation. In addition, the degrees
of the neighboring nodes of i are also correlated, leading to the so-called kn-kn correlation. Since
the effect of cutoff of the communication circle by a boundary makes the analysis on spatial degree
correlation extraordinarily complicated, here we neglect the effect of the boundary or, equivalently,
we focus on mobile networks with periodic boundary conditions.
For convenience, we classify the neighbors of node j into two classes with respect to the focal
node i: nj1 neighbors in the overlapping area Sij(r) (i.e., the regions shared by these nodes and i)
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 pnj11 (1− p1)ki(t)−1−nj1 , (5.15)
where p1 = Sij(r)/(πa




 N − ki(t)− 2
nj2

 pnj22 (1− p2)N−ki(t)−2−nj2 , (5.16)
where p2 = (πa






P (nj1) · P (nj2) · 2πr
πa2
dr (5.17)
where kj = nj1 + nj2. In the high-velocity regime, the self-consistent equation method can be
adopted to solving P (w) by substituting Pk(kn) from Eq. (5.11) into Eq. (5.17), while the quantity
Pk(k) in Eq. (5.12) can still be determined by Eq. (5.10). Figure 28b shows the flow distribution
P (w) obtained from direct simulation and from self-consistent theory with or without the k-kn
correlation. We observe a better agreement between simulation and theory when the k-kn correlation
is taken into account.
It is mathematically difficult to consider both the k-kn and kn-kn correlations. Nonetheless,
since the spatial degree correlation depends solely on the spatial distribution of the nodes, which is
completely random regardless of the velocity, the combined effect of the two kinds of correlations
on nex has little dependence on the actual value of the velocity. Consequently, the non-monotonous
behavior of extreme events caused by the boundary effect should persist even in realistic situations
where both types of degree-degree correlations are present, and we expect the theory of mobility-
based control developed in the main text to be generally valid.
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6 . RESILENCE OF INTERDEPENDENT COMPLEX NETWORKS - EMERGENCE OF
EXTREME EVENTS AND CONTROL
6.1. Introduction
Internal resource competitions are a ubiquitous phenomenon in modern infrastructures, but rel-
atively little attention has been paid to its impact on the dynamical evolution and resilience of the
underlying interdependent, multilayer networked systems. Examples are the airport and train-station
networks of the public transportation system, the base station network of the cellular communication
system, and the virtual networks based on software defined networks (SDNs). For example, in the
airport network, different airlines cover different subsets of the airports across the whole country,
and airlines operate in the same airport have to share or even compete for the limited resources such
as space and time. In the near future, different communication service providers may share base
stations, signifying potential competitions for the finite bandwidth and processing capability of the
based stations. The next generation of Internet may be built upon the framework of SDN, enabling
one same physical server network to be virtually separated into multiple virtually independent sub-
networks with scalable sizes, each serving or being operated by a particular user without interfering
other subnetwork layers. In this case, the same server may carry the load generated by multiple
layers (users), and its finite processing capacity is competed by the layers of virtual servers. All
these call for a systematic understanding of the resilience of multilayer, interdependent networks
subject to internal resource competitions. The goals of this paper are to develop a model capable
of capturing the key topological and dynamical features of the multilayer infrastructures in the real
world with inter-layer resource competitions, to study the extreme event dynamics from the stand-
point of resilience, and to articulate control strategies to enhance the resilience against global-scale,
catastrophic breakdown of the whole network system.
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Extreme events associated with transportation dynamics on networks are intimately related to
nodal flux fluctuations [48, 177, 178, 180, 182, 183, 196]. In previous models of single-layer trans-
portation networks, extreme events tend to occur independently in space and time, which often have
little effect on the system resilience [48,49,184,185]. However, for an interdependent network with
multiple interacting layers, fluctuations can induce qualitatively distinct phenomena in the system
that is intrinsically nonlinear. Recent works on interdependent networks have uncovered a rich vari-
ety of phenomena associated with network fragility and robustness [94–100], diffusion and spread-
ing processes [85–89], game dynamics [90–93], and synchronization [81–84]. Other related works
range from redefining the basic structural measures to understanding the impacts of the multilayer
nature of the network on dynamical processes. In spite of the tremendous efforts, to our knowledge
there were no prior models of interdependent networks with multiple layers defined according to
resource competitions, let alone any study of the extreme event dynamics in such networks.
In this paper, utilizing transportation as a prototypical dynamical process, we develop an inter-
layer traffic resource competing mechanism to characterize the real-world situation where different
network layers, corresponding to different social entities, coexist under limited capacities of public
transportation, power, information, or telecommunication service facilities. A striking finding is
that, when the number of network layers and/or the overlap among layers are increased, extreme
events can emerge in a cascading manner to trigger global-scale catastrophes, even when the capac-
ity is capable of accommodating the same number of independent layers without extreme events.
The system typically evolves into one of the two stable absorption states: a state free of extreme
events and a state with frequent occurrence of extreme events. We find that the transition between
the two states is abrupt in both time and parameter domains. The finding indicates that internal
interactions in a multiplex network system can yield qualitatively distinct phenomena. An impli-
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cation is that public resource competitions among different service providers can lead to higher
resource requirement than anticipated. We derive an analytical theory to understand the emergence
of global-scale extreme events based on the concept of effective betweenness that we specifically
introduce to describe the extreme event dynamics on interdependent networks. We also articulate an
efficient control scheme based on augmenting the capacity of very few hubs, which can dramatically
suppress the cascading process of extreme events and protect the entire multi-layer infrastructure
against global-scale breakdown.
6.2. Results
We model the entire public service facility in a large infrastructure as a complex network G
of N nodes. Among the M service providers, each provides packet transportation service on a
subnetwork Gm(1 ≤ m ≤ M) of Nm(Nm ≤ N) nodes connected via the links of G. The entire
networkG thus hasM layers, each being the subnetwork operated by one service provider, as shown
schematically in Fig. 29. For convenience, we callG the global network. Packets belonging to layer
Gm have their origins and destinations solely within Gm: they can only be transported within Gm
through its nodes and links, not to any other layer. Different layers can share common nodes, and
the number of layers sharing node i is denoted asMi.
The load of node i in the global network G is defined as the total number of packets from all
the layers containing node i, i.e., fi =
∑M
m=1 wmi, where wmi is the flux in layer m, among which
there areMi nonzero values. If fi reaches its capacity Ci, we say that an extreme event has occurred
on node i. The capacity Ci can then be defined as [48]
Ci = 〈fi〉+ α · σi, (6.1)
where 〈fi〉 is the average load, σi is the standard-deviation of fi, and α > 1 is the capacity pa-
rameter. Following Ref. [48], we set α = 4 (somewhat arbitrarily) in our study. In fact, variation
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Fig. 29. Schematic Illustration of a Multilayer, Interdependent Network Subject to Internal (Inter-
layer) Resource Competitions. Layers 1 (G1) and 2 (G2) are two different subsets of Layer 0 (G, or
the global network), which is solely used for model generate and does not participate in the trans-
portation dynamics. In this schematic example, N = 10 (number of node in Layer 0), M = 2 (the
number of interdependent layers), and Pm = 0.5 (m = 1 and 2). Accordingly, Nm = N · Pm = 5,
and correspondingly, the node degrees in Layers 1 and 2 are 0.5 time of their degrees in Layer 0
(fluctuation exists due to randomness). The combination of Layers 1 and 2 forms a multilayer in-
terdependent network. Nodes 5 and 6 exist in both Layers 1 and 2, and thus, the two layers would
compete for resources within each of these two overlapped nodes. Nodes 4 and 9 exist in neither
of the two layers. Each of all the other nodes exist in only one of the two layers. (See the Methods
section for model details.)
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Fig. 30. Extreme Event Occurrence and Packet Arrival Rates. (a) Extreme event occurrence rate
REE and (b) packet arrival rate RA versus the number of layers, M , for systems with Pm = 0.25
(circles), 0.5 (squares), 0.75 (diamonds), and 1 (triangles), respectively. (c) REE and (d) RA versus
Pm for M = 3 (diamonds), 5 (circles), and 10 (squares), respectively. The results are obtained
through 20 simulation realizations for each of the 10 network realizations. Each network has the
average degree 〈k〉 = 4 and sizeN = 1000. Each realization runs for 500 time steps. The quantities
REE and RA are averaged over the last 300 steps (typically, the system evolves into equilibrium
within 200 time steps).
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in α, insofar as it is larger than unity, will not affect the results qualitatively. This setting allows
the capacity of node i to be adjusted according to the number of layers Mi sharing it. For simplic-
ity, we assume that all layers share the same nodal coverage, i.e., Pm = Nm/N , where Pm = 1
corresponds to the special case where every layer is identical to the whole network, i.e., Gm = G.
The rules for packet transport/delivery are as follows. Within each layer, at each time step, G·Nm
new packets are generated, where G is the packet generation rate. The newly generated packets have
randomly assigned destinations and are originated from randomly selected nodes that are free of any
extreme events at the time. On a node, each previously generated packet is transported to a neighbor
of the node along the shortest path towards the packet’s destination. If no extreme event occurs on
the target neighbor at this time, the movement can be completed. If, however, there is an extreme
event on the desired spot that the packet is supposed to move into, the packet is transported to
a randomly chosen neighbor with no extreme event, provided such a neighbor exists. If all the
neighbors are currently having extreme events, the packet will remain at the original node.
6.2.1. Global Extreme Events and Two Absorption States
To quantify the transportation dynamics on the multilayer network, we use two quantities: (1)
the extreme event occurrence rate REE, defined as the fraction of nodes at which extreme events
occur at each time step, and (2) the packet arrival rate RA defined as the ratio between the numbers
of packets arriving and newly generated. Figure 30 shows the behaviors of REE and RA for various
numbers of layers and nodal coverage values. As shown in Figs. 30(a) and 30(b), REE for a single
layer network (M = 1) is close to 0%, and RA is 100%, implying that the capacity of a single layer
network is sufficient to handle all the load in the network. As the number of layers is increased, the
capacity is increased accordingly. If the layers are independent of each other, the total capacity can
accommodate all the load from all layers, ruling out extreme events. However, when the layers are
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interdependent, there is a dramatic increase in REE, indicating much higher total load generation
due to internal resource competitions among the layers. The competitions drive the load of many
nodes to their capacities, finally leading to the occurrence of extreme events at the global scale, i.e.,
REE = 100% and RA = 0. Further computations reveal another phenomenon: after the system
evolves into an equilibrium, only two types of steady absorption states can arise. They are (1) a free
state nearly free of extreme events (REE ≥ 0), and (2) a catastrophic state in which every single
node has an extreme event. The surprising feature is that there are no stable intermediate states
in between the two cases. In fact, we find numerically that any intermediate state must eventually
evolve into one of these two absorption states. The value of REE thus represents the probability of
the occurrence of the catastrophic state.
6.2.2. First-Order Phase Transition
As shown in Figs. 30(a) and Figs. 30(b), the curves corresponding to higher Pm values have
systematically higher REE values, indicating that Pm has an effect on the probability of the catas-
trophic state. Figures 30(c) and 30(d) are further results of how REE and RA vary with Pm when
the number of layers (M ) is fixed. A higher value of Pm means that it is more likely for two differ-
ent layers to share common nodes, signifying a higher degree of interdependence with more severe
internal competitions. As a result, REE (or RA) increases (or decreases) monotonically with Pm.
A striking behavior occurs for relatively large values of M , where REE (RA) exhibits an abrupt
increase (decrease) as Pm passes through a critical point, giving rise to a first-order phase transition.
In fact, about the transition point, the probability for the system to evolve into a catastrophic state
can show dramatic change, i.e., from 0 and 100% or vice versa, meaning that an arbitrarily small
change in Pm can drive the system into catastrophe. The value of Pm thus has a critical impact on
the emergence of extreme events on the global scale. The implication is that, when the infrastructure
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Fig. 31. System’s Time Evolution Towards a Catastrophic State. For a multilayer network of N =
1000 nodes, M = 3 layers, and Pm = 1, (a) the transition between a free (blue) and a catastrophic
states (red) in time for all nodes. (b) The ratio of node i’s load fi to its capacity Ci versus time for
all nodes. (c) Time traces of the total number of packets in the layer (denoted as W , thick solid
line), of the number of “stuck” packets due to the surrounding extreme events (Wstop, triangles),
and of the number of movable packets (Wjump, squares). Among the Wjump movable packets, the
number of those that effectively execute random walks (Wrand, red dashed line) and the number of
the remaining packets moving along their respective shortest paths (Wshort, blue dot line) are also
plotted versus time.
consists of multiple, interdependent layers, its resilience against catastrophe may exhibit a sensitive
dependence on the system parameter, such as Pm, whose critical value depends on the number of
layers. In the design of infrastructural systems, it is then necessary to construct a detailed multilayer
network model to estimate the critical parameter region of the first-order phase transition, and the
choices of the parameters should be such that they are far away from the critical region with large
margins.
6.2.3. Time Evolution and Packet Lifetime
In order to understand the emergence of extreme events at the global scale, we investigate the
time evolution of various dynamical quantities. Figure 31(a) shows the time evolution of the states of
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all nodes in the network, where at any time, each node can be in one of the two possible states: free
(blue) and catastrophic (red). Figure 31(b) shows the relative load of each node, fi/Ci, versus time.
In both panels, a sudden transition can be seen immediately before t = 150, at which the entire
population of nodes is taken over by extreme events almost simultaneously. After the transition,
transportation dynamics in the entire system is completely stalled, leading to a catastrophe.
If no extreme event occurs throughout the system, each packet would follow the shortest path
towards its destination without any delay so that its lifetime τ equals the length L of the path. In
the equilibrium, the expected total number of packets accommodated in layer m is given by (see
Methods for a detailed derivation)
Wm = NmG · 〈τ〉 = NmG · 〈L〉, (6.2)
where 〈τ〉 is the average packet lifetime and 〈L〉 is the average shortest path length of the layer.
An extreme event occurring at the packet’s next target node along the shortest path is most likely
to increase the lifetime τ by causing the packet to take one step onto a randomly selected neighbor
of the current node (carrier), because the probability is small for the randomly selected neighbor
to be located along another shortest path of the same length. In the case where extreme events
occur on all current carrier’s neighbors, the packet will stop moving and wait until at least one of
the neighboring nodes becomes free of extreme events. This scenario will also cause an increase in
τ . Figure 31(c) shows some quantities characterizing packet movements in one layer versus time
as the system evolves from a free state into a globally catastrophic state. At each time step, the
total number of packets in the layer, W , equals the sum of Wjump, the number of moved packets,
regardless of whether the packets are along the shortest path, andWstop, the number of stuck packets
due to the extreme events in the neighborhood. The quantity Wjump is equal to the sum of Wshort,
the number of packets that have moved along their corresponding shortest paths, and Wrand, the
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number of packets that are stuck through random walks. Based on these considerations, we can
write
W = Wstop +Wjump = Wstop +Wshort +Wrand. (6.3)
Until a global catastrophe takes place, Wstop is close to zero, Wshort increases slightly but Wrand
increases much faster with time. The behaviors of Wjump and consequently W are thus dominated
by that ofWrand, demonstrating the key role played byWrand: a few extreme events lead to random
walks that lead to an increase in 〈τ〉 and consequently an increase in W . The larger number of
packets in turn causes the total load to increase, enhancing the probability of extreme events, which
further generate more random walks. This self-stimulating, positive feedback type of mechanism is
responsible for driving the whole system into the catastrophic phase.
For a single-layer network, a catastrophic phase cannot occur. In this case, PLd , the fraction of
packets that are Ld steps away from their destinations, are constant in the equilibrium. Assuming
that packets corresponding to each Ld value have the same probability η to be driven into random
walks, we can solve both PLd and η analytically by using the principle of detailed balance from
statistical physics (seeMethods).
6.2.4. Positive Feedback Loop
Due to the internal resource competitions, the following process emerges: at a time step, the
resource requirement in layer m at node i is high, and a substantial portion of node i’s capacity is
devoted to layer m. As a result, other layers sharing node i will have to redistribute their load onto
i’s neighbors, which may squeeze the capacity available for layerm of these neighbors, which may
have to redistribute their load back onto node i in layer m, and so on. This mechanism can trigger
a cascading process and finally drive the system into a global-scale catastrophe. The cascading







































Fig. 32. Numerically Obtained and Theoretical Predicted Probabilities of Extreme Events. For
M = 1 (circles), 3 (squares), 5 (diamonds), and 10 (triangles), (a) numerically obtained probability
qEE(k) for an extreme event to occur on a node of degree k and (b) theoretical prediction based on
the concept of betweenness. (c) For Pm = 1, the probability of extreme events versus M , where





for kmin = 2 and kmax = 75 (typical values from network realizations). In fact, small changes in
the values of kmin and kmax do not affect the main features of the results.
6.2.5. Betweenness and Effective Betweenness
It is difficult to develop a rigorous mathematical theory to fully grasp the mechanism of the
cascading process. Our aim is to provide a physical understanding. In fact, the probability for
an extreme event to occur on a node can be quantitatively analyzed through estimating the nodal
flux distribution function using the concept of nodal betweenness [169], denoted as B(i). Previous
works [48,49,163,180,183] established that, for a single-layer transportation network, under random
routing the probability for a node to be visited is proportional to its degree, but for the shortest-path
routing scheme, the probability is proportional to the number of shortest paths through the node.
Motivated by these results, we hypothesize that the probability for node i to be visited under shortest
























































































Fig. 33. Probability of Extreme Events Calculated From Our Theory of Effective Betweenness.
(a-d) The probability qEE(k) for an extreme event to occur on a node of degree k obtained from
simulation (circles), the theory of betweenness (diamonds), and the theory of effective betweenness
(squares) for M = 1, 2, 3, and 5, respectively. In (e), the extreme-event probability versus M is
shown, obtained from simulation (circles), the theory of betweenness (diamonds), and the theory of
effective betweenness (squares), for M = 10 and Pm = 1. The degree distribution function P (k)
used to calculate qEE is obtained using 10 network realizations. The betweenness and effective be-
tweenness for each node of degree value k are calculated from the corresponding network topology
and averaged over all such nodes among the 10 network realizations.
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Under the shortest path routing scheme, the transportation dynamics can in fact be regarded as a
random-walk process with nodal visiting probability pB(i). If packets are uniformly distributed
on various paths of different length, the betweenness centrality scales with the nodal degree in a
power-law fashion [169, 197]:
pB(i) ≈ βkγi , (6.5)
where β is a normalization constant, γ is the power-law scaling exponent, and both β and γ can be
determined numerically. This relationship holds for most degree values (seeMethods), providing a
basis for our physical analysis.
Consider now a multilayer network. For layer m, the probability density function (PDF) of the











 (βkγi )wmi(1− βkγi )W−wmi .
(6.6)
For simplicity, we set Pm = 1 so that all layers are identical. In this case, we can replace Wm with
〈W 〉 so that the number of layers sharing node i is simplyMi = M . The total load on node i from
theM layers, fi =
∑M
m=1 wmi, can then be written as a sum ofM binomial random variables with
identical distributions as given by Eq. (6.6). During the dynamical evolution, the interdependence
among the M random variables is reflected through the inequality fi ≤ Ci. It is useful to calculate
the probability of fi = Ci, the criterion for an extreme event to occur on node i. If we set the
system free by removing the capacity bound of every node and allowing fi to increase indefinitely,
the probability will essentially be given by P (fi ≥ Ci), where fi is the sum of M independent,
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M · 〈W 〉

 (βkγi )fi(1− βkγi )M ·〈W 〉−fi . (6.7)






M · 〈W 〉

 (βkγ)fk(1− βkγ)M ·〈W 〉−fk , (6.8)
where fk and Ck denote the load and the capacity of a node of degree k, respectively. As shown in
Figs. 32(a) and 32(b), this analysis captures the qualitative behavior of the system from simulation.
We further see that, for nodes of relatively high degrees, qEE(k) for high values of M (or k) is
generally larger than those for lower values ofM (or k), revealing that extreme events tend to occur
on nodes shared by more layers and of larger degrees. This result should be contrasted to the case of
single layer networks, where extreme events tend to occur more on small degree nodes, e.g., under
the random routing scheme [48]. Thus, in multilayer networks, the hub nodes play a crucial role in
generating extreme events. Based on this, we can write the probability for an extreme event to occur




P (k) · qEE(k,M), (6.9)
where P (k) is the degree distribution of the entire network. Figure 32(c) reveals a monotonically
positive correlation between PEE(M) and M , providing a qualitative explanation for the more
frequent occurrence of extreme events in systems with more layers.
If we calculate pB(i) using the actual betweenness values for all the individual nodes and then
averaging the nodes of the same degree (which can be done based on the topological information of
the network) instead of using the approximation Eq. (6.5), we find systematical deviation in qEE(k)
as given by theory from that through simulation, as shown in Figs. 33 (a-e). Empirically, we are able
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to identify a quantity to replace the betweenness centrality in determining qEE(k) and PEE(M). We
name it effective betweenness, defined for node i as






whereLjs is the length of a shortest path through i between the origin j and the destination s (j 6= s),
and njs is the number of such paths. While a rigorous justification for the effective betweenness is
difficult, it gives a better agreement between theory and numerics. An intuitive understanding is the
following. For j 6= s, i.e., Ljs > 0, since the lengths of these shortest paths are proportional to the
lifetime of the packets, the packet assigned to a longer path Ljs has a longer lifetime. Along the
path, the packet occupies each node once, thereby contributing less to the visiting probability of a
given node in each time step. The term Nm counts for the contribution from the case of j = s, i.e.,
Ljs = 0.





More justifications for the use of the effective betweenness can be obtained through simulations (see
Methods).
In a similar manner, we can calculate qEE(k) and PEE(M) through pE(i) instead of pB(i).
Figures 33(a-e) show, for a number of different settings, good agreement between the predicted
values of qEE(k) with the numerical values. In fact, the predicted values of PEE(M) through
BE also match the simulation results very well, as compared with those through B, as shown in
Fig. 33(f). These results indicate that the effective betweenness is a key quantity characterizing
the transportation dynamics on multilayer networks subject to interlayer competitions under the
standard shortest path routing protocol. Utilizing this concept, the transportation dynamics can








































Fig. 34. Occurrence Rate of Extreme Events and Packet Arrival Rate Under Control. In the control
parameter space, ntop denotes the number of top-degree hubs whose capacities are augmented, and
ri is the ratio of the enhanced capacity to the original capacity. The extreme event occurrence rate
REE and the packet arrival rate RA in the parameter space are shown, respectively in (a) and (b).
The simulation parameters are the same as in Fig. 30.
6.2.6. Control Strategies to Suppress Extreme Events
From Figs. 30(c) and 30(d), we see that a small increase in the parameter Pm, when it is near
the critical point, can lead to a transition between the free and catastrophic states. A straightforward
control strategy is then to reduce the value of Pm. Since extreme events tend to occur on nodes
shared by many layers, controlled reduction of the overlap between the layers can also suppress
extreme events. However, these naive methods will not be effective when Pm has well passed the
critical point.
We focus on the case where Pm, by design, exceeds its critical value by a large amount. One
can increase the capacity of each node to prevent the occurrence of extreme events at a global scale,
but this may be costly. According to Fig. 32(a), despite small fluctuations, extreme events take
place on large degree nodes with a higher probability. A practical strategy is then to selectively
enhance the capacities of the hub nodes. Figures 34(a) and 34(b) show, respectively, REE and RA
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when the capacities of the top ntop nodes (ranked by degree) in the network are multiplied by the
factor ri > 1. There exists a region in the parameter space that is completely free of extreme events,
i.e., REE ≈ 0 and RA ≈ 1, with a clear boundary separating this region from the catastrophic
regions in the parameter space. We see that neither too small values of ri nor small values of
ntop can inhibit extreme events, implying that the extreme events occurring at a small set of hub
nodes form a positive feedback loop through mutual stimulation and accordingly trigger global-scale
cascading processes. We regard these hubs as constituting an extreme-event core (EE core), since
they serve as the source of the global catastrophe. We see that extreme events can be effectively
eliminated through providing reasonably more resources to nodes in the EE core. For example,
solely increasing the capacities of the top 5 hubs (5 out of 1000, less than 1%) by 1.7 times can
make the entire network system immune to any global cascade. The enhanced capacity is in fact
insignificant comparing with the total capacity of the system, but the targeted capacity enhancement
can improve the network resilience significantly by drastically reducing the probability of extreme-
event cascade. For a multilayer network system of infrastructure, it is thus important to identify the
EE core and to assign larger capacities to the nodes in the core.
6.3. Discussion
The ubiquitous phenomenon of resource competitions in real world systems motivates us to
articulate and study a class of interdependent complex networks in which a set of nodes representing,
e.g., public service facilities in a large infrastructure, are shared by different layers that correspond
to, e.g., different service providers. The set of shared nodes have relatively large capacities. We
find that internal competitions for common resources have a dramatic and sometimes devastating
effect on the network transportation dynamics. In particular, as the number of network layers is
increased, extreme events in which the delivering capabilities of certain nodes in the network are
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essentially depleted, can occur in a cascading manner, leading to the catastrophic occurrence of
such events on a global scale. This should be contrasted to the case of total absence of extreme
events in systems with the same nodal capacities but without internal competitions (so that the
layers are independent). A striking phenomenon is that, there are two distinct possible asymptotic
states for the system: (1) a state free of extreme events and (2) a state completely dominated by
extreme events. Varying one of the two key structural parameters, the number of layers and the
nodal coverage rate, a first-order phase transition can occur between the two states, meaning that
the system can change abruptly from one state to another as a control parameter passes through a
critical point. We develop a physical theory to understand the dynamics of the extreme events based
on a newly defined topological property, the effective betweenness, and the empirical scaling law
for betweenness centrality in general. To suppress extreme events and enhance the resilience of the
system against global-scale breakdown, we propose an effective and low-cost control strategy, the
articulation of which benefits from the finding of an extreme events core formed by a small number
of hub nodes, which plays a critical role in “spreading” the extreme events. When the capacities of
the nodes in the core are selectively augmented, the network’s ability to resist large-scale extreme
events can be enhanced significantly.
Our findings have potential applications in gaining insights into the resilience of large scale
infrastructural systems that are typically composed of many layers with shared public service facil-
ities. Our results indicate that competitions for public resources can lead to catastrophic behaviors,
and control is necessary to make the system resilient to large scale failures. Generally, control of
extreme events in interdependent networked system is an important and challenging problem, and




For a given network G (Layer 0, shown as Fig. 29), each of the M layers of subnetworks is
generated via the following procedure: (1) randomly select a node in G; (2) randomly select its
Pmk neighbors; (3) for each selected neighbor, do (2) and repeat the step for all newly selected
nodes until the total number of selected nodes reaches PmN . This procedure fixes the average
degree of each layer to be Pm〈k〉. To be concrete, we use the Barabasi-Albert (BA) type of scale-
free topology [112] for network G. The power-law exponent of the degree distribution for each
layer is approximately the same as that for the entire network G.
Due to randomness in the packet transportation process, the flux of node i in layer m, wmi,
is a random variable. Accordingly, fi is the sum of M random variables (with Mi of those being
nonzero). If different layers are independent and packet transportation process can be described as
a random walk, we have
〈wmi〉 = Wm kmi
2Em






whereWm is the total number of packets in layerm, kmi is the degree of node i in layerm, and Em




















where Wm can be determined numerically through a single layer simulation or be calculated ana-
lytically from Eq. (6.2).
Numerical simulations of the dynamical process of transportation are carried out, as follows.
Initially no packets exist in the system. At each time step, NmG newly generated packets with
randomly selected destinations are placed on randomly selected nodes that are currently free of
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extreme events. Any node with load equal to its capacity is not allowed to accept any packet from
its neighbors, but the packets on the node can still leave the node, if at least one of its neighbors is
not fully loaded. Asynchronous updating scheme is adopted in the simulation to ensure that no node
has load higher than its capacity and also for the reason that synchronization in large infrastructure
systems is not always realistic and necessary. (In fact, many systems are strongly asynchronous,
e.g., the planes or trains usually enter an airport or a train station one after another.) The number
of newly generated packets in the network is determined by the packet generation rate G and the
layer population Nm = PmN . Without loss of generality, we treat Pm as a tunable parameter while
keeping G fixed. Variations in G do not affect the results qualitatively. The packet generation rate is
set to be G = 0.1 in our study.
6.4.2. Total Number of Packets in a Layer
In an equilibrium state without extreme events on a global scale, each packet can move freely
along the shortest path towards its destination so that its lifetime τ is approximately equal to the
length L of the path. SinceWm(t) includes Wm(t− 1) and the newly generated NmG packets with
the number of arrivals subtracted off, we can derive the expression ofWm step by step. In particular,
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Fig. 35. Number of Packets Ld Steps Away From Their Destinations. For a single layer network
of size N = 1000, the number of packets in an equilibrium state that are Ld steps away from their
respective destinations from theory (triangles) and simulation (circles). The total number of packets
that the system can accommodate in the equilibrium state is about W = 558, which includes the
newly generated packets within the current time step (diamonds) and all the remaining old packets
(squares).
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starting from t = 1, we have
Wm(t = 1) = Nm · G, (6.12)
⇒ Wm(t = 2) = Wm(t = 1) +NmG −NmG ·Qnew(Ld = 1) = NmG[2−Qnew(Ld = 1)],
⇒ Wm(t = 3) = Wm(t = 2) +NmG −NmG ·Qnew(Ld = 1)−NmG ·Qnew(Ld = 2)
= NmG[3− 2Qnew(Ld = 1)−Qnew(Ld = 2)],
⇒ Wm(t = 4) = NmG(4− 3Qnew(Ld = 1)− 2Qnew(Ld = 2)−Qnew(Ld = 3),
⇒ . . . . . . ,




where Qnew(Ld) denotes the stable fraction of the newly generated packets that are Ld steps away
from their destinations. Apparently, if Ld > L
max
d , i.e., Ld is larger than the maximum shortest
path length Lmaxd in the focal layer, we have Q
new(Ld) = 0 and
Wm(t > L
max





new(Ld) = NmG〈L〉. (6.13)
The relaxation time for the system to evolve into the stable equilibrium state is given by t = Lmaxd .
We obtain Wm(t → ∞), as in Eq. (6.2). However, when extreme events take place in the system,
the packet lifetime τ can assume values much larger than the path length L. In this case, we have
Wm = NmG〈τ〉 > NmG〈L〉.
6.4.3. Effect of Rerouting Via RandomWalk
For a single-layer network, we can develop a theory to explain the qualitative behavior of the
transportation dynamics. In an equilibrium state, the probability Q(Ld) for a packet to be Ld steps
away from its destination satisfies the condition of detailed balance. For simplicity, we assume





























Fig. 36. Normalized Effective Betweenness and Free Flux Distribution Function. For a single layer
network of size N = 1000, (a) the normalized effective betweenness of a node of degree k, pE,
versus k, from simulation (squares) and theory (line). The simulation results are obtained from 20
network realizations. (b) The free flux distribution function P (w) for a node of degree 75 versus w
obtained from simulation (squares) and theory (line), where the distribution function is meaningful
only when the system is set to be free of extreme events, i.e., each node is set to have infinite
capacity so that packets can travel freely via the shortest path towards their destinations. This way
the theoretical probability for the node to be visited can be calculated.
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from its destination. A walk makes a packet one more step away from its destination (which is
numerically observed with high probability). Thus, at time t, packets corresponding to Ld consist
of (1) the packets corresponding to Ld + 1 at time t− 1 and moved along the shortest path towards
their destinations at time t, (2) the packets corresponding to Ld − 1 at time t − 1 and committing
random walks at time t, and (3) the newly generated packets corresponding to Ld. Consequently,
for Ld < LLmax
d
− 1, we have
Q(Ld) = (1− η)Q(Ld + 1) + ηQ(Ld − 1) +Qnew(Ld). (6.14)
Since, in a typical case, any movement of the packets corresponding to Lmaxd makes their distances
from the destinations smaller, packets for Ld = L
max
d −1 include all these that are Lmaxd steps away
from their destinations. We thus have
Q(Lmaxd − 1) = Q(Lmaxd ) + ηQ(Lmaxd − 2) +Qnew(Lmaxd − 1). (6.15)
As boundary conditions, for packets corresponding to Ld = L
max
d , we have
Q(Lmaxd ) = ηQ(L
max
d − 1) +Qnew(Lmaxd ), (6.16)
and for packets corresponding to Ld = 1, we have
Q(1) = (1− η)Q(2) +Qnew(1). (6.17)
Consider the case where Lmaxd = 7 (a typical case in our study). We obtain a complete equation set
for solving Q(Ld), as follows:

(1− η)Q(2) −Q(1) +Qnew(1) = 0
(1− η)Q(3) + ηQ(1) −Q(2) +Qnew(2) = 0
(1− η)Q(4) + ηQ(2) −Q(3) +Qnew(3) = 0
(1− η)Q(5) + ηQ(3) −Q(4) +Qnew(4) = 0
(1− η)Q(6) + ηQ(4) −Q(5) +Qnew(5) = 0
Q(6) + ηQ(5) −Q(6) +Qnew(6) = 0
ηQ(6) −Q(7) +Qnew(7) = 0
(6.18)
It can be written in the matrix form

−1 1− η 0 0 0 0 0
η −1 1− η 0 0 0 0
0 η −1 1− η 0 0 0
0 0 η −1 1− η 0 0
0 0 0 η −1 1− η 0
0 0 0 0 η −1 1







































This set of equations can be solved numerically. When the network topology is fixed, Qnew(Ld)
follows a constant distribution, which can be obtained from simulation. While each value of η
generates a set of Q(Ld) values, a proper value makes the sum of Q(Ld)’s unity. In our calculation,
as η is increased from 0 to 1, we find that the sum of theQ(Ld) increases monotonically and, hence,
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Q(Ld) = 1 provides a solution. Figure 35 shows the theoretical
solution of the Q(Ld) distribution, which qualitatively agrees with the simulation result.
6.4.4. Effective Betweenness Calculation and Flux Distribution
According to Eq. (6.10), the effective betweenness BE of each node can be calculated from
information about the network topology, and the probability of a node to be visited (the normalized
effective betweenness), pE, can be obtained from Eq. (6.11). Through extensive simulations, we
find that the effective betweenness under the condition that the contribution of packets is inversely
proportional to the path length exhibits a power-law scaling with the degree. The empirical relation-
ship between pE and degree k is verified by comparing the averaged BE(k)/
∑N
k=1BE(k) values
corresponding to each k value obtained via the topology information and the estimated values from
pE(i) ≈ βkγi , as shown in Fig. 36(a). We see that, except the nodes with very low connectivity,
the PE value obtained directly from the network topology matches that obtained from the empirical
relationship (the error bars are essentially invisible within the scale of the figure).
In our theory, the assumption that packets moving according to the shortest-path routing scheme
can be regarded as equivalent to random walks with node-visiting probability proportional to the ef-
fective betweenness can be justified through the flux distribution function. As shown in Fig. 36(b),
for a typical hub node, the flux distribution function obtained from theory, i.e, the binomial distribu-
tion in Eq. (6.6), correctly fits the statistics obtained from simulation. For certain nodes the theory
and simulation results may not match well, but the theoretically predicted and numerically obtain
peaks typically have a substantial overlap. Further calculations show that the flux distribution func-
tions obtained from the classical betweenness centrality deviate from the simulation systematically
with large errors, as there is little overlap between the peaks obtained from theory and numerics.
This provides further justification for the necessity to use the effective betweenness.
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7 . OPTIMIZING COOPERATION ON COMPLEX NETWORKS IN THE PRESENCE OF
FAILURE
7.1. Introduction
Natural selection favors the survival and prevalence of species with competitive edge, yet
the phenomenon of cooperation is ubiquitous in many biological, economical, and social sys-
tems [198, 199]. Understanding the emergence and evolution of cooperation has thus become a
field of significant interdisciplinary interest, where evolutionary-game theory [200] has served as a
powerful mathematical paradigm [20, 198]. In a typical setting, a number of agents on a network
interact with one another, where the network topology can be regular or complex, and each agent
can take on one of the two strategies at any given time: cooperation or defection. The defection
strategy is a selfish action that usually generates higher payoff [200] temporally, as in paradigmatic
games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma games (PDGs) [20], snowdrift games (SGs) [24], and pub-
lic goods games (PGGs) [201]. A basic issue is then how cooperation can possibly survive when
natural selection favors the defection strategy in order to gain higher individual fitness (at least
temporally). In the past two decades, many cooperation-facilitating mechanisms have been un-
covered, which include network reciprocity [202–204], reputation and punishment [205], random
diffusion [206], success-driven migration [207], memory effect [208], benefit of noise [209–211],
social diversity [22, 212], asymmetric cost [213], and teaching ability [214].
In most previous works, no death mechanism was incorporated in the evolutionary-game model
on networks, i.e., no agent can be removed from the system, even if it gains no payoff in a substantial
amount of time [215]. In real-world situations, an agent can go bankrupt and be eliminated imme-
diately when its payoff falls below a critical threshold for certain period of time. An example is the
great economical recession in 2008, where a large number of financial institutions and corporations
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collapsed. In an ecological system, death of individuals is a common phenomenon. In this regard,
a recent work [216] has incorporated a simple elimination mechanism into the evolutionary-game
rules. In particular, a tolerance parameter was assigned to each individual in the network, which is
the lowest allowed payoff. An agent dies and is removed from the network when its payoff falls
below this threshold. The threshold can be heterogeneously distributed among agents. It was shown
that rapid, cascading-like elimination of agents can result from such a death mechanism, and a pure
cooperation state can emerge afterwards, where all defectors are eliminated and the survivors are
exclusively cooperators [216]. One implication is that defectors, despite their advantages in get-
ting temporarily higher payoffs, may be particularly vulnerable to large-scale, catastrophic failures.
These findings thus suggest that, in a complex system where agents are subject to failure or death,
cooperation may be beneficial to mitigating large-scale breakdown.
7.2. Results
In this paper, we propose a control scheme to enhance cooperation and eliminate large-scale
failures in complex networked systems. Our key idea is that, due to the complex time evolution of
the system, although the payoff of any agent can inevitably become arbitrarily low, the probability
that the payoff remains low for an extended period of time will be small. We are thus led to introduce
a time tolerance for each agent, where an agent will not die or be removed unless its payoff remains
below a critical threshold for time longer than the tolerance. Since the degree distribution of the
network is in general not uniform, it is reasonable that the time tolerance be degree-dependent.
A parameter β can then be introduced to characterize the heterogeneity of the distribution of the
time tolerance, where β = 0 signifies completely uniform distribution. Our main result is that
properly chosen time delay can optimize cooperation and prevent large-scale death. A surprising
finding is that optimal state of cooperation occurs near β = 0, indicating that making time-tolerance
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distribution uniform is an effective strategy to enhance cooperation.
To impose a time tolerance on a complex network, we conceive that a node or an agent’s debt
capacity depends on its relative “importance” in the network. We thus hypothesize the following







where N is the total number of agents, T0 is the nominal time tolerance, and β is an externally
control parameter. For β < 0, agents with higher (lower) degree have lower (higher) time tolerance,
the situation is the opposite for β > 0, and β = 0 corresponds to uniform time tolerance in the
network. A large values of Ti means that the node is more resilient to failure or “bankruptcy.” A
death mechanism can be introduced for PDG by choosing the following payoff tolerance for agent
i [216] P Ti ≡ αPNi = αki, where agent i dies and is removed from the network if its payoff is
lower than Pi for consecutive Ti time steps, P
N
i is the normal payoff of agent i when the system is
in a healthy state in which all agents are cooperators, and 0 < α < 1 is a tolerance parameter. Since
an agent’s degree may change when their neighbors die, ki is the “instantaneous” degree of agent i.
For α = 1, agents have zero payoff tolerance to breakdown, while for α = 0, agents are completely
tolerant.
In our evolutionary game model, each time step (iteration) thus consists of the following four
dynamical processes. (1) Game playing and payoffs. Each agent plays the classical prisoner’s
dilemma game (PDG) with all its nearest neighbors, and the total payoff is the sum of the payoffs
gained in its two-player games with all other connected agents. The PDG parameters are chosen
to be R = 1, T = b > 1, and S = P = 0 [20]. (2) Strategy updating. At each time step,
agent i randomly chooses a neighbor j and imitates j’s strategy with the probability Wi→j = {1 +
exp [−(Pj − Pi)/κ]}−1, where Pi and Pj are the payoffs agents i and j, and κ is the level of
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agents’ “rationality” representing the uncertainties in assessing the best strategy. We set κ = 0.1.
(3) Failure and agent removal. At each iteration, for agent i, the time in debt ti increases by 1, if Pi
falls below the payoff tolerance P Ti during the prior ti time steps. Otherwise, we set ti = 0. Since
ki varies with time, P
T
i and Ti also change with time. If ti > Ti or if ki = 0, agent i and all its links
will be removed from the network. (4) Random rewiring. For agent i whose neighbor j has been
removed in step (3), a new connection is added between agent i and an randomly selected agent
in the remaining agents outside i’s current neighborhood, provided that such an agent exists. This
is motivated by the consideration that an agent in general will try to seek and engage new partners
when the payoffs of some of its current partners become insignificant, and lack of global information
leads to random selection. Note that, dynamical processes (1) and (2) are conventional for typical
evolutionary-game dynamics, but processes (3) and (4) are unique features of our model [104].
In our simulations, we use the standard scale-free network model [105, 112] with parameters
m0 = 5, m = 5, and average degree k¯ = 10. The total number of agents is N = 1000. The
initial condition is that both cooperative and defective strategies populate the scale-free network
with equal probability. A synchronous updating scheme is adopted. For the results that will be
presented below, the transient time is chosen to be 10000 iterations, and each data point is obtained
by averaging over 25 independent network realizations with 20 runs for each realization.
To characterize the behavior of the network dynamics in the presence of death, we use three
quantities: death rate Sd (the number of the dead agents in the final state normalized by the network
size), and the asymptotic frequencies of cooperators ρC and defectors ρD, where Sd+ρC+ρD = 1.
Figures 37(a-f) show, for six combinations of three values of the control parameter β and two
values of the nominal time tolerance T0, the asymptotic values of the three characterizing quantities
versus the profit-tolerance parameter α. We observe that, while in all cases, Sd increases and ρC
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β = 1, T0 = 100(g)
Fig. 37. (Color online.) Death rate Sd (red circles) and frequencies of cooperation ρC (blue squares)
and defection ρD (green triangles) versus the tolerance parameter α for six combinations of three
values of the control parameter β (−1, 0, and 1) and two values of T0 (20 and 100) for b = 1.5.
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α = 0.5, T0 = 100
(d)
Fig. 38. (Color online.) For four combinations of the parameter values of α and T0, Sd (red circles),
ρC (blue squares), and ρD (green triangles) versus the control parameter β for b = 1.5.
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decreases nearly monotonically with α, a large value of T0 can delay the occurrence of total death.
In fact, for T0 = 100, there exists a region of small α values in which the death rate is nearly zero
and vast majority of the agents are cooperators. For T0 → ∞, cooperators rule the whole region
of 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Comparing the three cases of β values, we see that this interval of sustainable
cooperation appears to be the largest for β = 0, implying that adjusting β can have the effect of
significantly promoting cooperation. Further investigation shows that during the cascading failure
and random rewiring process, the degree distribution of the network can evolve from power-law to
being Poisson eventually.
To demonstrate the ability of control strategy to optimize cooperation, we explore how the three
characterizing quantities depend on the control parameter β. Figure 38 shows their behaviors for
four combinations of two values of α and T0. We observe that ρC exhibits a non-monotonic behavior
with β, indicating that ρC can be optimized by a proper choice of β and this optimization effect is
stronger for larger value of T0 [panels (b) and (d)]. For example, for α = 0.3 and T0 = 100 [panel
(b)], for β near zero, the networked system becomes “super-cooperative” in the sense that almost
no agent dies (Sd ≈ 0) and nearly all agents survive as cooperators (ρC ≈ 1). The results do not
depend on the choices of b and κ. The revelation that the optimal value of β occurs near zero is
striking: it indicates that distributing time-tolerance uniformly can be tremendously advantageous
to promote and sustain cooperation on the networked system, despite the highly heterogeneous
character of the network topology. This finding has certain implication for policy making. For
example, an economical network constituting financial institutions and banks of various sizes as
its nodes may be subject to catastrophic breakdown [216]. External intervention, e.g., government
bailout, can prevent large-scale breakdown. Our result indicates that the intervention should be so as
to make the time tolerance as uniform as possible to keep any agent “alive” after it becomes broke,
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Fig. 39. (Color online.) Time tolerance T (k) (left) and its derivative dT (k)/dβ (right) versus
control parameter β for T0 = 20.
regardless of the size of the agent. Particularly, given a large and a small bank, both facing possible
bankruptcy, the criterion to determine the amount of governmental bailout is that they can survive
for approximately the same amount of time before turning themselves into profitable agents.
We now present a heuristic argument to understand the mechanism of cooperation optimization.
It is useful to rank the nodes into three classes according to their degree values. From Eq. (7.1) and
the degree distribution of BA network P (k) = 2m2k−3, we obtain a power-law distribution of the
time tolerance T as




















where kL and kS = m denote the largest and smallest degree value in the network, respectively.
From Eqs. (7.1) and (7.3), we get the dependence of an agent’s time tolerance T (k) on its degree
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value k as




































β − 2), (m ≤ x ≤ kL). (7.5)
We have df/dx = xβ−3 ln (k/x). For agent with the largest (or the smallest) degree value, i.e.,
k = kL (or m), the sign of df/dx is fixed in the open interval (m,kL) of x, and accordingly f(x)
is a monotonous function. For k = kL, we have k ≥ x, thus df/dx ≥ 0 holds. The situation
df/dx = 0 occurs if and only if x = kL, and subsequently f(x) monotonously increases with x.
Since kL > m, we have f(kL) − f(m) > 0 and correspondingly dT (k)/dβ > 0. This means that
the time tolerance of the networks’s largest degree node monotonically increases with β. By the
same argument, the time tolerance of the smallest-degree agents decreases monotonically with β.
This means that the agents with the largest-degree value, which play a critical role in maintaining
cooperation [105], and the agents with the smallest degree values, which account for the majority of
the system population, do not play a significant role in optimizing cooperation. Note that, the effects
are in fact insignificant, as can be seen from Fig. 38, where ρC , ρD, and sd vary non-monotonously
with the control parameter β. Since T (m) and T (kL) exhibit a monotonous behavior (which can be
argued analytically), the non-monotomous behavior in ρC , ρD, and sd is unlikely to be caused by
the behavior of T (m) and T (kL). In fact, it is caused by the non-monotonous behavior of T (k) for
m < k < kL.
The key to cooperation optimization thus lies in the nodes of medium degrees. In particular, for
m < k < kL, the sign of df(x)/dx becomes indeterminate and, accordingly, the sign of dT (k)/dβ
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cannot be determined. The dependence of T on β for agents with different degrees can be studied
numerically. We find that, except for the smallest- and highest-degree agents, T is typically a
convex function of β. Since the time tolerance values for the agents with medium degrees peak near
β = 0, as shown in Fig. 39, the corresponding agents live longer than other agents. Since the peak
values of T are not much larger than the nominal value T0, a slight increase in the medium-degree
agents’ lifetimes can help stabilize cooperation. The lifetimes of the medium-degree agents are thus
critically important for promoting cooperation [22].
7.3. Discussion
In summary, we find that in complex networked systems where agent interactions are governed
by evolutionary-game dynamics but agents are subject to death, an effective control scheme can be
introduced to optimize cooperation, which has the advantage to stabilize the system by preventing
large-scale cascading failures. The key to our control scheme is a time tolerance that prevents any
agent from being removed from the system immediately when its payoff falls below a threshold. Our
computation and heuristic analysis indicate that, despite the network’s being highly heterogeneous,
making the time tolerance as uniformly as possible across the network can lead to the emergence of
a stable cooperation cluster that has recruited majority of the agents in the network. Simultaneously,
substantial death of agents can be avoided. This finding may have implications to policy making
to prevent, for example, large-scale breakdown of social and economical systems. The emergence
and evolution of cooperation in complex systems have been recognized as a fundamental issue in
natural, social, and economical sciences, and our work provides insights into the control of complex
dynamical systems in terms of critical issues such as stability, performance, and sustainability.
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8 . SPATIOTEMPORAL PATTERNS AND PREDICTABILITY OF CYBERATTACKS
8.1. Introduction
Highly networked communication and information infrastructures built via various state-of-the-
art technologies play crucial roles in modern economic, social, military, and political activities.
However, such sophisticated infrastructures are facing more and more severe security challenges on
the global scale [218–222]. Earlier theoretical works focused on understanding the complex topolo-
gies of the Internet [223] and on the likelihood of large scale failures caused by node removal in
complex networks [224–228]. Recent years have witnessed tremendous efforts devoted to mitigat-
ing and coping with increasing cybersecurity threats. For example, attack graphs were invented to
analyze the overall network vulnerability and to generate a global view of network security against
attacks [229–232]. By deploying network sensors at particular points in the Internet, monitoring
systems were built to detect cyberthreats and statistically analyze the time, sources, and the types of
attacks [233], and various visualization methods were developed to better understand the result of
the detection and analysis [234–237]. Quite recently, a genetic epidemiology approach to cyberse-
curity was proposed to understand the factors that determine the likelihood that individual computers
are compromised [238], and the general concept of cybersecurity dynamics was introduced [239].
Attack traffic analysis were mainly done in the field of Intrusion Detection System (IDS), the
cyberspace’s equivalent to the burglar alarm. IDS has become one of the fundamental technolo-
gies for network security [240]. There are three approaches to building an IDS: (1) signature
or misuse detection, (2) anomaly detection, and (3) hybrid or compound detection. In particu-
lar, signature detection technique is based on a predefined set of known attack signatures obtained
from security experts. The system observes the activities of subjects and alarms if their behaviors
match the malicious ones in the attack signature set. Both host-based [241, 242] and network-
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based [243, 244] detection systems were developed. Anomaly detection technique is based on ma-
chine learning methodologies, such as system call based sequence analysis [245–247], Bayesian
networks [248–250], principal component analysis [251–253], and Markov models [254, 255]. The
IDS monitoring capability can be improved by taking a hybrid approach that combines both signa-
ture and anomaly detection strategies [256, 257]. All these methods are often based on data packet
payload inspection and thus are difficult to perform for high speed networks. Another limitation of
these approaches is the assumption that either the attacks are well defined (i.e., signatures) or the
normal behaviors are well defined (so are the abnormal behaviors). Recently, there has been a grow-
ing interest in flow-based intrusion detection technologies, by which communication patterns within
the network are analyzed, instead of the contents of individual packets [258, 259]. Interestingly, a
quite recent study analyzing the data obtained from the host IDSs reveals strong associations be-
tween the network services running on the host and the specific types of threats to which it is suscep-
tible [238]. Making use of the plan recognition method in artificial intelligence, one can predict the
attack plan from the IDS alert information [260]. Utilizing virtual or physical networks to test these
IDS techniques can be costly and time consuming, hence, as an alternative, simulation modeling
approaches were developed to represent computer networks and IDS to efficiently simulate cyberat-
tack scenarios [261–263]. As botnets have become a major threat in cyberspace, cyberattack traffic
patterns have also been used to understand botnet’s Command-and-Control strategies [264–266].
In this paper, we uncover the existence of intrinsic spatiotemporal patterns underlying cyber-
attacks and address the important question of whether certain such attacks may be predicted or
anticipated in advance. The overwhelming complexity of the modern cyberspace would suggest
complete randomness in the distribution of cyberattacks and, as a result, the intuitive expectation is
that attackers’ behaviors are random and attacks are unpredictable. However, our discovery of the
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spatiotemporal patterns and quantitative characterization of the predictability of these patterns sug-
gest the otherwise. In particular, distinct from previous works on cyberattack analysis, our efforts
concentrate on analyzing the macroscopic properties of the attack traffic flows using a data set of
cyberattacks available to us. Especially, the data set recorded attacks on 491 consecutive victim IP
addresses (sensors) in 18 days. The IP addresses can thus be regarded, approximately, as a vari-
able in space. An attack is regarded as an event occurring in both space and time, and we speak
of events in spatiotemporal dimensions. This is much more comprehensive than the analysis of the
individual time series obtained from sampled IP addresses or the time series obtained by treating
the IP addresses as a whole [267–275]. Our results reveal, for the first time, that robust macro-
scopic patterns exist in the seemingly random cyberspace: majority of the attacks are governed by
a few very limited number of patterns, indicating that cyberattacks are mainly committed by a few
types of major attackers, each with unique spatiotemporal characteristics. More specifically, the
patterns can be divided into two types: deterministic and stochastic. The emergence of determin-
istic patterns implies predictability, which can potentially be exploited to anticipate certain types
of attacks to achieve greater cybersecurity. We characterize the predictability of attack frequency
time series based on information entropy [276]. Our results suggest a surprisingly high degree of
predictability, especially for the IPs under deterministic attack. Effective algorithms can then be de-
veloped to predict the future attack frequencies. We also develop methods to evaluate the inference
probability between the attack frequency time series based on series similarity, which may allow
us to plant much fewer attack probes into the Internet while still achieving effective monitoring.
The stochastic patterns can be quantified using the flux-fluctuation law in statistical and nonlinear
physics [48, 49, 176–180, 182, 183, 196]. Our findings outline a global picture of how cyberattacks
are initiated and distributed into the Internet. This will be of potential value to the development of
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defense strategies against cyberattacks on a global scale.
8.2. Results
Existence of IP address blocks sharing similar attack patterns and common backgrounds. We
define attack frequency w(t) as the number of attacks received by a victim IP per time unit ∆t.
Figure 40 shows the time series w(t) from all the victim IP addresses for ∆t = 1000 seconds.
Surprisingly, instead of overwhelming randomness, we observe substantial regularity: the IP-space
can be unequivocally divided into distinct colored blocks, where the amplitudes of the time se-
ries within each block are approximately of the same order of magnitude, but the amplitudes from
different blocks vary considerably. Note that, within each block, the time series w(t) are approxi-
mately synchronized, which correspond to a particular attack pattern. For different attack patterns,
there exists a common background in the different IP sectors. For example, about half of the IP
addresses (from 1 to 246) belong to the background of aqua block [w(t) ∼ 101.5], in which yel-
low, orange, and red patterns all exist, while all other IP addresses possess a dark-blue background
[w(t) < 100.5] with a number of vertical light-blue lines going through them.
To further investigate the properties of each pattern, we concentrate on a small time period,
as shown in Fig. 41. Firstly, under much higher time resolution (∆t = 10sec), the large number
of vertical light-blue lines in Fig. 40 (a) become curves evenly distributed along the t axis and
occupying about half of the IP-space (from 1 to 246). These curves are approximately parallel lines
within the same IP region but with different slopes in different IP regions (the sloped lines become
visually vertical under low time resolution or large observational time period). It is these curves
that form the aqua background throughout the upper half of the IP space in Fig. 40. Secondly, all
the light-blue curves exist on a dark-blue background with three vertical light-blue lines appearing
throughout the entire IP-space, indicating a common background covering every single IP address
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Fig. 40. Time Series of Attack Frequency w(T ) for All IP Addresses. (a) Spatiotemporal represen-
tation of attack frequencies w(t) of all IP addresses on a logarithmic scale, where the x-axis and
y-axis are, respectively, time t and IP address index from 1 to 491 (top to bottom). The IP region
1-246 is denoted as the aqua background, where each of the four IP regions (19-31, 35-47, 50-130,
and 131-191) exhibits a particular attack pattern that is overlayed on the background. The IP region
247-363 possesses an attack pattern that is overlayed on the dark-blue background lying under the
entire IP-space. (b) Three-dimensional presentation of the attack frequency w(t) on a logarithmic
scale. The “walls” of unity height are not visible on the logarithmic scale, but higher “walls” are vis-
ible in the IP region 364-491 [corresponding to the vertical light-blue lines on the bottom dark-blue
background in (a)], which actually occur in the entire IP-space but are mixed with other patterns.
The time resolution is∆t = 1000 seconds.
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Fig. 41. Time Series of Attack Frequency with Higher Time Resolution. Time range: t = 86200 to
86600. Time resolution: ∆t = 10 seconds. (a,b) Two- and three-dimensional representations of the
attack frequency w(t) for the entire IP-space on a linear scale, respectively.
on which other attack patterns are superimposed. We call the vertical lines “walls,” which represent
the level of simultaneous attacks on each victim IP and are visually similar to walls in the three-
dimensional representation, as shown in Figs. 40(b) and 41(b).
These observations have the following implications. Firstly, IP addresses in the same colored
block are attacked through quite similar patterns, and the block as a whole shows unique spatial-
temporal features, which can be effectively associated with the “fingerprint” of a particular set of
attackers. For an IP block corresponding to a particular attack pattern, since the relatively strong
spatiotemporal regularity of the pattern can only be achieved via attacks highly organized in time
and space, it is reasonable to speculate that the corresponding attacks are solely committed by a
set of intimately correlated attackers, or even one major attacker, rather than by a set of multiple
independent attackers. A single major attacker is more likely to play the role, due to the require-
ment of close cooperation between the attackers that may be unrealistic. Thus, a particular type of

































Fig. 42. Deterministic Attack Pattern on Different Time Scales. For time resolution ∆t = 10
seconds and IP region 1-250, (a) deterministic attack pattern in a relatively large time scale: the
sloped light-green lines in the IP region 19-31, where the time range is t = 38000 to 42000, (b)
enlarged section between the two vertical pink lines in (a) in the time range from t = 39500 to
40000, which provides a time-scale comparison between two types of deterministic attack patterns.
the limited types of attack patterns, a small number of major attackers are responsible for almost all
the attacks. Secondly, the consecutiveness of IP addresses attacked in similar patterns reveals the
way how the corresponding attackers select their targets, i.e., targeting each IP address within a con-
secutive IP sector rather than distantly separated IP addresses. Thirdly, the coexistence of multiple
patterns overlaying on some identical background indicates that some IP addresses may be under
the cross fire from multiple major attackers.
8.2.1. Deterministic Attacks
Counterintuitively, the parallel light-blue lines in Fig. 41(a) constituting the aqua background
in the upper half IP-space show a substantial component of deterministic attack behaviors. We
speculate that each light-blue line is generated by one of the attacker’s devices, such as a zombie
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computer in a botnet that launches attacks on a certain IP region with a constant sweeping speed and
a certain order with similar time intervals. Such an “organized” attack pattern makes the light-blue
lines nearly evenly distributed along the time axis, which can be regarded as deterministic attacks.
Because of the deterministic rules that the attacks follow, it is possible to predict when and where
the next attack is going to take place by identifying the ordered time interval and extrapolating the
sweeping speed. We observe that the attacker associated with a light-blue line typically attacks
each IP address once approximately within every 3 to 8 seconds. Specifically, the three different
sweeping rates in the three sub-regions of IP addresses are about 8 seconds per IP from 51 to 130, 3
seconds per IP from 131 to 191, and 6 seconds per IP from 192 to 246. Similar deterministic attack
patterns can also be observed in a relatively narrow IP region close to the top of the IP region (IP
19-31), but in a much larger time scale, indicated as the thicker light-green lines right below the
top of Fig. 42(a). Fig. 42(b) is the enlarged graph with the contrast slopes of the two deterministic
attack patterns shown more clearly. The deterministic attacks in the IP range 19-31 typically take
about 200 to 1100 seconds per IP before switching to the next, with the attack rate of about once
per second.
The “wall” attacks in the dark-blue background show another type of deterministic attack pat-
terns [Figs. 40 and 41], which are instantaneous attacks to each IP that can be observed with time
resolution of ∆t = 1 second. However, when a higher time resolution is used, e.g., ∆t = 10−3
second, the “wall” attacks are found to occur one after another in the order of the IP index. Fig. 43
shows two typical types of “wall” attacks. For the first type, attacks are performed exactly once on
each IP in the order of IP index but with time delays of the order of 10−2 second. This is the most
frequently observed walls with unity height in the data set, while close occurrence of several “wall”






































Fig. 43. Deterministic Attack Pattern of ‘‘Walls”. For time resolution ∆t = 10−3 second, (a) one
type of “wall” attacks over the entire IP space, with each IP receiving one attack. The time delays
for the attacks to reach the targeted IP addresses exhibit three distinct values, separating the dots in
this panel into three lines. (b) A different type of “wall” attack with different delay, and (c) enlarged
section in the small red square in (a). Five consecutive attacks on each IP occurred before the next
IP is attacked.
shown in Figs. 43(b) and 43(c) consists of 5 consecutive attacks on one IP before skipping to the
next, strictly in terms of the IP order.
The three different deterministic attack patterns observed in Fig. 42, i.e., the thick green lines in
IP 19-31, the background in IP 1-246, the “wall” attacks over the whole IP space, all sweep the IP
space strictly in order but with time scales differing by orders of magnitude. The multiscale behav-
iors associated with the deterministic attack patterns are crucial for understanding and predicting
attacks in the cyberspace.
8.2.2. Flux-Fluctuation Relation and Stochastic Attack
Recently there has been a great deal of attention to the flux-fluctuation relations in complex
networked systems with stochastic transportation dynamics [48, 49, 176–180, 182, 183, 196], where







































Fig. 44. Flux-Fluctuation Relation. For time resolution ∆t = 10 seconds, 〈w〉-σ relations (a) for
each IP in the IP space, (b) for IP regions 247-257 and 364-491, and for each IP in the dark-blue
background with walls (red circles) and without walls (blue squares), (c) for IP region 258-363 with
(red circles) and without (blue squares) walls. The blue dashed lines in (b) and (c) have the slope
1/2.
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unit at time t, and the standard deviation σ of w(t) corresponds to the fluctuation. The following











where 〈w〉 is the time average of flux w(t), 〈W 〉 is the time average of the external driveW (t), and
σext denotes the standard deviation of W (t). If the external drive W is approximately a constant,
i.e., σext ≈ 0, or ifW follows the Poisson distribution (σext = 〈W 〉), then σ ∼
√
〈w〉. However, if
the external drive has large fluctuations, the relation becomes σ ∼ 〈w〉.
Our key idea is that the stochastic component of cyberattacks can be characterized as a flux dis-
tribution processes among all the IP addresses. Using the flux-fluctuation relation, we can identify
and distinguish the patterns of the external drives. Fig. 44(a) shows the flux-fluctuation relation on a
double logarithmic scale, where the attack frequency w(t) of a victim IP corresponds to its flux, and
the total number of attacks on a certain IP region is regarded as the external driveM(t). We observe
that a substantial part of the flux-fluctuation relation follows the scaling σ ∼
√
〈w〉 (with slope 1/2
on the logarithmic scale), while a small portion follows the scaling σ ∼ 〈w〉 (with slope 1). These
results suggest that cyberattacks share some intrinsic common features with stochastic transporta-
tion dynamics. The flux-fluctuation theory can then be used to analyze the stochastic components
of cyberattack patterns.
From Fig. 44(a), we see that the flux-fluctuation relation for the most heavily bombarded IP
region (35-47, see Fig. 40) displays the unity slope, indicating a non-Poisson type of external
drive with strong fluctuations. The IP region under mostly deterministic attacks (IP 192-246, the
aqua background with no other overlayed attack patterns) corresponds to only one dot in the flux-
fluctuation diagram, establishing the deterministic nature of the attack without any randomness.
Figure 44(b) shows the σ-〈w〉 relation for the dark-blue background with no overlayed attack pat-
157
Fig. 45. Attack Frequency Deviation Within An IP Region Versus the Average At Each Time Unit
for (a) the the dark-blue background and (b) IP region 258-363. The time resolution is ∆t = 10
seconds.
terns, where we obtain the relation σ =
√〈w〉 by removing the deterministic attacks. This is
mainly due to the sparsity of attacks associated with the dark-blue background. That is, without
walls, mostly only one attack was received in the corresponding IP region within each time unit.
We thus have W = 1 or 0. The average flux per unit time for one given IP is 〈w〉 ≤ 1/N , with N
being the size of the IP region. For observation with T time units, the number of time units with
W = 1 is denoted by t. We have








= 〈W 〉 − 〈W 〉2. (8.2)











〈w〉 − 〈w〉2 ≈
√
〈w〉. (8.3)






















〈w′〉 − 〈w′〉2, (8.4)
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where 〈w′〉 = (t + twall)/T , and twall is the number of walls with one attack to each IP. Since
twall ≫ ta, 〈w′〉2 cannot be ignored, and so the slope of the σ′-〈w′〉 relation on a double logarithmic


















As shown in Fig. 44(b), walls tend to reduce the slope slightly. This example illustrates the effect
of deterministic attacks on the fluctuation of the attack flux. Similar phenomenon is observed in
another IP region (IP 258-363) where a less sparse but larger 〈w〉 scale attack pattern takes place,
as shown in Fig. 44(c).
8.2.3. Spatial Concentration of Attacks
Our analysis so far has focused on the temporal flux and fluctuation behavior of each IP. It is
useful to study the distribution of the attacks in the IP space to distinguish the attack patterns in
different IP blocks. The relation between the average attack frequency over the IP addresses in a
given region, denoted by wIP, and the standard deviation of the attacks distributed among these IP
addresses, denoted by σIP, is shown in Fig. 45, where the left and right panels correspond to the
attacks associated with the dark-blue background and with IP address block 258-363, respectively.
In the dark-blue background, attacks are sparse. The extreme case with n attacks homogeneously
distributed among N IP addresses leads to wIP = n/N , where each of n IP addresses receives
w = 1 attack and the remaining IP addresses have w = 0. The standard deviation of the attacks















which is the equation of an ellipse. This equation matches the lower bound of the real data very

























































Fig. 46. Correlation Coefficients. (a) Correlation coefficient matrix associated with the IP space, (b)
total number of attacks on an IP address, M (blue), the average time interval between consecutive
attacks on an IP, 〈τ〉 (red), and the cluster size to which each IP belongs (green). The clustering
threshold is set to be 0.7 (somewhat arbitrary). (c) Time series of attack frequency for IP 155 (red),
160 (blue), and 165 (green). All three IP addresses belong to the region of the aqua background
without any other overlayed attack patterns. (d) Time series of attack frequency for IP 405 (red),
409 (blue), and 420 (green), which belong to the region of the dark-blue background without any
other overlayed attack patterns. One abrupt peak occurs at IP 409, and another at IP 420. The time
resolution is ∆t = 10000 seconds for all four panels.
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In addition, for the time resolution of 10 seconds, the effect of “wall” attacks with unity height is to
increase each wIP exactly by 1, since a wall introduces one attack to each single IP. However, the
change in σIP due to the “wall” attacks is small. Thus we observe two ellipses from real data in
both Figs. 45(a) and 45(b).
The major difference between Figs. 45(a) and 45(b) is the straight line that appears only in 45(b).
This is due to the concentration of multiple attacks on a few IP addresses, leaving the remaining IP
addresses free of attacks. The extreme case is where all n attacks focus merely on one IP. Then, the







N − 1 · wIP, (8.7)
which gives the upper bound fit (the straight line) with the real data, as shown in Fig. 45(b). Conse-
quently, it is the concentration of attacks that distinguishes the attack pattern in the IP region (258-
363) from the dark-blue background. We thus see that, for observational time resolution ∆t < 10
seconds in which the attacks are sparse, the plots of σIP-wIP relation are confined in the region
bounded by Eqs. (8.6) and (8.7), and larger values of σIP imply that the attacks are inhomogeneous
in the IP space with uneven spatial concentration.
We conclude that the target selection scheme in the IP region 259-491 is highly stochastic due
to the lack of regular spatiotemporal pattern. Within each time unit, there are mainly two target
selection schemes: (1) all attacks are concentrated only on a single IP; (2) attacks are evenly spread
over the whole region, i.e., each attack packet is received by a different IP.
8.2.4. Inference Probability of Attack Patterns
Due to the surprisingly stable similarity of the attack patterns within an IP block, attack time
sequences of frequencies on all IP addresses may be inferred from any single sequence. High
inference probability of a consecutive IP region indicates that information obtained from one sensor
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Fig. 47. Markov State Transition Probability Matrix (MSTPMs). For time resolution ∆t = 10
seconds, MSTPMs obtained from two randomly selected IP addresses within the corresponding IP
region. See the legend of Fig. 45(a) for the eight IP regions under different attack patterns: IP
addresses (a1,a2) 10 and 33, (b1,b2) 20 and 30, (c1,c2) 40 and 45, (d1,d2) 60 and 120, (e1,e2) 140
and 190, (f1,f2) 200 and 240, (g1,g2) 260 and 360, and (h1,h2) 420 and 490.
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(one IP) may be sufficient to capture the key features of the attack patterns in the whole region.
Thus, our discovery of the attack pattern similarity may help to reduce dramatically the number of
sensors needed to monitor the attack behavior in the whole cyberspace of interest.
A straightforward measure of inference probability is the correlation coefficient, as the time
series belonging to a similar attack pattern are likely to be highly correlated. The correlation coeffi-
cient between two time series i and j is given by
ρi,j =
〈(wi − 〈wi〉)(wj − 〈wj〉)〉
σiσj
, (8.8)
where wi and wj are the attack frequencies of IP addresses i and j, and σi and σj are the corre-
sponding standard deviations. Fig. 46(a) shows the correlation coefficient matrix containing ρi,j for
each i-j pair with relatively low time resolution (∆t = 104 seconds). We see that relatively large
correlation coefficients appear within the IP regions corresponding to the readily distinguishable
colored blocks in Fig. 40. To further exploit the use of the correlation coefficients, we consider the
IP group generated from one given IP i by calculating the correlation coefficients between the time
series from this IP and those from all other IP addresses, ρij , over a certain threshold ρc. The sizes
of the groups generated from the IP addresses under a similar attack pattern would be close to each
other. From the group size of each IP shown in Fig. 46(b), we see that time series associated with
IP addresses in different blocks behave differently, despite the large fluctuations. The correlation
coefficient, however, may not be a reliable measure to characterize similarity and inference proba-
bility of the main attack pattern. Figure 46(c) shows a case where the correlation coefficient works
well, but an unsuccessful case is shown in Fig. 46(d) where the two abrupt peaks produce very low
correlation coefficients among the three time series, in spite of their similarities in regions excluding
the peaks. We note that the peaks correspond to extreme events with highly concentrated attacks.
When the extreme events on different IP addresses are out of phase, the correlation coefficient fails
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to reflect the similarity of the main attack pattern and can lead to large fluctuations. Other statisti-
cal properties, such as M , the total number of attacks on a particular IP, and 〈τ〉, the average time
interval between consecutive attacks, can also be used to characterize the attack pattern similarity,
as shown in Fig. 46(b). We see that the fluctuations of these quantities are much smaller than ρij
and they are thus able to better distinguish the IP addresses under different attack patterns. Another
disadvantage of the correlation coefficients is that they are sensitive to time resolution ∆t. For high
resolution (small∆t), the reduction in the attack frequency values may make a time series so sparse
that it is dominated by random fluctuations, and this can result in a sharp decrease in the correlation
coefficients between such sparse series. For example, for ∆t = 10 seconds, ρi,j is close to 0 for
almost any i-j pairs.
To better characterize the attack patterns and overcome the sensitivity on time resolution and
frequency value fluctuations, we coarse-grain the time series according to the order of magnitude
of their amplitude, i.e., we replace each w(t) by a state number, X(t) = int[log10 w(t)], where int
denotes the integer closest to log10 w(t) [for w(t) = 0, we set w(t) = 0.1 so that X(t) = −1].
Based on X(t), we can construct a Markov state transition probability matrix (MSTPM) to capture
the key information about the attack pattern on any particular IP. The entry in the matrix at themth
row and nth column denotes the probability that the IP is in state m at t −∆t and it transitions to
state n at time t. Since the length of the time series is relatively large, the transition probabilities
are robust against random fluctuations. In addition, for IP addresses under similar attack patterns,
the similarity in their state transition patterns would hold irrespective of the time resolution. As
shown in Fig. 47, IP addresses within the same attack pattern region have similar MSTPMs, even
for high resolution (e.g., ∆t = 10 second). This suggests that MSTPMs, which can be measured








































Fig. 48. Correlation Coefficient Matrix Associated with the MSTPMs for (a) ∆t = 10 seconds and
(b) ∆t = 100 seconds.
certain order, can be used to quantify the inference probability, as shown in Fig. 48. We observe that
the IP addresses attacked under similar patterns have relatively high correlation coefficients, while
low correlation coefficients can distinguish the deterministic from stochastic attacks. In general,
the attack frequencies of a group of IP addresses under deterministic (or stochastic) attack can be
inferred from one of them under attack of the same type.
Generally, attack frequency time series have high inference probability, which can be measured
by the correlation coefficients or the MSTPMs. The latter, however, are more reliable especially for
high time resolutions. This finding would enable one to monitor the cyberattack patterns throughout
the entire IP space of interest using fewer sensors.
8.2.5. Predictability of Cyberattacks
Predicting future cyberattacks is an ultimate goal in investigating cyberattack patterns through
data analysis. The degree of predictability can be characterized by the uncertainty associated with
the state transitions in the coarse-grained time series of attack frequencies, which can be further
quantified by the information entropy. Taking into account the temporal correlations in the state
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P (S′i) log2[P (S
′
i)], (8.9)
where Si = {X1,X2, . . . ,XT } denotes the sequence of states that the time series reached for IP i,
and P (S′i) is the probability that the state sequence S
′
i appears to IP i. The information entropy Ei
takes into account both the heterogeneous probability distribution in different states and the temporal
correlations among the states. The entropy is thus able to provide a realistic characterization of the
attack patterns.
The predictability Π of a state sequence is defined as the success rate that an algorithm can
achieve in predicting the sequence’s future states [276]. For a sequence with NS possible states,
the predictability measure is subject to the Fano’s inequality: Π ≤ Πmax(E,NS), where the pre-
dictability upper bound Πmax(E,NS) is obtained by solving the following equation
E = −Πmax log2(Πmax)− (1−Πmax) log2(1−Πmax) + (1−Πmax) log2(NS − 1). (8.10)
In the predictability calculation, high time resolutions, e.g., ∆t = 10 seconds, can make the series
so sparse that the overwhelming majority of the states are reduced to the “ground state” X(t) =
−1 [corresponding to w(t) = 0]. In this case, the predictability Πmax assumes artificially high
values, as the future states can trivially be predicted to be X(t) = −1, leading to a high success
rate. To avoid this artifact, we need to use moderate time resolutions, e.g., ∆t = 100 seconds or
1000 seconds. The length of the time series can affect the value of the predictability. Predictable
patterns may not be fully contained within short time series and, hence, we evenly divide the whole
time series into multiple sections, each of length of h hours. Figures 49(a) and 49(b) show the
predictability upper bound Πmax for different section lengths and time resolutions. While longer
time series (higher h) tend to be more predictable as expected, all time series have surprisingly high
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∆t = 100, D
∆t = 100, R
∆t = 1000, D
∆t = 1000, R
Fig. 49. Predictability Calculated From Coarse-Grained Time Series. (a,b) Predictability upper
bound Πmax for all 491 IP addresses for various section lengths under time resolutions ∆t = 100
seconds and 1000 seconds, respectively, where Πmax values are averaged over all sections. (c)
Average Πmax versus section length h for ∆t = 100 seconds (red circles) and 1000 seconds (blue
squares). (d) Average Πmax of the deterministic (open symbols) and stochastic (closed) attacks
versus the section length h for ∆t = 100 seconds (red circles) and 1000 seconds (blue squares).
In the figure, “D” denotes deterministic and “R” stands for random or stochastic. See text for
explanation on why, in the case of ∆t = 100, stochastic attacks can have a higher predictability
upper bound than deterministic attacks.
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predictability. There are cases where the predictability probability is over 90%, indicating that it is
possible to make correct predictions for over 90% of the cases. We observe that the IP regions of
different attack patterns in Fig. 40 have differentΠmax values, and the IP addresses under each attack
pattern are approximately equally predictable. Deterministic attacks have higher predictability than
stochastic attacks for ∆t = 1000 seconds, but the opposite occurs for ∆t = 100 seconds, due
to the fact that stochastic attacks are much more sparse and, as such, a higher time resolution can
introduce overwhelmingly more ground states into the state sequence. Despite the different attack
patterns, the average predictability over all IP addresses converges to about 93% with relatively
small error bars as the section length is increased, as shown in Fig. 49(c). Figure 49(d) shows the
average predictability of the deterministic and stochastic attacks. We see that deterministic attacks
systematically have higher predictability than stochastic attacks for ∆ = 1000 seconds. Again,
sparsity contributes to the relatively high predictability (over 85% for long sections) of stochastic
attacks.
8.3. Discussion
8.3.1. How Do Attackers Choose Their Targets?
From Fig. 46(b), we see that the IP addresses under a similar attack pattern have similar M
values, which means that different IP addresses in the IP region dominated by one particular attack
pattern are approximately equally visited by the attackers. Due to this, we speculate that in most
cases, an attacker does not target some specific IP addresses, but a consecutive IP region. In the
case of deterministic attacks, the attacker scans a whole block of adjacent IP addresses by using its
botnet, and each IP in the targeted block has equal probability to be hit. In the case of stochastic
attacks, at each time an attack is launched, IP addresses in the targeted block have similar chances
to receive it. It may indicate that the attackers are most likely to view the targeted IP block as a
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black-box, the internal structure of which may be irrelevant.
8.3.2. Interplay Between Different Attack Patterns
Except for the parts in Fig. 44 that show slope 1 or 1/2, there are some parts of the data that
do not exhibit a plausible scaling, which correspond to the high attack density patterns that are
overlayed on the deterministic aqua background. Figs. 41(a) and 42(b) show that the light-blue lines
change their slopes when other attack pattern are superimposed on them. This reveals an interesting
phenomenon: different attack patterns may interfere with each other. If so, it would be of great
importance to investigate how a certain type of attack pattern promotes or suppresses the efficiency
of another type, and how the attack packets differ from normal data packets when transporting
through the Internet. Making use of the suppression effect can lead to a dramatic reduction in the
transportation efficiency of the attack packets. Our work indicates that it is potentially possible to
mitigate or eliminate cybersecurity threats substantially through a macroscopic approach, a field
that requires much further efforts.
8.3.3. Attack Pattern Inference and Prediction
The surprising finding that cyberattack patterns are highly predictable encourages us to develop
inference and prediction algorithms. The former can provide us with global insights into cyberse-
curity based on limited information resources, and the latter would enable us not just to get a better
understanding of current cyberattack data but also help us to forecast future cyberthreats.
8.3.4. Possible Improvement for Future IDS
The analysis on the deterministic attack reveals the possibility for an IDS to be prepared in
advance to the coming attack based on the estimation of the relatively constant attack frequency. If
we could make the IDSes in a consecutive IP region communicate on attack information, then the
sweeping speed can be estimated, which more accurately tells each IDS when shall the next attack
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take place, since the adjacent victim IPs are swept by the attacker one after another in order within
a constant time interval.
8.3.5. About the IP Information of the Attackers
With the IP information of the attackers, if possible, we would be able to further verify our
speculation that each sweeping is generated by a simple IP address. The spatial distribution of
the attackers’ IPs can also be retrieved. For deterministic attack, the sweepings are targeted on
consecutive IPs, and it is very likely that a substantial part of the attackers’ IPs are also consecutive
or nearly consecutive, since those attacker could be ex-victims of the same type of attack, which
have been successfully compromised by a major attacker and are now serving as a part of its botnet.
More properties of cyberattack which can not be observed on the victims’ side could also be revealed
via such information.
8.4. Materials and Methods
The data set we analyzed was collected between 2/9/2011 and 2/25/2011 by a cyber instru-
ment known as honeypot (see http://www.honeynet.org). The data set contains 491 honeypot IP
addresses. The honeypot simulates vulnerable computer services corresponding to distinct TCP
ports. Since there are no legitimate services associated with these IP addresses, the traffic arriving
at these ports is widely deemed as attacks. The raw network traffic arriving at these ports was ini-
tially recorded as pcap files. By using some standard pre-processing procedure, we reformulated
the raw traffic into flows, which are the commonly accepted representation of cyber attacks. The
pre-processing procedure uses two widely used parameters: the flow timeout time of 60 seconds,
meaning that a flow expires after 60 seconds of no more packets arriving activities; the flow life-
time of 300 seconds, meaning that a flow expires after 300 seconds. The supplementary material
contains the data set, which has two columns. Each row is a tuple (a, b), which represents that IP
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address a was attacked at time b at some TCP port. Since our analysis treats an IP address as a
whole, we do not distinguish the specific ports. For the purpose of protecting privacy, the honeypot
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SUPPLEMENTARYMATERIALS FOR UNIVERSAL STRUCTURAL ESTIMATOR AND
DYNAMICS APPROXIMATOR FOR COMPLEX NETWORKS
Supplementary Note 1: Implementation details of 14 dynamical processes on complex
networks
All types of network dynamical processes studied in the main text, except for PDG and SG, are
implemented in the following way. At each time step t, the probabilities for node i to have a state
xi(t + 1) = 1 and 0 at the next time step conditioned on the state configuration of i’s neighbors,
i.e., P 0→1i and P
1→0
i , are calculated according to Table 1 in the main text. If xi(t) = 0 (or 1), then




i ) or remains at 0 (or
1) with the probability 1− P 0→1i (or 1− P 1→0i ).
Listed below is a detailed description of the dynamical processes and the parameter settings.
(Reasonable changes in parameter values do not affect the reconstruction performance).
1. SDBM. The dynamics is described in detail in the main text. The network parameters (link
weights and node biases) are uniformly chosen between 0.3 and 0.7 in our calculation.
2. Ising Glauber. Opinion dynamics models often adopt the classic Ising model of ferromag-
netic spins [1]. The temperature parameter κ characterizes the level of “rationality” of the in-
dividuals, which represents the uncertainties in accepting the opinion. The coupling strength
parameter J (or the ferromagnetic-interaction parameter) characterizes the intensity of the
interaction between the connected nodes. The simulation parameters are κ = 1 and J = 0.1.
3. Majority vote. The majority-vote model [2, 3] is a non-equilibrium spin model. Spins tend to
align with the neighborhood majority under the influence of noise with parameter Q quanti-
fying the probability of misalignment. In our simulations, we set Q = 0.3.
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4. Minority game. In the minority game model [4–8], each individual chooses the strategy
adopted by the minority of its neighbors with a higher probability than that for the major-
ity. The probability for node i to be 1 at the next time step is proportional to the number of its
0-state neighbors, ki − ni. We then have P 0→1i = (ki − ni)/ki and P 1→0i = ni/ki.
5. Voter and link-update voter. In the voter model [2,9], each node i adopts the state of one of its
randomly selected neighbors. If i is currently inactive (state 0), while there are ni neighbors
in the active state (state 1), it becomes active with the probability P 0→1i = ni/ki. An active
node i becomes inactive with the probability P 1→0i = (ki−ni)/ki. The voter model is similar
to the minority game model but with the definition of P 0→1i and P
1→0
i swapped.
The link-update voter model is a variant of the voter model [10, 11].
6. Language model. In the language model [12, 13], the 0 and 1 states stand for an individual’s
two primary choices of the language. The probability of switching language is proportional
to the fraction of the speakers in its neighborhood, raised to the power α and multiplied by
the status parameter s or 1− s of the respective language. In our simulations, we use α = 0.5
and s = 0.6.
7. Kirman ant colony model. In the model [14, 15], to choose between stock market trading
strategies, nodes move from the non-adopted state (state 0) to the adopted state (state 1) with
the probability P 0→1i = c1 + dni, where c1 represents the individual strategy, which is inde-
pendent of the influence of its neighbors. The parameter d quantifies the herding behavior,
whereby a non-adopted-state individual copies the strategy of their ni adopted-state neigh-
bors. A node i with ni of its ki neighbors in the adopted state has ki − ni neighbors in
the non-adopted state. Due to the herding effect, the probability for the transition from an
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adopted state to a non-adopted state is P 1→0i = c2 + d(ki − ni). In our simulations, we set
c1 = c2 = 0.1 and d = 10/N , where N is the network size.
8. SIS and CP. In the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) disease-spread model [?, 16,17], an
infected individual transmits disease to node i in its neighborhood with the probability λi. If
a susceptible node i has ni infected neighbors, the probability that it will be infected is P
0→1
i .
The recovery rate P 1→0i = µi is kept constant for node i. When simulating the SIS model,
all infected neighbors of node i affect i. In particular, for each infected neighbor, a random
number is drawn and checked if it is smaller than λi, and i gets infected if any of the random
number is smaller than λi. We thus have P
0→1
i = 1− (1−λ)ni , where the second term gives
the chance for i to remain susceptible.
For the contact process (CP) model [18, 19], at a time step, each node i randomly selects one
of its ki neighbors and check whether it is an infected node. If yes, it will transmit the disease
to i with the probability λi. Since the chance of getting an infected node selected is ni/ki,
the probability of infecting node i at the current time step is (ni/ki)λi.
9. Evolutionary game models: SG, SQ-SG, PDG, and SQ-PDG. The implementation of evolu-
tionary game dynamics, PDG [20–23] and SG [24], is slightly more complicated. In the PDG
model, the following two processes occur at each time step. (1) Game playing and payoffs.
Each agent plays the classical prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) with all its nearest neighbors,
and the total payoff is the sum of the payoffs gained in its two-player games with all the
connected agents. Each player may choose either to cooperate, C, or to defect, D, in a single
encounter. If both players choose C, both will get payoff R. If one defects while the other
cooperates, D gets T , while C gets S. If both defect, both get P , where T > R > P > S.
The PDG parameters in our work are chosen to be R = 1, T = b > 1, and S = P = 0 [20].
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(2) Strategy updating. At each time step, agent i randomly chooses a neighbor j and imi-
tates j’s strategy with the probability Pi→j = {1 + exp [−(Uj − Ui)/κ]}−1, where Ui and
Uj are the payoffs for agents i and j, and κ is the level of agents’ “rationality” representing
the uncertainties in assessing the best strategy. The only difference between PDG and SG
is the choice of the game parameter values. In SG, the parameters are chosen to be R = 1,
T = 1+r, S = 1−r, and P = 0, where 0 < r < 1. The probability that node i chooses to be
cooperative or defective at the next time step requires information about its neighbors’ states
and payoffs at the current time step. This violates the interdependency assumption underly-
ing a Markov network. It is thus difficult to analytically calculate the probabilities P 0→1i and
P 1→0i . We find, however, that the structure of this non-Markov network can be successfully
reconstructed by SDBM, a Markov network.
A self-questioning mechanism [25] can be introduced to ensure the interdependency proper-
ties of the Markov networks for PDG and SG. At the strategy updating stage, we define the
probability that a cooperative node i chooses a defective strategy at the next time step to be
P 0→1i = {1 + exp [−(UCi − UDi )/κ]}−1, where UCi and UDi are the payoffs obtained while
adopting the cooperative and defective strategies, respectively. The probability of choos-
ing a cooperative strategy is P 1→0i = 1 − P 0→1i . For PDG, we have UCi = ki − ni and
UDi = b(ki −ni). For SG, we have UCi = (ki−ni) + (1− r)ni and UDi = (1+ r)(ki−ni),
where ni denotes the number of defective neighbors. In our simulations, nodal states 0 and 1
denote cooperation and defection, respectively, and we set b = 1.2, r = 0.7, and κ = 2 for
all cases of the evolutionary game dynamics.
Supplementary Note 2: Model and real-world networks
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TABLE 6
Description of the 9 real-world networks used in our study (N - number of nodes; L - number of
edges).
Type Index Name N L Description
Trust
1 College Student [4, 5] 32 96 Social network
2 Prison Inmate [4, 5] 67 182 Social network
Protein
4 Protein-1 [5] 95 213 Protein network
5 Protein-2 [5] 53 123 Protein network
6 Protein-3 [5] 99 212 Protein network
Food Web
12 Seagrass [9] 49 226 Food Web
13 Grassland [10] 88 137 Food Web
14 Ythan [10] 135 601 Food Web
Circuits 3 s208a [6] 122 189 Logic circuit
Supplementary Table 7 lists the names, types, sizes of the real-world networks used for topology
reconstruction in the main text.
Supplementary Note 3: SDBM as a generative model for all types of dynamics
Supplemental Figs. 1-12 show the comparison between the conditional probabilities of the orig-
inal system and of the approximator using its self-generated state configuration time series for all
types of dynamics studied except for the non-Markovian classic PDG and SG, whose conditional
probability time series are difficult to compute. We observe that in about half of the cases, namely,
SDBM itself, Ising Glauber, SQ-SG, SQ-PDG, the Kirman model, CP, and SIS, the reconstructed
SDBM approximators are capable of serving as a generative model of the original time series data,
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Fig. 50. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the Ap-
proximator Using Its Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series for SDBM Dynamics. The
conditional probability P [xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)] time series generated by the original system from
the original state configuration time series (a,c) and by the SDBM approximator from the state con-
figuration time series produced by itself (b,d) for ER random (a,b) and BA scale-free (c,d) topology.
(e,f) The mean and standard deviations of p = P [xi(t + 1) = 1|XRi (t)] for each node i for all
time steps for ER random (e) and BA scale-free (f) networks obtained from the original system (red
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Fig. 51. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the Approx-
imator Using Its Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series for Ising Glauber (IS) Dynamics.
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Fig. 52. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the Approx-
imator Using Its Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series for Self-Questioning Snowdrift
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Fig. 53. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the Approx-
imator Using Its Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series for Self-Questioning Prisoner’s
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Fig. 54. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the Ap-
proximator Using Its Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series for Minority Game (MG)
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Fig. 55. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the Approxi-
mator Using Its Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series for Voter (VT) Dynamics. Legends
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Fig. 56. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the Approxi-
mator Using Its Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series for Majority Vote (MV) Dynamics.
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Fig. 57. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the Ap-
proximator Using Its Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series for Link-Update Voter (LV)
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Fig. 58. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the Ap-
proximator Using Its Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series for Language Model (LM).
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Fig. 59. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the Ap-
proximator Using Its Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series for Kirman (KM) Dynamics.
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Fig. 60. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the Approx-
imator Using Its Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series for Contact Process (CP) Model.
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Fig. 61. Comparison Between the Conditional Probabilities of the Original System and the Ap-
proximator Using Its Self-Generated State Configuration Time Series for Susceptible-Infected-
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THE PARADOX OF CONTROLLING COMPLEX NETWORKS: CONTROL INPUTS
VERSUS ENERGY REQUIREMENT
Supplementary Note 1: Analytical calculation of the in- and out-degree distributions
The in- and out-degree distributions of a directed complex network under connection bias prob-
ability λ ≡ Pb can be obtained analytically.
Defining kS and kL to be the numbers of nodes in the neighborhood of a node with degree k,
































〈k〉(γ − 2) . (B.3)
Therefore,
kS = k − kL. (B.4)
We then have
kout = λkS+(1−λ)kL = λ(k−kL)+(1−λ)kL = (1−2λ)kL+λk = (1−2λ)Ak3−γ+λk, (B.5)
and
kin = (1− λ)kS + λkL = (1− λ)k + (2λ− 1)Ak3−γ .
The quantities P (kout) and P (kin) can be derived from
P (kout) dkout = P (k) dk and P (kin) dkin = P (k) dk, (B.6)
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which yield
P (kout) = P (k)
dk
dkout




Setting k = f−11 (kout) and k = f
−1
2 (kin), we can obtain the distributions.
Using
kout = f1(k) and kin = f2(k),
we obtain



















In general, it is difficult to obtain an explicit expression. However, for some specific values of λ or
γ, analytical results are available.
Case I: λ = 0.5.
In this case, we have





k = 2kout = 2kin. (B.11)
Thus
P (kout) = 2P (2kout) = 2C(2kout)
−γ = 21−γCk−γout .
Akin to P (kout), we have
P (kin) = P (kout) = 2
1−γCk−γin .
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Case II: λ = 0.
kout = Ak





































Case III: λ = 1.
kin = Ak














Case IV: γ = 3. For example, for BA model, we have
kout = (1− 2λ)A+ λk, (B.15)
and
k =
kout + (2λ− 1)A
λ
. (B.16)
P (kout) = C
(


















kin + (1− 2λ)A
1− λ , (B.18)
so
P (kin) = C
[
kin + (1− 2λ)A
1− λ
]−γ 1
1− λ = C(1− λ)
γ−1[kin + (1− 2λ)kmin]−γ . (B.19)
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Supplementary Note 2: Additional numerical results
2.1 Condition number and control error.
The correlation between the condition number CW and the control error eX is shown in Sup-
plementary Fig. 62. We observe that, within a certain range of CW , an approximate scaling relation
exists between CW and eX , shown in panels (a), (c), (e), and (g). However, the scaling disappears
outside the shown CW range. The reason is that, outside the CW range, the Gramian matrix W is
ill conditioned, leading to considerable errors when computing the matrix inverse. In principle, the
scaling regime can be extended with improved computational precision, but not indefinitely.
2.2 More on structural and practical controllability measures.
Supplementary Figure 63 shows the measure of the structural controllability, nD, and the mea-
sure of the practical controllability, P (C¯W ), versus Pb for ER random and BA scale-free networks
of size N = 200. We see that the structural and practical controllability cannot be simultaneously
optimized irrespective of the network size.
2.3 More on control energy power law distribution.
Supplementary Figure 64 shows the robustness of the control energy power-law distribution
against varying network size for both random [(a)] and scale-free [(b)] topology.
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Fig. 62. Condition Number CW Versus Control Error eX for Random and Scale-Free Networks.
Network size is N = 100 for (a-d) and 200 for (e-h), average degree is 〈k〉 = 6 for ER random
networks [(a),(b),(e), and (f)] and 8 for BA scale-free networks [(c), (d), (g), and (h)]. Directional
link probability between any pair of nodes is Pb = 0.1. Panels (a),(c),(e), and (g) show the scaling
relation between the condition number CW and control error eX . Panels (b), (d), (f), and (h) show
the fractionRCW of the networks with a certain CW number. The scaling relation holds within some
CW -eX region with boundaries specified as the black dashed lines. The eX values are not physically
meaningful outside the boundaries that are defined according to the precision limit of computation.
The thresholds of CW and eX used in the computations are 10
12 and 10−4, respectively, which
are indicated as the blue dashed lines. The threshold values are chosen to lie within the physical
boundaries so that the calculations for all CW values are meaningful.
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Fig. 63. Practical Controllability Measures for Directed Networks. Measure of the practical con-
trollability, P (C¯W ), for (a) ER random networks and (b) BA scale-free networks of size N = 200.


























Fig. 64. Distributions of Control Energy for Practically Controllable Networks Under Different
Network Sizes. Panels (a) and (b) are for random networks with 〈k〉 = 6 and scale-free networks
with 〈k〉 = 8, respectively, for two values of the network size (N = 100 and N = 200), where we
set C¯W = 10
12 and tf = 1. In all cases, we observe an algebraic (power-law) scaling behavior.
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Supplementary Note 3: Control Energy of One-Dimensional String
As shown in Supplementary Fig. 65, the energy required to control a unidirectional 1D string
nearly overlaps with that of a bidirectional one with identical weights. In fact, if the chains are not
too long, the relative difference in the energy between the two case are within the same order of
magnitude. Here we provide an analytical calculation of the control energy for a bidirectional 1D
chain network.
The energy E is given by
E(tf) = x
T
0 ·H−1 · x0, (B.20)
where H ≡ e−Atf · W · e−AT tf , x0 is the initial state of the network, and W is the Gramian
matrix. Note that x0 can have arbitrary values but fixed after initial time. We stress that, again,
for the dicussion in this paper, x0 is an arbitrary but fixed value. Since H is positive definite and
symmetric, its inverse H−1 can be decomposed in terms of its eigenvectors as H−1 = QΛQT ,
where Q = [q1, q2, . . . , qN ] is composed of the orthonormal eigenvectors that satisfy QQ
T =
QTQ = I , and Λ = diag{λ1, λ2, . . . , λN} is the diagonal eigenvalue matrix of H−1 in descending











2 ≈ λ1(qT1 x0)2. (B.21)
Since x0 can be chosen arbitrarily, in rare cases, for example, if we set x0 = q1, then Eq. (B.21)
becomes
E(tf) ≈ λ1(qT1 q1)2 = λ1. (B.22)
For an undirected network, the adjacency matrix A is positive definite and symmetric. We can
decompose A into the form A = V SV T , where the columns of V constitute the orthonormal eigen-
vectors of A and S = diag{s1, s2, . . . , sN} is the diagonal eigenvalue matrix of A in descending
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order. We thus have H = e−AtfWe−A
T tf = V e−StfV TWV e−StfV T . Let
ΛH = diag{λH1 , λH2 , . . . , λHN } = diag{1/λN , 1/λN−1, . . . , 1/λ1}
be the eigenvalue matrix of H in descending order. The energy can thus be expressed as
E(tf) ≈ λ1(qT1 x0)2 = λ−1HN (qT1 x0)2.
Letting ΛW = diag{λW1 , λW2 , . . . , λWN} be the eigenvalue matrix of W in descending order.
We can approximate the eigenvalue ofH byW , which has been numerically validated: ΛH ≈ ΛW .
We thus have
ε ≈ λ1(qT1 x0)2 = λ−1HN (q
T
1 x0)




Since orthonormal transform does not alter the eigenvalues of a given matrix, we have ΛH =
e−StfΛW e
−Stf .
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, i, j = 1, . . . , N. (B.25)
Recall that H = V e−Stf(
∫ tf
0 e
StV TBBTV eSt dt)e−StfV T . Substituting this in Eqs. (B.24) and






















with θ = π/(N + 1), j, k = 1, · · · , N .
As a result, we have S = diag{2cos( πN+1 ), 2cos( 2πN+1 ), ..., 2cos( NπN+1 )}. The minimum eigen-










)tfλWN = 1/λ1. (B.27)




≤ λP1 , (B.28)
where y = [y1, y2, . . . , yN ]
T is an arbitrary nonzero column vector, λPN and λP1 are the maximal
and minimal eigenvalues of P , respectively. Letting T = 2tf, we have



































































Fig. 65. Comparison Between Energies Required to Control a Unidirectional and a Bidirectional 1D
Chains: (a) energies required to control a unidirectional chain Euni (red) and a bidirectional one Ebi
(blue) versus chain length L, and (b) the relative energy difference |Euni − Ebi|/Euni versus chain
length L.
with 〈f, g〉 ≡ ∫ T0 fg dτ .
Letting bj = e




















we have btj = qj(t)+[− cos(jθ)]N ·(tNj /N !). Consequently, the numerator in the Rayleigh quotient
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Since y = [y1, y2, . . . , yN ]
T is an arbitrary nonzero column vector, for each N and T , we can
choose y = ym insofar as K1 and K2 are relatively small compared with K3. We can normalize
















where λPN is the smallest eigenvalue of P . Recall that P is symmetric and positive definite, using
Cholesky decompostion we can obtain its factorization [1] as P = LLT , where L is the lower
triangular matrix with its diagonal filled with square roots of eigenvalues of P . Therefore, Eq. (B.26)
can be written as H = 1N+1VWLL
TWV T . Since orthonormal transform does not change the
eigenvalues of a matrix, H has the same eigenvalues as R = 1N+1WLL
TW = 1N+1WL(WL)
T .
Suppose ΛP = diag{λP1 , λP2 , . . . , λPN } is the diagonal eigenvalue matrix of P in descending









where j and k run from 1 to n. Therefore, assuming that x0 is arbitrary and fixed, the control energy
E(tf) can then be approximated as






































Fig. 66. Correlation Between Network Control Energy and the Smallest Eigenvalue of H-Matrix.
Network size is N = 100, directional link probability between any pair of nodes is Pb = 0.1, and
average degree is (a) 〈k〉 = 6 for ER random networks and (b) 〈k〉 = 8 for BA sale-free networks.
Supplementary Note 4: Correlation between network control energy and smallest eigen-
value of H-matrix
Strong correlation between the average network control energy, 〈E〉, and the smallest eigenvalue
of the H-matrix, λ−1HN , for ER random and BA scale-free networks can be observed in Supplemen-
tary Fig. 66, indicating that the network control energy is essentially determined by the smallest
eigenvalue of its H-matrix.
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Supplementary Note 5: LCC-skeleton and double-chain interaction models
5.1 LCC-skeleton model.
Referring to Fig. 4 in the main text, we assume that the control chains are independent of each
other so that E2 is negligible as compared with E1. Each control chain is effectively a 1D string.
Due to the exponential increase in energy via chain length increment, E1 can be regarded as the sum
of control energies associated with the set of unidirectional 1D strings, to which the contribution of
the LCC dominates. The required energy to control the full network can thus be approximated as
that required to control all LCCs,
E = E1 + E2 ≈ E1 ≈ m · EL ≈ m · λ−1HL , (B.34)
where EL denotes the energy required to control an LCC, λHL is the smallest eigenvalue of the
LCC’sH matrixHL, andm denotes the degeneracy (multiplicity) of the LCC, as shown in Fig. 4(b)
in the main text. Results presented in Fig. 3(b) of the main text demonstrate a positive correlation
between E andm ·EL, reinforcing the idea the independent LCCs are the key topological structure
dictating the energy required to control the whole network. In particular, if a network contains long
LCCs (as can be determined straightforwardly by maximum matching from the structural control-
lability theory [2]), there is high likelihood that it cannot be practically controlled as practically the
required energy would diverge.
Reasoning from an alternative standpoint, an arbitrary combination of DC and m effectively
represents a network, as shown in Fig. 4(b) in the main text, and the entire network ensemble
can be represented by the ensemble of all possible combinations of LCCs. In the LCC ensemble,
the quantities DC and m emerge according to their probability density functions, PDC(DC) and
Pm(m), respectively, and the appearance of an arbitrary pair of DC and m is determined by their
joint probability density function P (DC,m). Consequently, the distribution of the energy required
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to control the original network can be characterized accurately by the distribution of the energy
required to control the LCC skeleton in the corresponding ensemble.
Supplementary Figure 67(a) shows the distribution of the control diameter DC, essentially the
length distribution of LCCs. The probability density function decays approximately exponentially
withDC, so we write
PDC(DC) = a · e−b·DC , (B.35)
where a and b are positive constants. Using the relationship between EL and DC [e.g., Fig. 3(a) in
the main text], we have




























In the ER random network ensemble, the probability density of LCC degeneracy m for networks
withDC > 2 also exhibits an exponential decay, as shown in Supplementary Fig. 67(b):
Pm(m) = c · e−g·m, (B.38)
where c and d are positive constants.
Since the control energy depends monotonously on the control diameter DC, the energy depen-
dence onm can be revealed by examining the correlation between DC andm, which can in general
be either positive or negative. From Eq. (B.38), we see that Pm(m) increases exponentially withm,
implying a positive correlation:
DC = s1 + s2 ·m, (B.39)
where s1 and s2 are positive constants. This form of relation ensures that Pm(m) has the form in
Eq. (B.38). Positive correlation, however, means that the number of LCCs increases with its length,
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Fig. 67. Probability Distribution of Control Diameter and Its Degeneracy. (a) Distribution of DC
(blue) and the probability that an LCC of lengthDC appears in the random network ensemble versus
DC. (b) Probability distribution of LCC-degeneracy m for networks with DC > 2.
which is unphysical for random networks. These arguments suggest that a contradiction can arise
if we assume either positive or negative correlation between DC and m. A natural resolution is
that these two quantities are independent of each other. Since EL, the energy required to control
a chain of length L, is determined mainly by the control diameter DC, EL and m can be assumed
to be independent of each other so that their joint probability density function can be expressed as
P (EL,m) ≈ PL(EL) · Pm(m).
Having obtained PL(EL) and Pm(m), we can calculate the cumulative probability distribution
function of the estimated control energy E = m · EL required to control the original network. We
have

























, gE)] · (gE)− bB },
where Γ( bB ) and Γ(
b
B , gE) are the Gamma and incomplete Gamma function, respectively. Thus,
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, gE)] · (gE)−(1+ bB )}, (B.41)
where the first term −e−gE/E can be neglected due to the typically large value of E. Since we ob-
serve numerically that the difference between the two Gamma functions is approximately constant:
h(Γ) ≡ Γ( bB )− Γ( bB , gE) ≈ 1.7, we can simplify Eq. (B.41) as










) · hΓ] is a positive constant. Equation (B.42) indicates a power-law
distribution of the control energy, providing an analytical explanation to the numerically discovered
energy distribution for practically controllable networks, as exemplified in Fig. 3 in the main text.
To get a rough idea about the value of the power-law scaling exponent, say we takeB ≈ 2 and b ≈ 1
(typical numerical values). A theoretical estimate of the power-law exponent is thus 1+ b/B ≈ 1.5,
which is consistent with the value obtained from results from direct numerical simulation. The fact
that the distribution of EL is power law with the identical exponent provides additional support for
our assumption that the LCC degeneracy m plays little role in determining the control energy. It is
the combination of the exponential decay in the probability distribution of the control diameter [cf.,
Eq. (B.35)] and the exponential increase in the energy required to control LCC with its length [cf.,
Eq. (B.36)] that gives rise to the power-law energy distribution of the LCCs, which ultimately leads
to the power-law distribution in the actual energy required to control the original random network.
We see that the control diameter of a network is a key quantity determining the required control
energy. The topological diameter, on the other hand, is a fundamental quantity characterizing, for
example, the small-world structure of the network [3]. An interesting issue concerns the relation
between the control and topological diameters. In particular, if the network has a large diameter,
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does it mean that its control diameter must be large as well? This issue has been addressed, with the
finding that there is little correlation between the two types of diameters.
5.2 Double-chain interaction model.
Our analysis of the LCC-skeleton model predicts power-law distribution of the required en-
ergy for practically controllable networks, which agrees qualitatively with numerics. However, in
the model interactions among the coexisting chains are ignored. In a physical system, interactions
among the basic components usually plays an important role in determining the system’s properties.
To obtain a more accurate estimate of the behaviors of the control energy, we need to include the in-
teractions among the chains. The necessity is further justified as there are discrepancies between the
actual control energy and that from the LCC-skeleton model, as exemplified in Fig. 3(b) in the main
text. In particular, there is an approximately continuous distribution in the energy required to control
the actual network, but the distribution of the energy from the LCC-skeleton model tends to aggre-
gate into a number of subintervals, each corresponding to a certain value of the control diameter
associated with an LCC. Thus, in order to reproduce the numerically obtained energy distributions,
we must incorporate the interactions among the LCCs into the model. However, including the inter-
actions makes analysis difficult, as there are typically a large number of interacting pairs of chains.
To gain insight into the role played by the interactions, it is useful to focus on the relatively simple
case of two interacting chains.
Our double-chain interaction model is constructed, as follows. Consider two identical unidi-
rectional chains, denoted by C1 and C2, each of length DC. Every node in C1 connects with
every node in C2 with probability p, all links between the two chains are unidirectional. A link
points to C2 from C1 with probability p1→2 and the probability for a link in the opposite direc-
tion is p2→1 = 1 − p1→2. By changing the connection rate p and the directional bias p1→2, we
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Fig. 68. Distribution of control energy in a double-chain interaction models. (a) Two chains of
DC = 5 (red) andDC = 6 (black), where the upper panel is a schematic illustration of two LCCs of
identical length DC = 5 interacting with each other via some random links (green) between them.
(b) Two chains with their lengths randomly chosen from 3 − 6, where the upper panel shows the
case of two interacting chains of length 5 and 3. The longer chain (red) plays the role of LCC, while
the shorter chain is a non-LCC (orange).
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can simulate and characterize various interaction patterns between the two chains. To be concrete,
we generate an ensemble of 10000 interacting double-chain networks, each with 2 ·DC nodes and
multiple randomized interchain links as determined by the parameters p and p1→2. As shown in
Supplementary Fig. 68(a), the distribution of the control energy displays a remarkable similarity to
that for random networks, in that a power-law scaling behavior emerges with the exponent about
1.5. A striking result is that the energy distributions from the double-chain interaction model are
much more smooth than those from the LCC-skeleton model, indicating the key role played by the
interchain interactions in spreading out the control energies that are clustered when the interactions
are absent. The power-law distribution holds robustly with respect to variations in the parameters p
and p1→2. In addition, to reveal the role of the interaction between an LCC and a non-LCC chain
in the control energy, we randomly pick their lengths from [3, 6] with equal probability, where the
longer chain acts as an LCC. Again, we observe a strong similarity between the energy distributions
from random networks and from this model, as shown in Supplementary Fig. 68(b), suggesting a
universal pattern followed by pair interactions, regardless of the length of the chains. In particular,
interactions between two chains, LCC or not, have similar effect on the control-energy distribu-
tion. These results indicate that the double-chain interaction model captures the essential physical
ingredients of the energy distribution in controlling complex networks.
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Supplementary Note 6: Energy optimization of a cascade parallel R-C circuit network
6.1 Network representation of a circuit system
We consider a cascade parallel R-C circuit consisting of three identical resistors and capacitors
as an example to illustrate how the circuit can be abstracted into a directed network, as shown in
Supplementary Fig. 69. For convenience, we setR1 = R2 = R3 = R and C1 = C2 = C3 = C , and
denote the currents through R1, R2, and R3 as i1(t) , i2(t), and i3(t), respectively. The equations
of the circuit are 

u(t) = i1(t)R+ u1(t)
u1(t) = i2(t)R + u2(t)
u2(t) = i3(t)R + u3(t)
C du1(t)dt = i1(t)− i2(t)
C du2(t)dt = i2(t)− i3(t)
C du3(t)dt = i3(t)
(B.43)
After some algebraic manipulation, we have

du1(t)
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Fig. 69. Controlling and Optimizing a Cascade Parallel R-C Circuit and the Corresponding Network
Presentation. (a) A cascade parallel R-C circuit with 3 resistors (R1, R2, and R3, each of resistance
1Ω) and 3 capacitors (C1, C2, and C3, each of capacitance 1F), where u(t) is the external input
voltage, u1(t), u2(t), and u3(t) are the voltages on the capacitors C1,C2, and C3, respectively, i1(t),
i2(t), and i3(t) are the currents through the resistors R1, R2, and R3, respectively. (b) Network
representation of the circuit in (a). (c) Circuit with an extra external current input ie(t) into the
capacitor C2. (d) The extra external current input ie(t) serves as a redundant control input injected
into node 2 of the network in (b). There are two driver nodes (yellow) in the network: 1 and 3.
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is the control input matrix. The circuit has then been transferred into a 3-node bidirectional 1D
chain network with adjacency matrix A.
6.2 The implementation of extra control input
Without loss of generality, we inject an extra external current input ie(t) into the capacitor C2,
and the circuit equations become:

u(t) = i1(t)R + u1(t)
u1(t) = i2(t)R+ u2(t)
u2(t) = i3(t)R+ u3(t)
C du1(t)dt = i1(t)− i2(t)
C du2(t)dt = i2(t)− i3(t) + ie(t)
C du3(t)dt = i3(t)
(B.49)
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is the control input matrix of the circuit under the original control input u(t) on node 1 and a
redundant control input ie(t) to node 2. Similarly, the redundant control input can be injected into
any capacitor.
It is necessary to keep all other nodes unaffected while introducing exactly one extra control
input into the circuit. However, any additional voltage change in any part of the circuit can lead to
voltage changes on all the capacitors. A change in the current through a capacitor will not affect the
currents in other components of the network, since only the time derivative of its voltage is affected.
Thus, a meaningful way to introduce an extra control signal input to one node of a circuit’s network
is to inject current into one particular capacitor in the circuit.
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Supplementary Note 7: The practical controllability of real-world networks
Supplementary Table 7 lists the names and types of the real-world networks studied and Sup-
plementary Table 8 presents more detailed information about the controllability of the 18 real-world
networks analyzed in the main text.
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TABLE 7
Description of the 18 real-world networks used in the paper (N - number of nodes; M - number of
edges).
Type Index Name N M Description
Trust
1 College Student [4, 5] 32 96 Social network
2 Prison Inmate [4, 5] 67 182 Social network
Circuits
3 s208a [6] 122 189 Logic circuit
4 s420a [6] 252 399 Logic circuit
5 s838a [6] 512 189 Logic circuit
Citation
6 Small World [3] 233 1988 Stanley Milgram
7 Kohonen [7] 3772 96 T. Kohonen
Protein
8 Protein-1 [5] 95 213 Protein network
9 Protein-2 [5] 53 123 Protein network
10 Protein-3 [5] 99 212 Protein network
Food Web
11 St. Martin [8] 45 224 Food Web
12 Seagrass [9] 49 226 Food Web
13 Grassland [10] 88 137 Food Web
14 Ythan [10] 135 601 Food Web
15 Silwood [11] 154 370 Food Web
16 Little Rock [12] 183 2494 Food Web
17 Baydry [13] 128 2137 Food Web
18 Florida [13] 128 2106 Food Web
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TABLE 8
Practical controllability of real-world networks studied in Ref. [2], where ND denotes the number
of controllers as determined by the structural controllability theory andM⋆ is the number of
augmented driver nodes needed to make the network practically controllable. The densities of the
original driver nodes and withM⋆ augmented drivers included are nD = ND/N and
n⋆D = N
⋆
D /N , respectively, where N
⋆
D = ND +M
⋆; n⋆D is the new measure of controllability; and
E⋆ denotes the new energy.






Coll. Student 32 6 0 0.19 0.19 7.9× 1010
Prison Inmate 67 9 27 0.13 0.54 2.3× 107
Electronic
Circuits
s208a 122 29 40 0.24 0.57 2.3× 107
s420a 252 59 71 0.23 0.52 2.6× 106
s838a 512 119 81 0.23 0.39 4.1× 109
Citation
Small World 233 140 11 0.60 0.65 2.0× 103
Kohonen 3772 2114 413 0.56 0.67 9.4× 104
Protein
Protein-1 95 48 19 0.51 0.71 1.9× 1010
Protein-2 53 13 0 0.25 0.25 3.7× 109
Protein-3 99 22 35 0.22 0.58 3.9× 105
Food
Web
St. Martin 45 14 9 0.31 0.51 2.7× 103
Seagrass 49 13 7 0.27 0.4l 3.6× 103
Grassland 88 46 0 0.52 0.52 3.4× 105
Ythan 135 69 14 0.51 0.62 2.6× 103
Silwood 154 116 12 0.75 0.83 1.5× 104
Little Rock 183 99 36 0.54 0.74 5.4× 103
Baydry 128 62 34 0.48 0.75 1.7× 103
Florida 128 30 69 0.23 0.77 NaN
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TABLE 9
In addition to Table 8, when an additional control signal is added to the middle of each LCC
[strategy (I)] so thatM⋆mid extra control inputs are used, the control energy is E
⋆
mid. For
comparison, we useM⋆mid randomly chosen extra driver nodes and calculate the required control
energy E⋆R-mid. We also test another strategy in which an extra control signal is applied to each of
them convergent nodes of all LCCs [strategy (II)], in whichM⋆end additional control inputs are
used. The control energy required is denoted as E⋆end, with E
⋆
R-end being the control energy when
the same number of additional controllers are chosen randomly. All energies are result of averaging
over 1000 combinations of initial and final states. The control diameter DC of each network is
listed in the last column. (See Supplementary Table 7 for detailed description of the 18 networks.)












Coll. Student 3 2.5× 105 2.4 × 107 4 7.3 × 104 2.7× 107 4
Prison Inmate 1 4.6× 103 2.2 × 107 1 9.7 × 104 1.8× 107 5
Electronic
Circuits
s208a 1 3.0× 105 1.8 × 107 1 4.0 × 105 2.3× 107 5
s420a 11 2.1× 105 1.3 × 106 10 2.2 × 105 1.5× 106 4
s838a 13 3.1× 106 3.7 × 109 6 3.7 × 106 3.7× 109 5
Citation
Small World 1 1.9× 103 1.9 × 103 1 1.9 × 103 1.8× 103 5
Kohonen 49 4.0× 104 9.0 × 104 37 5.1 × 104 9.0× 104 3
Protein
Protein-1 7 8.5× 102 1.9 × 109 5 2.2 × 103 1.3× 105 3
Protein-2 2 9.0× 108 1.3 × 109 2 1.2 × 109 2.0× 109 4
Protein-3 3 5.1× 104 3.1 × 105 3 5.3 × 104 3.6× 105 4
Food
Web
St. Martin 2 9.2× 102 2.0 × 103 2 1.5 × 103 1.6× 103 3
Seagrass 3 8.3× 102 9.8 × 102 2 3.4 × 103 2.4× 103 3
Grassland 1 8.6× 104 3.3 × 105 1 9.2 × 104 3.4× 105 4
Ythan 4 1.9× 103 2.0 × 103 2 2.0 × 103 2.3× 103 3
Silwood 3 1.0× 103 1.8 × 104 2 9.9 × 102 1.2× 104 3
Little Rock 48 3.6× 103 3.6 × 103 48 3.6 × 103 3.6× 103 2
Baydry 32 9.6× 102 9.6 × 102 48 9.6 × 102 9.6× 102 2
Florida 1 NaN NaN 1 NaN NaN 3240
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